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 Vertical coordination through contracts between farmers and other stages of the 
agro food chain have been of growing importance in US agriculture. Production contract 
arrangements between contractors and individual growers have been one of the major 
vehicles of this emerging system of vertical coordination. Despite the unprecedented 
success of production contracts as claimed by many through risk reduction, income 
stabilization, use of improved managerial inputs, and know-how transfer from contractors 
to growers, contract growers dissatisfied with existing contract payments complain that 
contractors are extracting too much of contract benefits while growers gain only small, or 
even negative, returns from contract production. Thus, measuring growers’ gains from 
contracting, and understanding what determines the returns to contracting, is important 
for evaluating the policy issues associated with contracting in agriculture. This study 
examines hog growers’ gains from contracting and explores the distribution of the gains 
from contracting among contract hog growers.  
 The purpose of this dissertation is threefold. The first purpose is to review the 
major issues that have been examined in the literature on principal-agent theory, with 
special attention to the issues that are important in the agricultural sector in general and 
hog production in particular. Some further extensions of the basic theories are developed 
to enable solving the empirical puzzles. Some implications for agents’ gains from 
contracting in both static and dynamic settings are derived. Related discussion shows 
how hog contracts relate to standard principal-agent theories. The main finding is that for 
the most plausible information structure, that is, when growers have partial but better 
knowledge of their ability than contractors, some low ability growers with below average 
productivity receive negative gains from contracting on average. This conclusion holds 
even when renegotiation-proof long-term contracts are in place for each ability 
distribution. In contrast, none of the growers receives negative gains from contracting 
when they have complete knowledge of their ability before signing the contract.    
 The second purpose is an explicit theoretical modeling of hog contracts to 
theoretically analyze optimal incentive structures for hog contracts. A principal-agent 
model allowing reservation profit to vary with ability is developed to explore whether 
some contract growers receive negative gains from contracting on average. The results of 
this theoretical development suggest a rich set of alternative conditions where negative 
 
average gains from contracting are possible for growers with below average productivity 
of any particular ability level discernible by the contractor. These losses are likely to be 
repeated under long-term contracting when ability is a permanent random draw for the 
grower that is different than expected. Even low-ability growers with above average 
productivity can experience an ex post loss from contracting.  
 The third purpose of this dissertation is to test the main theoretical findings on 
contract growers’ gains from contracting using revealed preference data from the well-
known Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) for 2004. In order to do this, 
contract growers’ gains from contracting are measured using standard impact evaluation 
methods. By going beyond typical estimation of how contracting affects average 
growers’ profits, estimates are developed to show how high-profit growers are affected 
differently from low-profit growers, and whether some growers are worse off with 
contracting. The results are especially relevant for policy analysis regarding hog 
contracting because it shows what share of contract growers lose from contracting and 
identifies their characteristics. The impact distribution of contract growers’ gains is also 
explored using quantile regression. The estimated growers’ gains from contracting are 
then used to evaluate theoretical predictions of the hog model.  
 The main empirical findings of this research can be summarized as follows. First, 
both risk reduction and limited credit are important motivations for hog contracting. 
Second, the sorting effect is positive, implying that contract growers tend (because of the 
effect of unobservables) to choose contracting because of a comparative advantage in 
doing so. A positive selection bias is estimated, which tends to give contract growers a 
comparative disadvantage from independent operation. Third, high ability growers earn 
higher profits on average than low ability growers as predicted by the hog contracting 
model. Fourth, the mean effect of contracting for contract growers (ATET) is positive for 
all contract growers. However, when contract growers are divided into quartiles by size, 
the ATET is positive only for the lower three quartiles whereas it is negative for the 
highest. Fifth, the ATET decrease over quantiles of the profit distribution for contract 
growers and the ATNT decreases over quantiles of the profit distribution for independent 
growers. Sixth, one third of the contract growers receive negative gains from contracting. 
Below average productivity growers lose from contracting as predicted by the hog 
contracting model.  Seventh, the mean effect of contracting for independent growers 
(ATNT) is negative. Eighth, the ATET exceeds the ATNT, meaning that independent 
growers would gain less than contract growers had they contracted.  Ninth, contract and 
independent growers are different with respect to the productivity of the variable factors 
of production but unilateral technological superiority of one group to the other is not 
found. Finally, the results suggest that small growers will be forced either to exit the hog 
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 Vertical coordination through contracts between farmers and other stages of the 
agro food chain have been of growing importance in US agriculture. Production contract 
arrangements between contractors, often referred to as integrators, and individual growers 
have been one of the major vehicles of this emerging system of vertical coordination. 
Even though the number of farms using contracts in US agriculture grew slowly from 6 
percent in 1969 to 11 percent in 2001, the increase in the share of the value of production 
under contracts grew from 12 percent in 1969, to 28 percent in 1991 and 36 percent in 
2001 (MacDonald et al, 2004).   
Although most of the value of the contracted production was produced under 
marketing contracts, the share of contracted value under production contracts was 
remarkable. The share of the value of production under production contracts went up 
from 10.6 percent in 1996-97  to 17.5 percent in 2003 (MacDonald and Korb, 2006).  
The share of poultry and eggs produced under production contracts was 92.3 percent in 
2001-2002 (MacDonald and Korb, 2006). The share of hogs produced under production 
contracts had reached 50.4 percent by 2003 (MacDonald and Korb, 2006). This growing 
share of the value of production under production contracts in agriculture has raised 
growing concern from various quarters about the impact of contracting on the parties, 
particularly on the growers.   
Some have argued that production contracts have benefited growers by reducing 
risk and stabilizing income with low capital requirements (Rhodes, 1989; Rhodes and 
Grimes, 1992; Johnson and Foster, 1994; Knoeber and Thurman, 1995; USDA, 1996; 
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Martin, 1997; Vukina and Foster, 1998). Some have pointed out that contract 
production appears to have aided expanding broiler and hog operations by providing the 
capital necessary for operations of unprecedented size (Kliebenstein and Lawrence, 
1995). In addition, contracting appears to raise farm productivity by promoting growers 
use of improved managerial inputs, and by transferring know-how from contractors to 
growers rapidly (Just, Mitra, and Netanyahu, 2005). Others argue that contracting raises 
farm productivity through technology adoption facilitated by growers’ easy access to 
credit (McBride and Key, 2003).   
Despite the unprecedented success of production contracts as claimed by many, 
an increasing number of dissatisfied contract growers are complaining about specific 
features of the contracts in place in recent years (Vukina, 2003). Many contract-growers, 
dissatisfied with existing contract payments, complain that contractors are extracting too 
much of contract benefits while growers gain only small, or even negative, returns from 
contract production (Kolmer et al. 1963; Aho, 1988; Morison, 1996a and 1996b; 
Guebert, 1996; Russell, 1996; Lipton, 1997). Concerns have been raised about the 
bargaining power disparity in contractual arrangements that goes against the growers’ 
interest. Concerns have also been raised about the risk shifting implication of large asset-
specific investments by contract growers in broiler and hog operations. The loss of 
transparency in transactions because of the confidentiality clauses that limit potential 
contract growers from evaluating and negotiating contract terms raises concerns (Iowa 
Department of Justice, 2001). State and federal lawmakers are taking such concerns 
seriously and moving forward to exert concerted efforts to place some legal constraints 
on the type of contracts that both the parties can sign (Vukina, 2003).  
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 Nonetheless, few investigative attempts have been made to confirm or reject 
such claims by contract growers or to quantify the distribution of growers’ gains from 
contracting. Measuring growers’ gains from contracting and understanding what 
determines the returns to contracting is important for evaluating the policy issues 
associated with contracting in agriculture. This study is examines hog growers’ gains 




          The typical production contract is an agreement between a contractor (also called 
an integrator) and a farmer detailing specific farmer and contractor responsibilities for 
production inputs and practices, as well as a mechanism for determining payment. 
According to many livestock production contracts, the grower cares for the animals, and 
usually provides land, labor, housing, utilities, and other operating expenses, such as 
repairs and maintenance. The contractor provides feed, veterinary supplies and services, 
and young animals. Expenses for fuel and litter can be shared or paid by either party, 
depending on the nature of the contract. Typically, the contractor also owns and operates 
hatcheries, feed mills, and a processing plant, and provides transportation of feed and live 
animals (Tsoulouhas and Vukina, 2001; Knoeber, 1989). Contractors rather than 
farmers often retain ownership of the commodity during the production process and 
marketing of the products.  
 According to Tsoulouhas and Vukina (2001), nearly all livestock production 
contracts have a fairly similar payment structure, taking the form of a two-part piece rate 
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tournament or a fixed performance standard. A two-part piece rate tournament consists of 
a fixed base payment per pound of live meat produced and a variable bonus payment 
based on the grower’s performance relative to other growers. Performance is largely 
driven by the effectiveness with which growers convert feed to live meat. Often, the 
performance is measured by the so-called settlement cost, which is obtained by 
combining feed with other contractor’s costs (animals to be grown, medication, etc) 
divided by the total pounds of live weight produced. The relative performance is 
determined by comparing the individual grower’s performance with the group average 
for a given flock of animals in the same area. For a feed-conversion ratio below average 
(that is, for above-average performance) the grower receives a positive amount over the 
base payment and for a feed-conversion ratio above average (that is, for below average 
performance) the grower receives a penalty (Tsoulouhas and Vukina, 2001; Knoeber, 
1989). 
 A second type of grower remuneration approach is a two-part piece rate based on 
a fixed performance standard. It consists of a fixed base payment per pound of live meat 
produced and a variable bonus payment based on the grower’s performance compared to 
a predetermined feed conversion standard.  In this case, the benchmark is not determined 
by a contest among the growers as in a tournament. Instead, the benchmark is a 
predetermined technological constant. Another version of the fixed performance standard 
is a discrete scheme where, for a given weight of the finished animal, the contract design 
specifies different bonus payments for each different feed conversion interval (bracket) 
Tsoulouhas and Vukina, 2001).  
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 Two more variations of the payment scheme are sometimes used: (i) a version 
where, along with a base payment per live weight, the bonus payment is paid per head of 
the delivered animal, and (ii) a version where there is no direct base payment but the 
entire payment per pound of live weight delivered varies with the bracket in which the 
individual grower’s feed conversion lies (Tsoulouhas and Vukina, 2001). Two-part 
piece-rate tournaments are used by almost all broiler contractors whereas they are almost 
nonexistent in the hog industry. On the other hand, fixed performance standards dominate 
hog production contracts, but they are almost nonexistent in the broiler industry.  
 The poultry industry is one of the first agricultural sectors to use production 
contracts widely. The share of poultry and eggs produced under production contract is 
87.2 percent in 2003 (MacDonald and Korb, 2006), with the reminder mainly raised at 
processor-owned facilities. Beginning in the 1950s, the poultry industry experienced a 
remarkable change from a “backyard” family owned industry to a specialized hatchery 
and broiler operation. Now it produces more than 900 million birds for meat per year 
(Madison and Harvey, 1997). There has been a substantial increase in productivity and 
decrease in the real price of broilers during this expansion phase (Lasley, 1983). Today, 
the broiler industry is one of the most competitive and tightly coordinated sub-sectors in 
the U.S. food and agricultural sector (Schrader, 1981). This industry is often cited as an 
eventual model of the organization that may portray most of U.S. farming in near future 
(Perry, Banker, and Green, 1999).  
 The hog industry appears to be following a path similar to broilers as it moves 
toward a vertical organization with widespread use of production contracts. Seventy-five 
years ago nearly every farm raised some hogs. Hog production has changed incredibly 
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from that state in the last quarter century (Rhodes, 1998). Since 1920, the number of 
farms in the U.S. has fallen dramatically. At the same time, the percentage of U.S. farms 
with hogs has also been falling dramatically. Most farms discontinuing hog production 
had fewer than 100 head in inventory.  
 At the same time the number of farms with hogs has been declining, the 
concentration of hog production on remaining farms has been increasing dramatically in 
recent years. Total inventory on farms with at least 2,000 head in inventory rose from 
16.6 million head in1992 to 28.6 million head in 1996. Farms with at least 2,000 pigs in 
inventory accounted for 51 percent of total U.S. swine inventory in 1996 although they 
had represented only 3.1 percent of all farms having at least one pig (Zering, 1998).  
Production contracts are widely used in these rapidly expanding hog operations. 
The share of hog production under contract rose remarkably from only 5 percent in 1992 
to 40 percent in 1998. But the aggregate data conceal sharp and striking changes that 
occurred in specialized hog operations. Production contracts grew from 8 percent in 1992 
to 83 percent in 1998 on specialized feeder pig operations. Among specialized hog 
feeding operations, production contracts grew from 22 percent in 1992 to 62 percent in 
1998. By comparison, the growth of contracting among farrow-to-finish operations was 
less impressive during that period (McBride and Key, 2003).1 In addition, hog growers 
realized an unprecedented growth in averge farm size with contractual arrangements in 
place.2 
                                                 
1 By comparison, the share of cattle produced under production contracts has grown only from 11.1 percent 
in 1996-97  to 25.4 percent in 2003 (MacDonald and Korb, 2006). 
2 Average hog sales and contract removals per farm increased 174 percent between 1992 and 1998, from 
945 to 2,589. There was an extraordinary growth in the average size of specialized hog operations during 
that period. Feeder pig operations increased their sales and removals by an average of 400 percent. Hog 
finishing operations showed an average increase of 240 percent in sales and removals. In contrast, farrow-
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In view of this dramatic growth in contract production, a fundamental question 
attracting much research is what motivates almost all broiler growers and half of hog 
growers to participate in contract production? Why have farmers and their buyers shifted 
to contracts from spot markets? And what are the implications for farm profits?  
   
1.2 Motivation for Contracting 
Two wide-ranging explanations – risk-sharing and transactions cost – have been 
used to explain the choice between spot markets and contracts. The risk-sharing approach 
considers contracts as a means of reducing price and production risks faced by farmers 
and shifting them to the contractors who are more able to bear the risks. The transactions 
cost approach highlights the costs of using spot markets to organize transactions and 
considers contracts as a means to reduce those costs. Transaction costs arise because of 
the conflicting interests between the parties (the contractor and the growers) when the 
grower's efforts cannot be easily monitored by the contractor and where the output is not 
influenced by the grower's effort alone but by factors beyond the control of the grower. 
Examples of such transactions costs include costs associated with negotiation, 
supervision, and enforcement of spot transactions.  
The most important reason cited by hog growers for choosing contract farming is 
risk reduction (Rhodes, 1989; Rhodes and Grimes, 1992; Johnson and Foster, 1994; 
Kliebenstein and Lawrence, 1995; Lawrence and Grimes, 2001).  This strain of literature, 
which emphasizes the reduction of farmers’ economic risks through contracting with 
                                                                                                                                                 
to-finish operations showed a smaller expansion of only 40 percent in their sales and removals during that 
period. (McBride and Key, 2003).  
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contractors, appears to be aligned with the risk sharing approach. But this approach has 
an inherent moral hazard problem associated with the extent of risk that can be efficiently 
shifted to contractors. Risk-reducing contracts eliminate growers’ incentives to carry out 
standard management practices, and can therefore result in higher total costs through 
lower effort (Knoeber, 2000). Thus, the transactions cost of providing incentives limit the 
extent of risk that can be efficiently shifted to contractors.  
Turning to the transactions cost explanation, Williamson’s (1985) approach, 
which explains vertical coordination by its lower transaction costs compared to market 
exchange, has become the conventional wisdom. Contracts can increase efficiency in 
organizing production, making the adoption of large-scale and specialized techniques 
easy. Thus, contracts can reduce transaction costs through lower costs or higher product 
quality (Knoeber, 2000; Lawrence, Schroeder, and Hayenga, 2001; Hueth and 
Hennessy, 2002). Large farms, which are handling rapidly growing shares of agricultural 
production, use contracts much more than other farms (Hoppe and Korb, 2002).  
Large farms make large investments to exploit the benefit of economies of size 
and scale in operations. But these large investments are often asset- and site-specific in 
nature. The specificity arises when assets are much less useful, and hence less valuable, 
in any other use than the one for which they were initially designed. When production 
requires investing in an asset that is specialized to a particular trading partner, any deal 
made prior to investing in the specialized asset may not be enforceable once the 
investment is made. The non-investing party may have an incentive to use his newly 
created bargaining power by demanding more favorable terms (MacDonald et al, 2004). 
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For example, large broiler and hog farms make large asset and site-specific 
investments in chicken and hog facilities, respectively, to exploit the benefit of 
economies of size and scale in these operations. But these site and asset specific 
investments create the so-called “hold-up” problem discussed by Klein, Crawford and 
Alchian (1978). Contracts can mitigate this hold-up problem because farmers can be 
guaranteed of a compensation scheme before making an investment, although typical 
contracts do not cover the full economic life of the facilities. In fact, in some cases, 
processors may help farmers finance investments directly through the contractual 
arrangements (MacDonald et al, 2004).3  
Production contracts that require both parties to invest in assets specialized to the 
other further help to alleviate the hold-up problem. However, this may not be the case 
with broilers and hogs even though growers invest in feeding facilities and contractors 
invest in breeding facilities, feed mills, and processing plants. The weakness in applying 
this argument to broiler and hog production is that specific investments from both sides 
alone may not cancel out the opportunistic incentives and consequences. Rather, the 
extent of the stakes that each party has in the other’s specific investment must be weighed 
in drawing such a conclusion. 
The role of transaction costs reduction using livestock production contracts is 
reviewed by Knoeber (1989), Frank and Henderson (1992), Barry, Sonka and Lajili 
(1992) and Sporleader (1992). Contracting is believed to lower the transaction costs 
associated with growers’ uncertainty; resolve the common problem of asymmetric 
information between growers and contractors about product quality; and improve 
                                                 
3 Another reason growers enter contract farming is to obtain credit for financing the investment needed for 
building facilities (Kliebenstein and Lawrence, 1995).  
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coordination of product delivery (McBride and Key, 2003; Knoeber and Thurman, 
1995). An efficient contract should solve these problems with the lowest transaction 
costs.4  
Finally, a resource-providing contract, which is a better alternative for the purpose 
of providing the contractor a consistent supply of quality meat, both reduces the hold-up 
for growers by requiring less investment and relaxes the grower’s credit constraint, 
freeing funds to use factor inputs at a more efficient level (Hueth and Hennessy, 2002). 
  Regardless of motivation, contracting is expected to add value in some way if 
growers and contractors are to go to the trouble of setting up contractual relationships. 
But the question is: What is the grower’s gain from contracting? Additional claims have 
been that growers benefit from having an assured market, a higher price, and access to a 
wider range of production inputs (USDA, 1996). Others claim that contracts benefit 
growers by offering opportunities to earn income with low capital requirements, by 
easing cash flow constraints, and by allowing enterprise diversification on the farm 
(Vukina and Foster, 1998). 
  Based on broiler data, Knoeber and Thurman (1995) estimate that a substantial 
amount of risk is shifted from growers to contractors through contracting. Martin (1994) 
has argued that the extent of risk shifting is not as prominent in swine production as for 
broilers. However, Martin (1997) argues that the contractor provides most of the variable 
                                                 
4 However, it has been claimed that transaction costs reduction by contracting is not the most important 
reason for contract farming in hog operations. The increased returns from being a leader in reducing 
production costs have been the main incentive for contract farming. It has been argued that most hog 
operations have been induced to contract more by high returns on equity in hog production than the small 
savings attainable in transaction costs (Rhodes, 1993).  
 
 11
inputs and guarantees a payment to the hog grower. So considerable risk associated with 
input and output price variability is shifted from the grower to the contractor.  
 
 
1.3 Complaints about Gains 
 Despite the risk shifting properties often claimed for contracts, many contract 
growers, dissatisfied with existing payment mechanisms complain about their gains from 
contracting. In recent years, the number of contract growers complaining about the 
features of the contracts has been increasing (Vukina, 2003). Growers complain that 
contractors receive large contract benefits while the growers gain only small, or even 
negative, returns from contract production (Kolmer et al. 1963; Aho, 1988; Morison, 
1996a and 1996b; Guebert, 1996; Russell, 1996; Lipton, 1997).  
Since both broiler and hog production involves large asset- and site-specific 
investments in chicken and hog plants, respectively, concerns have been raised about the 
possibility that contractors are extracting quasirents from contract growers. Large specific 
investments may reduce the bargaining power of contract growers, making growers 
vulnerable to changes in contract terms (Shelanski and Klein, 1995). Even though risk 
reduction is the primary motivation for contracting, contracts do not fully insulate 
producers from economic risks because of the need to maintain incentives. As a result, 
both hog and poultry producers face considerable production and quality risk (Hueth and 
Hennessy, 2002). This may be another reason for grower discontent.5  
                                                 
5 Tsoulouhas and Vukina (2001) consider poultry growers complaints that tournament schemes are unfair 
because the set of growers in a group continually changes. For a given set of production outcomes, group 
composition can substantially affect payment outcomes. Thus, tournament schemes may be replacing 
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1.4 Legal Limitations 
Few investigative attempts have been made to confirm or reject the above claims 
by contract growers or to examine the how growers’ gains from contracting vary. 
Nevertheless, state and federal lawmakers’ moves to introduce legislation for growers’ 
protection is further fueling growers’ expression of discontent. Out of grower discontent, 
some states have already considered legislation to protect growers (Vukina, 1997; Lewin, 
1998; Hamilton and Andrews, 1992).6 On the federal level, policy makers are also 
taking such concerns seriously and moving toward necessary steps to protect contract 
growers. Concerns regarding the implications of reorganization and the increasin
production contracts in certain sectors have led to calls for legislation to protect 
producers in these sectors from unfair business practices. With this pressure from grower 
circles to adopt more concrete regulatory measures to protect them, empirical analysis 
that analyzes the impacts of contracting on growers profits and growers’ vulnerabilities to 
loss by contracting is sorely needed. 
g use of 





traditional price and production risk with “group composition risk.” The analyses by Goodhue (2000) and 
Tsoulouhas and Vukina (2001) suggest that unobserved agent heterogeneity introduces a new source of 
risk that can offset risk reductions associated with relative performance evaluation. 
6 Contractors in some Southern states have blocked legislative proposals regulating broiler contracts. One 
of those attempts failed in North Carolina in1993 when an attempt was made to introduce a bill prohibiting 
payments to a grower based on relative performance (Vukina, 1997). Various forms of legislation aimed at 
regulating contracts were passed in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Kansas in the early 1990s (Lewin). Iowa 
was the first state to adopt anti-vertical integration legislation for livestock packing firms. The legislation 
was amended in 1988 to prohibit contracting by packers. According to Hamilton and Andrews (1992), 
eight states – Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wisconsin 
– have passed anti-corporate farming legislation. They also mention adoption of some form of legislation 
regulating production contracts in agriculture in Iowa, Kansas, and Minnesota. 
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1.5 Research Objectives 
  The closely related literature on regulation has criticized government regulation 
on the grounds that any regulatory action targeting distribution will interfere with the 
ability of economic parties to achieve efficient outcomes. Certainly, if new public policy 
in this area is to be informed, research must be conducted on the economic impact of 
contractor practices and procedures on contract growers. Such research should be 
conducted before regulatory intervention, particularly given that regulatory intervention 
is largely irreversible once implemented.  
 In order to measure the impact of contracting on contract growers, research is 
needed to determine what the returns to farming would have been had each grower 
chosen not to contract. This information is not directly observable because contract 
growers do not produce independently at the same time. To overcome this problem of 
missing data, impact evaluation methods use the mean returns of independent growers as 
the counterfactual for the mean returns of contract growers (although without 
sophisticated methods, these simple analyses can be quite misleading). 
 Since the broiler and hog industries have the potential to become role models for 
rest of the US agriculture, and because of the importance of contracting in these 
industries, they are ideal candidates for examining the incentives underlying contract 
design and calculating the contracting gains for contract growers from contract 
production. Unfortunately, at this point in time, data on broiler operations are available 
only on contract broiler growers. Data on independent broiler growers is almost 
nonexistent because the share of broilers produced under contract exceeds 90 percent, 
with the rest mostly raised at processor-owned facilities. Although the new larger hog 
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growers are overwhelmingly engaged in contract production, unlike broiler industry, the 
hog industry still has a large core of independent hog producers who sell on the open 
market. Thus, hog contracting seems to offer the only good opportunity for this analysis. 
The dissertation uses the Agricultural Resource Management Survey Phase III, 
Hog Production Practices and Costs and Returns Report, Version 4, for 2004 (hereafter 
ARMS III V4) data to examine the impact of contracting on contract hog growers.7 These 
data present a typical impact evaluation problem which requires obtaining credible 
estimates of the counterfactual returns that would have been realized had contract 
growers not participated in contracting. Conventional approaches to impact evaluation 
problems assume that the impact of participation is the same for every grower.8 Such 
approaches do not account for heterogeneity in responses to participation. Hog growers 
are heterogeneous because they operate in different regions with different backgrounds, 
differing innate abilities, different farm sizes, different levels of risk aversion, use 
different levels of inputs, etc. Assuming a common impact of contracting is not sensible 
when growers are heterogeneous.    
In recent years, statistical techniques have been developed to estimate models in 
which the impact of participation differs across participants. One implication of 
heterogeneity is that it may cause self-selection bias by affecting participation in 
contracting.9 A major goal of this dissertation is to measure the impact of contracting 
                                                 
7 Because the greatest mix of behavior is found in the feeder pig-to-finish category, and to maintain 
maximum comparability by choosing a single type of operation, this study focuses only on feeder pig-to-
finish producers. 
8 Participation will be used interchangeably to refer to contract hog growing, and nonparticipation will refer 
to independent growing. 
9 Contracting may have different effects on different participants. If no one can predict in advance who will 
gain more and who will gain less or who will lose, the variation in impacts will have no effect on who 
initially participates in contracting. In this case, the typical self-selection problem may be reduced. But this 
is not the case for hog growers. Hog growers face predetermined standards, and know the production 
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when the impact is heterogeneous. For this purpose, sample selection bias is corrected in 
a parametric fashion using two-step estimation procedures introduced by Heckman 
(1979).  
 While systematic heterogeneity in the impact of contracting is recognized, the 
mean impact measures do not tell the whole story about contracting effects. Measuring 
dispersion of contracting effects is required to characterize completely the consequences 
of contracting and to understand the discontent among contract growers. With 
heterogeneous impacts, the mean impact of contracting may be large and positive despite 
unfavorable outcomes for many contract growers. The second major research goal of this 
dissertation is to explore the differential effects of contracting on contract growers using 
quantile regression techniques. These techniques allow investigation of contracting 
effects at various quantiles of the conditional profit distribution. Hence, quantile 
treatment effects at various quantiles of the conditional profit distribution are estimated to 
perform an in-depth examination of the effect of contracting, and to examine the inter-
quantile differences of contracting impacts (Heckman, 1979; Ichimura, 1993; Newey, 
1991; and Buchinsky, 1998).  
 
1.6 Organization of the Dissertation  
 The outline of this dissertation is as follows.  The next four chapters review the 
major issues that have been examined in the literature on principal-agent theory, with 
special attention to the issues that are important in the agricultural sector in general and 
                                                                                                                                                 
environment associated with production uncertainty. They participate in contract production based on 
subjective expectations of their own productivity. In this case, the grower-specific component of the impact 
may affect participation in contract production.  As a result, based on the prior expected outcomes (or 
productivities), those participating in contract production may be systematically different from 
nonparticipants. This systematic difference between the two groups may cause self-selection bias. 
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hog production in particular. These chapters review some empirical studies of incentives 
in the agricultural sector, examining how these studies relate to the basic theoretical 
predictions. Then some further development and extensions of the basic theories are 
discussed to enable solving the empirical puzzles. Some implications for agents’ gains 
from contracting are also derived.  
 Chapter 2 begins with a brief review of the general theory of incentives by 
discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems. The principal's optimal 
responses to these frictions are explored, taking as given the characteristics of the agents 
with whom the principal interacts in a non-repeated setting. Since Prendergast (1999), 
Gibbons (1987), Sappington (1991), Hart and Holmstrom (1987) and Laffont and 
Maskin (1982) offer excellent recent surveys of principal agent theories, I present only a 
brief and selective review focusing on the aspects that are particularly relevant for hog 
contracting. Then in chapter 3, heterogeneity in the characteristics of agents and 
principals is introduced in a multiple-agent setting and theoretical predictions of agents’ 
gains from contracting are derived.  
 Chapter 4 explores the principal's optimal responses to heterogeneous agents in a 
setting of repeated contracting, and examines whether the theoretical predictions of 
chapter 3 hold in a repeated or dynamic setting. The question of how the theoretical 
predictions fit hog contracting is addressed in chapter 5. In this chapter, I show how hog 
contracts relate to standard principal-agent theories, and refine theoretical predictions of 
agents’ gains from contracting applicable to hog contracting parties, and especially to 
contract growers. Chapter 6 models hog contracts explicitly with separating contract 
parameters and explores whether some growers are left with negative gains from 
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contracting on average with this separation. Possibilities are also explored for uniform 
contracts based on payment parameters. 
 Chapter 7 reviews the econometric methods that provide all the necessary 
techniques to estimate not only the average effects of contracting but how contracting 
affects individual growers in the overall distribution of growers. Finally, chapter 8 
describes the data used for estimation, provides a summary analysis of the variables used 
in this study. Then results are presented and discussed regarding the estimated 
contracting effects on revenues and costs employing two-step estimation methods and 
related quantile regression techniques. The chapter ends with a summary of the results.
 18
Chapter 2:  
The Elementary Theory of Incentives 
 2.1 Introduction 
 In the last few decades, the principal-agent model has received considerable 
recognition and attention as an important analytical device in the study of incentive 
schemes and contracts among economic agents. Whenever there are gains to 
specialization there is likely a relationship in which one party (agent) acts on behalf of 
another (principal) because of comparative advantage. If the agent could costlessly be 
induced to internalize the principal’s objectives, there would be no reason to study 
agency theory. This problem becomes interesting only when objectives of the parties 
cannot be automatically aligned with each other. In principal-agent theory, the central 
concern is how the principal can best induce the agent to perform as the principal would 
prefer, taking into account the difficulties in monitoring the agent's activities.  
 Economic relationships in which one party (the principal) wishes to affect the 
actions of another (the agent) by means of incentives are ubiquitous. Examples abound 
including workers supplying labor to a firm, managers acting on behalf of owners, 
doctors serving patients, lawyers advising clients, the government taxing its citizens to 
provide government services and a regulator controlling firms. All of these examples are 
substantial problems in their own right (Sappington, 1991).  
 Under certain circumstances, it is possible for a principal to induce agents to 
behave exactly as the principal would if the principal shared the agents' skills and 
knowledge. By describing these circumstances, it becomes possible to pinpoint the 
sources of friction between principal and agent that typically preclude this ideal 
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arrangement. Section 2.2 of this chapter introduces the basic moral hazard model, where 
the agent chooses his effort before he observes random states of nature, and discusses 
various aspects of it. Under the same information structure, section 2.3 discusses a simple 
closed-form agency model in which linear schemes are optimal. Section 2.4 explores the 
limited liability contracts that arise from a specific information structure where the agent 
observes random states of nature before he chooses his effort. Section 2.5 explains 
precontractual asymmetric information contracts that arise from another class of 
information structure where the agent observes random states of nature even before he 
accepts or signs the contract. Finally, section 2.6 describes the results of some of the 
empirical studies that test the basic theoretical predictions.      
 
2.2.  The Basic Moral Hazard Model 
 To set the stage, consider the classic example of the principal-agent relationship 
between a worker (agent) and a firm (principal) where the  agent works for the principal. 
Suppose that there is only one firm and one agent. There are two widely used 
formulations of the agency problem – the state-space formulation and the parameterized 
distribution forumation– each with its own merits. 
 To outline the general structure of the hidden action model with the state-space 
formulation, suppose the agent makes an effort e, unobservable by the principal or any 
third party, to produce a verifiable output π. The effort e affects the probability 
distribution of the output. Let θ represent a state of nature drawn from a distribution G(θ), 
with a density g(θ). The agent’s effort and the state of nature jointly determine the 
verifiable output π = π(e,θ). For the nonobservability of agential effort to have any 
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consequence, the agent’s effort must not be perfectly deducible from observable π.10 
Higher realizations of either the productivity parameter, θ, or the agent’s effort, e, both 
increase the agent's expected output. The state-space formulation of the agency problem 
was developed by Wilson (1969), Spence and Zeckhauser (1971), and Ross (1973). Its 
main advantage is that the technology is presented in what appears to be the most natural 
terms. 
 The parameterized distribution formulation provides an equivalent way of 
representing the principal-agent problem that yields more economic insights. Assume that 
the firm’s profit π is stochastically related to e. By the choice of e , the agent effectively 
chooses a distribution overπ , which can be derived from G(θ) via the technology π(e,θ). 
That is, a technology represented by π(e,θ) given the distribution of states, G(θ), 
generates the distribution of output, F(π | e), with corresponding density f(π | e) where f(π 
| e) > 0 for all e∈E and all π [ , ].π π∈  Thus, any potential realization of π can arise 
following any given effort choice by the agent. This parameterized distribution 
formulation was pioneered by Mirrlees (1974, 1976) and further explored by Holmstrom 
(1979). In the discussion that follows, the principal’s problem is stated mathematically 
with a parameterized distribution and then the state-space approach is used to find a 
closed form solution. 
 Although the principal cannot observe the efforts of the agent, she can potentially 
overcome the unobservability problem through a set of signals that are correlated with the 
agent's effort. She can then condition the agent’s payments for exerted effort on the set of 
                                                 
e
10 For example, if π = eθ, then performance is proportional to the farmer’s effort and to the amount of 
rainfall, θ. If performance does not vary with θ, the magnitude of the agent’s effort can be inferred perfectly 
from π, making the incentive problem a trivial one. To consider the interesting and realistic case, I assume, 
as is standard, that although the principal’s profits are affected by , they are not fully determined by it. 
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signals that are correlated with the agent's effort. One such signal of effort is output π. 
The principal’s problem is to construct a reward scheme w(π) that takes output into 
account to determine payments to the agent. The price of output is assumed to be 1. The 
principal’s profit (output minus wage costs), is π – w(π). The agent is assumed to be an 
expected utility maximizer with a Bernoulli utility function u(w,e) over his wage w and 
effort level e. This agent’s utility function is assumed to satisfy uw(w,e) > 0, ue(w,e) < 0, 
and uww(w,e) ≤ 0 for all (w,e) where subscripts denote partial derivatives). That is, the 
agent prefers more income to less, is weakly risk averse over income lotteries, and 
dislikes a high level of effort. The agent and the principal agree on the distribution G(θ), 
the technology π(e,θ), and the utility and cost functions. 
 Suppose the agent’s utility is additively separable in the form u(w,e) = u(w(π)) – 
c(e). The principal is endowed with all of the bargaining power in this simple setting, and 
thus she can make a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer to the agent. An offer here specifies the 
agent’s wage payment as a function of observed output π. The principal's problem is to 
devise a payment scheme w(π) to maximize her expected profit, ( ( )) ( | )w f e dπ π π− π∫ . 
The principal is assumed to be risk neutral throughout unless explicitly assumed 
otherwise. The agent will accept the contract offered by the principal if and only if the 
terms of the contract provide the agent with a level of expected utility that exceeds his 
reservation utility level, .u  This reservation level is assumed known to both the principal 
and the agent. 
 The timing of interaction between the principal and the agent in this simple 
setting is the following. First, the principal designs the terms of the contract and then 
offers the contract to the agent. Next, the agent decides whether to accept or reject the 
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contract. If the agent rejects the contract, the relationship is terminated. In this case the 
principal receives a payoff of zero. It is assumed throughout that the principal is better off 
making the agent an offer that he will accept.  If the agent accepts the contract, he begins 
his "employment" and decides how much effort to exert. Then the state of nature, θ, 
occurs. Finally, the agent's output is observed, and the payment is made to the agent as 
promised in the contract.  
 
2.2.1 Contract design with observable effort 
 I first develop as a point of reference for later discussion the trivial case where 
effort is observable. When the effort, e, is directly observable or verifiable, w and e can 
be used jointly to achieve a Pareto optimal or first-best outcome. The optimal contract for 
the principal if effort is observable is to solve the following problem (for notational 
simplicity, the lower and upper limits of integration, π  and π , are suppressed): 
, ( )
 ( ( )) ( | )
e w
Max w f e d
π
π π π−∫ π  (2.1) 
s.t. (i) ( ( )) ( | ) ( )v w f e d c e uπ π π − ≥∫ .  
Constraint (i) of (2.1) is known as the Individual Rationality (IR) constraint. It requires 
that the agent must receive an expected utility of at least u  in order to accept the contract 
that the principal offers. 
 In this problem, the principal first decides on the effort she wants the agent to 
implement. Then she picks the least cost incentive scheme w(π) that induces the agent to 
exert that effort. Thus, it is convenient to think of this problem in two stages (Mas-Colell, 
Whinston, and Green, 1995; pp. 477-88). First, for each choice of e, what is the cost 
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minimizing compensation scheme w(π) is determined that will make that e the agent’s 
best choice? Second, among the cost minimizing w(π)’s for different effort levels, the 
profit maximizing e is chosen? Given that the contract specifies effort level e, choosing 
w(π) to maximize ( ( )) ( | ) ( | ) ( ) ( | )w f e d f e d w f e dπ π π π π π π π π− = −∫ ∫ ∫
( )
π  is 
equivalent to minimizing the principal’s expected compensation costs, ( | )w f e dπ π π∫ , 
so formally the optimal incentive scheme for implementing e must solve 
 
( )
 ( ) ( | )
w
Min w f e d
π
π π∫ π  (2.2) 
s.t. (i) ( ( )) ( | ) ( )v w f e d c e uπ π π − ≥∫ .  
Constraint (i) of (2.2) always binds at a solution to this problem; otherwise, the principal 
can reduce w(π) while still inducing the agent to accept the contract. Where γ is the 
Lagrangian multiplier for the constraint, the agent’s compensation scheme w(π) at the 
solution to problem (2.2) must satisfy the first-order condition 
0)|())(()|( =′+− efwvef ππγπ , which can also be expressed as 
 1/ ( ( ))v w π γ′ = . (2.3) 
If the agent is strictly risk averse [so that v΄(w) is strictly decreasing in w], the 
implication of condition (2.3) is that the optimal compensation scheme w(π) is a constant. 
For observable effort, there is no problem with providing incentives. Thus, the risk-
neutral principal should fully insure the risk-averse agent against any risk in his wage. 
Hence, given the contract’s specification of e, the principal offers a fixed wage  such 
that the agent receives exactly his reservation utility level, 
*
ew
,u  that is, *( ) ( )e− = ,ev w c u  
which can also be expressed as 
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* 1( (ew v u c e
−= + )) .  (2.4) 
For a risk neutral agent, constraint (i) of (2.2) is replaced by 
( ) ( | ) ( )w f e d c e uπ π π − ≥∫ . First order condition (2.3) thus becomes γ = 1. The 
implication of this condition is that no restriction other than the agent’s IR constraint is 
required for optimal risk sharing. This condition is necessarily satisfied for any 
compensation scheme such that the wage payment  satisfies  *ew
*( ) ( )eE w u c e= + .  (2.5) 
A fixed wage scheme is merely one of many possible optimal compensation schemes that 
satisfy (2.5). Any other compensation scheme that gives the agent an expected wage 
payment equal to his reservation wage plus effort cost is also optimal. 
Now consider the optimal choice of e. The principal optimally specifies the effort 
level e that maximizes expected output less wage payment, 1( | ) ( ( ))f e d v u c eπ π π −− +∫  
(or ( | ) ( )f e d c e uπ π π − −∫  for risk neutral case).   
 
2.2.2 Contract design with unobservable effort 
 More realistically, effort is not verifiable. In this case, the agent will in general 
not find the first-best effort level to be optimal because he dislikes effort. This fact causes 
a conflict between the interests of the principal and the agent. This conflict results from 
the unobservability of the agent’s effort and creates a moral hazard whereby the agent 
shirks in his effort to the detriment of the principal. An important assumption in this 
model is that the agent observes the state of nature, θ, after he chooses his effort, e. The 
case, where the agent observes θ before he chooses his effort e is discussed in section 2.4. 
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The case, where the agent observes θ before he accepts or signs the contract is discussed 
in section 2.5. 
Another important assumption is that the principal never observes θ. She only 
observes output, π. If the state of nature, θ, is directly observable or verifiable, then π and 
θ can be used jointly to induce the first-best effort e. Then there would be no moral 
hazard problem provided that output is observed without error as in the case of section 
2.2.1. At this point, output π is assumed to be measured without error. This assumption 
will be relaxed later to explore its potential impact on the contract parameters. Since the 
agent’s effort is not observable the contract cannot specify it in an effective manner 
because there is simply no way to verify whether the agent has exerted the contracted 
effort. In this situation, the principal must redesign w(π) in a way that indirectly gives the 
agent the incentive to choose the desired effort that would be contracted if effort were 
observable. 
An incentive to induce high effort can be provided only at the cost of having the 
agent bear part of the loss resulting from lower effort. This must be accomplished while 
maintaining the IR constraint whereby the agent must receive an expected utility of at 
least u  if he is to accept the offered contract. Since the agent’s effort is unobservable, 
however, the principal also faces a second constraint that the agent must desire to choose 
effort e when facing the offered incentive scheme (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 
1995; pp. 477-88). This means it is not in the interest of the agent to deviate from the 
optimal effort. The optimal contract for the principal thus solves the problem,  
, ( )
 ( ( )) ( | )
e w
Max w f e d
π
π π π−∫ π  (2.6) 
s.t. (i) uecdefwu ≥−∫ )()|())(( πππ  
 26
 (ii)  arg max  ( ( )) ( | ) ( ).
e
e u w f e dπ π π∈ −∫
%
% %c e
The added constraint (ii) of (2.6) is known as the Incentive Compatibility (IC) 
constraint. It requires that under compensation scheme w(π) the agent’s optimal effort 
choice is the optimized effort desired by the principal. Following the two-stage solution 
described in the introduction of section 2.2 and as demonstrated by Mas-Colell, 
Whinston, and Green (1995; pp. 477-88), the optimal incentive scheme must solve  
( )
 ( ) ( | )
w
Min w f e d
π
π π∫ π  (2.7) 
s.t. (i) uecdefwu ≥−∫ )()|())(( πππ  
 (ii)   arg max  ( ( )) ( | ) ( ).
e
e u w f e dπ π π∈ −∫
%
% c e%
For this parameterized formulation, I restrict attention to the case where the agent has 
only two possible effort choices. Most of the general insights of moral hazard models can 
be conveyed in the simple setting where the agent has only two effort levels from which 
to choose. In section 2.2.5, the model is generalized using a first-order approach for 
continuous effort choice.  
For the case with two possible effort choices, let eH denote high effort and eL 
denote low effort, eH > eL. Suppose the distribution of π conditional on eH  stochastically 
dominates the distribution conditional on eL in a first-order sense; that is, the distribution 
functions F(π | eL) and F(π | eH) satisfy F(π | eH) ≤ F(π | eL) at all π [ , ]π π∈ , with strict 
inequality on some open set П [ , ]π π⊂ . This implies that the level of expected output 
when the agent chooses eH  is larger than that from eL, ( | ) ( | )H LF e d F e dπ π π π π> π∫ ∫ . 
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If the principal wants to implement eL, she optimally offers the agent the fixed 
wage payment  = *ew uu (
1−  + c(eL)), the same payment she would offer if contractually 
specifying effort eL when effort is observable. If the optimal choice is eL, then the 
incentive problem is solved because of c(eH) > c(eL). In this case, the agent’s wage 
payment is unaffected by his effort, and so he will choose the effort level that involves 
the lowest cost, namely eL. Doing so, he earns exactly u . The more interesting case arises 
when the principal wishes to implement the effort level eH , because some risk-sharing 
benefits have to be sacrificed in order to provide the agent a sufficient incentive to 
expend high effort. In this case, constraint (ii) of (2.7) can be written as  
(iiH) ( ( )) ( | ) ( ) ( ( )) ( | ) ( )H H Lu w f e d c e u w f e d c eπ π π π π π− ≥ −∫ ∫ L . 
Letting γ ≥ 0 and μ ≥ 0 be the Lagrangian multipliers for constraints (i) and (iiH),  
respectively, w(π) must satisfy the following Kuhn-Tucker first-order condition at every 
],[ πππ ∈ :11 
 ( | ) ( ( )) ( | ) ( ( | ) ( | )) ( ( )) 0H H H Lf e u w f e f e f e u wπ γ π π μ π π π′ ′− + + − =        
or, equivalently,12 
 1/ ( ( )) (1 ( | ) / ( | ))L Hu w f e f eπ γ μ π π′ = + − .  (2.8) 
Equation (2.8) is derived in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995; pp. 477-88). This 
is a particular version of Mirrlees’s (1974, 1976) formula, analyzed and interpreted 
further by Holmstrom (1979). 
                                                 
11 The optimal incentive scheme would not change materially by assuming that the principal is risk-averse; 
only the left-hand side of equation (2.8) would change to v΄(π-w(π))/u΄(w(π)). 
12 Throughout this dissertation, to avoid excessive use of parentheses and brackets, I assume that any 
expression of the form a/b + c/d means (a/b) + (c/d). 
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 In any solution to problem (2.7), where e = eH, both γ and μ are strictly positive 
(Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995; pp. 477-88). With μ positive, w(π) will vary 
with the output π, trading off some risk-sharing benefits for incentive provisions.  More 
precisely, as implied by (2.8), it will vary with the likelihood ratio f(π | eL)/f(π | eH). Thus, 
I next explore conditions on the likelihood ratio that shape the optimal compensation 
scheme, w(π). 
 
2.2.3 The shape of the optimal compensation scheme 
 The likelihood ratio is a concept familiar from statistical inference. It reflects how 
strongly π signals that the true distribution from which the sample was drawn is f(π | eL)  
rather than f(π | eH). A high likelihood ratio evidence in favor of eL and against eH; a value 
of one is the intermediate case in which nothing new is learned from the sample, because 
it implies the two distributions are equally likely.  
 Given that both γ and μ are strictly positive, condition (2.8) can be used to derive 
some useful insights into the shape of the optimal compensation scheme, w(π). Consider, 
for example, the fixed wage payment  such that ŵ ˆ1/ ( ) .v w γ′ =  According to condition 
(2.8), w(π) >  if f(π | eL)/f(π | eH) < 1 and w(π) <  if f(π | eL)/f(π | eH) > 1. Thus, the 
optimal compensation scheme pays more than  for outputs that are statistically more 
likely to occur under eH than under eL, as determined by having a likelihood ratio f(π | 
eL)/f(π | eH) less than1. Similarly, it offers less compensation for outputs that are 
relatively more likely when eL is chosen. However, in an optimal incentive scheme, 




 As is clear from examination of condition (2.8), for the optimal compensation 
scheme to be monotonically increasing in π, the likelihood ratio f(π | eL)/f(π | eH) must be 
decreasing in π. That is, as π increases, the likelihood of getting output level π if effort is 
eH relative to the likelihood if effort is eL must increase. This property, known as the 
monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) following Milgrom (1981), is not implied by 
first-order stochastic dominance. First-order stochastic dominance ensures that an 
increase of effort is good for the principal in a very strong sense, namely, that any 
principal with a utility function increasing in π favors a higher effort level. However, to 
reward the agent with a payment increasing in π a higher output level must be clearly 
evidence that the agent has made a higher effort. The MRLP provides this additional 
information. It states that a higher effort level increases the likelihood of a high output 
level more than the likelihood of a low output level. Because, from (2.8), the sharing rule 
is monotone in the likelihood ratio, the MLRP assures a monotone sharing rule. The same 
conclusion follows for the continuous effort case as long as MLRP holds.  
 
 2.2.4 Optimal effort 
 Given the variability that is optimally introduced into w(π), the expected value of 
the agent’s wage payment must be enough greater than his (fixed) wage payment in the 
reservation case to compensate for any risk bearing, *
He
w  ≥ 1( ( Hu u c e
− + )) . In choosing 
which effort level to induce, the principal compares the incremental change in expected 
output from the two effort levels, ( | )HF e dπ π π∫  and ( | )LF e dπ π π∫ , with the 
difference in expected wage payments in the contracts that optimally implement each.  
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 From the preceding analysis, the wage payment for eL is exactly the same as when 
effort is observable, whereas the expected wage payment when the principal implements 
eH under nonobservability is strictly larger than his payment in the observable case 
described in section 2.2.1. Thus, nonobservability in this model raises the cost of 
implementing eH and does not change the cost of implementing eL. This fact means that 
nonobservability of effort can lead to implementation of an inefficiently low level of 
effort. When eL would be the optimal effort level if effort were observable, then it is also 
optimal when effort is unobservable. In contrast, when eH would be optimal if effort were 
observable, then one of two things may happen: it may be optimal to implement eH using 
an incentive scheme or, alternatively, the risk-bearing costs may be high enough that the 
principal decides that it is better to simply implement eL. In either case, nonobservability 
causes a welfare loss to the principal (the agent’s expected utility is u  in either case), but 
the latter case also incurs a joint or social loss compared to observable effort. 
 
2.2.5 The continuous effort case 
 Consider next the continuous effort case in contrast to the case with two effort 
levels. Economically, not much is different but it is important to understand why. 
Consider the common case where the agent’s effort is a continuous variable. The agent’s 
IC constraint (ii) in this case is problematic. A standard practice is to replace it with the 
more manageable restriction representing the first-order condition as 
(ii )′  ( ( )) ( | ) ( ) 0eu w f e d c eπ π π ′− =∫  
where fe(π | e) is the partial derivative of f(π | e) with respect to e. Relaxing (ii) in this way 
is called the first-order approach in the literature. It is easy to proceed to a 
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characterization of the optimal scheme, provided the relaxation in  is appropriate. In 
this case, equation (2.8) becomes  
(ii )′
 1/ ( ( )) ( | ) / ( | ).eu w f e f eπ γ μ π π′ = +   
Here, fe(π | e)/f(π | e) is the continuous counterpart of the likelihood ratio. Thus, when this 
characterization is correct, the same qualitative insights on w(π) are obtained as from the 
simple case with two effort levels.  
 With μ positive, w(π) will vary with the output π, trading off some risk-sharing 
benefits for incentive provisions. In particular, w(π) will vary with the likelihood ratio fe(π 
| e)/f(π | e) so as to assure the risk-averse agent of an expected utility level of u  that 
compensates him for the risk he is bearing. The fact that the unobservability of effort 
leads only to downward distortions in the agent’s effort is a special feature of the two-
effort-level specification. With many possible effort choices, unobservability may alter 
the level of effort induced in an optimal contract from its level under full observability, 
but the direction of the bias can be upward as well as downward depending on skewness 
in the distrubution (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995; pp. 477-88).  
 
2.2.6 Validity of the first-order approach 
 The first-order approach does not always work because it can identify a scheme 
that in the end does not satisfy the global IC constraint (ii). If first-order conditions do not 
fully identify global optima for the agent, then the solution to the principal’s problem 
replacing the IC constraint by the first-order conditions of the agent’s problem may not 
maximize the agent’s utility. As a result, the identified maximum of the principal’s 
problem may not be attainable by the principal. Mirrlees (1975) was the first to recognize 
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this dilemma. Subsequently, Grossman and Hart (1983) and Rogerson (1985) worked 
out conditions that ensure the validity of the first-order approach. 
 The necessary conditions to substitute the agent’s first-order condition for the 
agent’s IC constraint are satisfied if the solution to the agent’s first-order condition is 
unique and the agent’s optimization problem is concave. Sufficient conditions are met by 
the MLRP together with convexity of the conditional distribution function condition 
(CDFC) The CDFC requires that the distribution function F(π | e) is convex in e, i.e., F(π 
| ζe + (1 – ζ)e΄) ≤ ζF(π | e) + (1 – ζ)F(π | e΄) ,e e E′∀ ∈  and [0,1]ζ ∈ . These two 
conditions essentially guarantee that the agent’s optimization problem is concave, and 
hence, that the first-order conditions fully identify the global optimum for the agent. 
However, the CDFC and MLRP together are very restrictive conditions. For instance, 
none of the well-known distribution functions satisfy both of these conditions 
simultaneously. 
 
2.2.7 Linearity of w(π) in π 
 An interesting issue is whether all the stated conditions can be met with a 
compensation scheme such that w(π) is linear in π. Condition (2.8) suggests that the 
optimal contract is not likely to take a simple (e.g., linear) form. The optimal shape of 
w(π) is a function of the informational content of various output levels (through the 
likelihood ratio), which is unlikely to vary with π.in a simple manner in many problems. 
The problem is that the connection between π as a physical output and as statistical 
information is tenuous. In fact, the physical properties of π are rather irrelevant for the 
solution. All that matters is the distribution of the posterior (or likelihood ratio) as a 
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function of the agent’s effort. In other words, all that matters is the signaling value of π. 
Thus, cardinality of π is not required to have the same information content. Because the 
information content of π determines the shape of the optimal incentive scheme, 
determining natural economic assumptions that connect the agent’s reward in any 
particular way to the physical measure of π is difficult. 
 As a result, one problem with the basic agency model is its sensitivity to 
distributional assumptions. It manifests itself in an optimal sharing rule that is complex, 
responding to the slightest changes in the informational content of the output π. Such 
fine-tuning appears unrealistic. In the real world, incentive schemes show variety, but not 
to the degree predicted by the basic theory (Bolton, and Dewatripont, 2005). Linear or 
piece-wise linear schemes, for instance, are used frequently and across a wide range of 
environments. Their popularity is hardly explained by shared properties of the 
information technology, as the basic model would have it. Other technological or 
organizational features excluded from the simple model may be responsible for 
regularities in shapes observed empirically. 
 Also, without specifying more about the various functions in the above 
formulation, very little can be said about the solution (see Grossman and Hart, 1983). As 
a result, empirical work has often been based linearity of w(π) in the agency problem as 
found in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). 
 
2.3 Holmstrom and Milgrom’s Linear Scheme 
 Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) have proposed a simple closed-form agency 
model in which linear schemes are optimal because the agent is assumed to have a rather 
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rich effort space. This special case assumes normally distributed output, negative 
exponential utility, and a linear incentive scheme. Output, π, is assumed to be equal to 
effort plus noise, π = e + θ, where θ is normally distributed with zero-mean and 
variance 2πσ . In other words, the agent controls the mean of a normally distributed output. 
The distribution of θ is common knowledge unless otherwise indicated.  
 The agent has risk preferences following constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA), 
which requires /u u′′ ′− = η for η constant. Solving this differential equation, CARA 
implies a negative exponential utility function of the form u(w(π), e) = –  
aside from inconsequential affine transformations, where η > 0 is the agent’s coefficient 
of absolute risk aversion. If the agent is risk neutral, then u
[ ( ) ( )] ,w c ee η π− −
′  is constant so (without 
solving a differential equation) the utility function can simply be represented as 
( ( )), ) ( ).u w e c e( )wπ π=




( ( ), )v w
 Similarly, the principal’s utility can be characterized by 
 where τ > 0 is the principal’s coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion. Except where indicated otherwise, however, the principal is assumed to be risk 
neutral, in which case the principal’s utility function can be represented as 
π π π π= −  For simplicity of illustration, the effort cost function is assumed to 
be quadratic and given explicitly by c(e) = ce2/2. In contrast with formulations thus far, 
effort cost here is measured in monetary units. Suppose that the principal and agent can 
write only linear contracts of the form w(π) = t + sπ  where t is the base salary and s is the 




2.3.1 Risk neutrality and observability 
 A useful reference point is the case of optimal contracting when effort is 
observable and the agent is risk neutral. If the agent’s effort is observable, then the 
contracting problem is relatively straightforward. The contract would simply specify the 
exact action to be taken by the agent and the compensation (wage payment) that the 
principal is to provide in return. The principal’s objective is to maximize E(π) – E(w(π)) 
where E(π) = E(e + θ) = e and E(w(π)) = E(t + sπ) = t + sE(π) = t + se. Thus, E(π) – 




Max s e t− −   (2.9) 
s.t. (i) . 2 / 2 0t se ce+ − ≥
Constraint (i) always binds at a solution. Otherwise, the principal could lower the agent’s 





Max s e t− −   (2.10) 
s.t. (i) .  2 / 2 0t se ce+ − =
 Upon substitution for t from constraint (i) of (2.10), this problem reduces to 
maximization of e – ce2/2 with respect to e. The first-order condition with respect to e is 
solved by e* = 1/c. Thus, the principal offers a wage payment E(w(π)) = t + se* such that t 
+ se* = c(e*)2/2 = 1/(2c). The principal’s profit is E(π) – E(w(π)) = 1/c – 1/(2c) = 1/(2c). 
In this case, a fixed wage payment t* = 1/(2c) with output share s = 0 is merely one of 
                                                 
13 Most of this literature assumes that when the agent is indifferent among efforts or actions, e.g., between 
accepting or rejecting a contract, the agent will choose the action most preferred by the principal. This 





2.3.2 Risk neutrality and unobservability 
 When the agent’s effort is not observable, however, the contract can no longer 
specify the effort level because there is no way to verify whether the agent has fulfilled 
his obligations. The agent may exert effort less than 1/c while getting paid 1/(2c) for an 
agreed effort level 1/c. In this circumstance, the principal must design the agent’s 
compensation scheme in a way that indirectly gives the agent an incentive to choose the 
contracted effort level. 
For the case of unobservable effort where the risk-bearing concern is absent, the 
principal can achieve the same outcome as when effort is observable. Specifically, there 
is a contract the principal can offer that gives her the same payoff as when effort is 
observable. This contract must therefore be an optimal contract for the principal because 





Max s e t− −  (2.11) 
s.t. (i)  2 / 2 0t se ce+ − ≥
(ii) .  2arg max( / 2)
e
e t se ce∈ + −
The second constraint of (2.11) is the IC constraint, which ensures that the principal’s 
optimal effort choice will also be the maximizing choice of the agent. Hence, the agent 
will have no incentive to deviate from the optimal effort. The first-order condition of the 
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agent’s problem,  implies e = s/c. Thus, the principal’s problem 
becomes 
2max  ( / 2),
e
t se ce+ −
 
,
 (1 ) /
t s
Max s s c t− −  (2.12) 
s.t. (i) . 2 /(2 ) 0t s c+ ≥
Again, constraint (i) in (2.12) will hold as an equality at the optimum. Thus, 
solving for 2 (2 )t s c= −  and substituting for t into the maximand transforms the 
constrained problem into the unconstraint problem of maximizing s/c – s2/(2c) with 
respect to s. The first-order condition requires 1/c – s/c = 0, and thus s* = 1. The complete 
solution is thus e* = 1/c, and t* = –1/(2c).  
This contract induces the first-best effort level e* as under full observability. With 
s* = 1, the agent receives the full π and pays a fixed fee, 1/(2c), to the principal. The agent 
receives {E(π) – t | e =  e*} = e* – 1/(2c) = 1/(c) – 1/(2c) = 1/(2c). This is exactly his 
reservation wage 0 net of his effort cost 1/(2c). Thus, the optimal fixed fee is set to 
extract the entire surplus of the agent. With the compensation scheme s* = 1 and t* = –
1/(2c), both the principal and the agent receive exactly the same payoff as when effort is 
observable. The only difference is that instead of the principal choosing e, the agent 
chooses e. 
The basic idea behind this result is that, if the agent is risk neutral, then the 
problem of risk sharing disappears. When the agent is risk neutral, the principal can 
ensure her most preferred arrangement with a simple contract that promises a payment 
w(π) to the agent equal to the profit less some fixed payment 1/(2c) that can be 
interpreted as a "franchise fee" or fixed fee for the right to work for the principal. This 
franchise fee is set equal to the expected net profit from efficient operation. Since the 
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agent pays that fee regardless of the exerted effort, any effort less than the efficient effort, 
1/c, has no impact on the principal’s payoff. Rather, the agent is punished for inefficient 
operation. 
In summary, this result implies that making the agent the residual claimant for the 
firm’s profit is an optimal response to the moral hazard problem if the agent is risk 
neutral. In other words, the principal, in effect, sells the property rights over the firm to 
the agent. As usual, a proper allocation of property rights is sufficient to induce 
efficiency. After "buying" the "franchise," the agent's goals are perfectly aligned with the 
principal's initial goals. Therefore, the agent acts as the principal would if she shared the 
agent's superior information and expertise. 
A critical assumption of this result is that the agent has enough wealth to pay the 
fixed fee, 1/(2c), in any state. Also noteworthy is that this fixed fee contract would be 
strictly preferred by the principal even in the case of observable effort if she were risk-
averse rather than risk neutral. 
 
2.3.3 Assumptions behind the simple results 
 The simple solution of what might, at first, appear to be a nontrivial incentive 
problem relies heavily on some special features of the canonical model (Sappington, 
1991). These special features are what create frictions in the principal-agent relationship, 
and thus necessitate the use of a broader set of tools and institutions. The first feature is 
the assumption that the agent is risk neutral. Under a fixed fee contract, the agent bears 
all the risk associated with output stochasticity. Since the agent is risk neutral, he does 
not care about randomness in the output he produces. In general, whenever the agent is 
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risk-averse, he has to be paid for bearing this randomness and, accordingly, some sharing 
of the risk between the principal and the agent will be optimal.  For example, optimal risk 
sharing would not have a risk-averse agent bear the entire burden of a poor output due to 
extreme bad luck (when θ  turns out to be unusually small). 
 The second feature is the assumption of the agent’s full commitment to the fixed 
fee contract. That means the agent can be bound costlessly to carry out the terms of any 
contract he accepts. A critical case is where the agent observes such an unfavorable 
production environment that the best he can do is earn an expected net profit below his 
reservation utility. The canonical model assumes the agent is unable to breach or 
renegotiate the contract even though he knows an unfavorable state has occurred. The 
same applies to the principal's commitment. The payment schedule announced by the 
principal cannot be changed after the output is observed. This fact assures that the agent 
will not be "held up" by the principal after costly effort has been exerted.  In practice, a 
worker's commitment abilities are not perfect. Also, labor laws prohibit slavery, so an 
employee cannot credibly promise to serve his employer indefinitely. The commitment 
ability of a principal is often limited in practice too. This assumption is relaxed in section 
2.4 to determine its potential impact on the contract. 
 The third feature is the assumption of precontractual symmetric beliefs about the 
potential states of nature represented by θ. If the principal and the agent do not share the 
same beliefs about θ, they might not agree on the value of the fixed fee to buy or sell the 
firm, rendering inapplicable the convenient separation of incentive issues (that motivate 
the agent to choose an efficient level of effort) from distribution issues (that determine 
how profit is divided). However, as long as precontractual beliefs are symmetric, the 
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fixed fee contract maximizes total profit. Symmetric beliefs imply that both parties are 
able to anticipate fully all possible contingencies that might arise during their 
relationship. This assumption is relaxed in section 2.5. 
 Finally, in the simplest setting described above, because all contracting frictions 
can be costlessly avoided with a fixed fee contract, the principal will not pay to obtain 
information on the working environment or the magnitude of the agent's efforts. When 
frictions are caused by precontractual asymmetries of information, risk aversion, limited 
commitment abilities, or problems in measuring the agent's effort, the principal generally 
will benefit from redesigning the simplest franchise fee contract in several ways. These 
complications are discussed next. 
 
2.3.4 Contracting with agent risk aversion 
 This section considers implications of relaxing the strong assumption that agents 
are risk neutral. Again, a useful starting point is the optimal contracting problem where 
effort is observable. 
 
2.3.4.1 Contracting with effort observability 
 The optimal contract for the principal when the agent is risk averse and effort is 





Max s e t− −   (2.13) 
s.t. (i) /2–2t se ce+ − 2 2s πη σ /2 ≥ 0. 
This problem is similar to (2.9) except that the right hand side of the IR constraint in 
(2.13) represents the certainty equivalent income rather than the expected wage. Again, 
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the constraint in (2.13) always binds at the optimal solution. Otherwise, the principal 
could lower the agent’s wages without causing him to reject the contract. Substitution of t 
= –[se – ce2/2 – η 2 2s πσ /2] into (2.13) converts the problem to maximization of 
 with respect to e and s. First-order conditions with respect to e and s 
yield e* = 1/c and s* = 0, which imply t* = –(s*e* – c(e*)2/2 – = 1/(2c). The 
agent receives 1/(2c) which is 0 net of effort cost and the principal receives 1/c – 1/(2c) = 
1/(2c).  
2 / 2e ce− 2 2 / 2πsη σ−
* 2 2( ) / 2)s πη σ
 The implication is that the optimal compensation scheme w(π) is a constant. That 
is, the principal provides the agent with a fixed-wage payment. This is an optimal risk-
sharing result. Given that the contract explicitly dictates the agent’s effort choice and that 
providing incentives is not a problem, the risk-neutral principal fully insures the risk-
averse agent against any risk. Therefore, as long as effort is observable, a first-best 
solution is obtained regardless of the agent’s risk preferences. 
 
2.3.4.2 Contract design with unobservable effort 
 When the agent’s efforts are not observable, the contract cannot specify effort 
effectively because the agent’s effort cannot be verified. In this circumstance, the 
principal must design the agent’s compensation scheme to give an indirect incentive to 
take the correct action (the action that would be contracted if his actions were 
observable). When the effort is unobservable, incentives for high effort can be provided 
only at the cost of imposing risk on the agent. The optimal incentive scheme for 
implementing a specific effort level e minimizes the principal’s expected wage payment 
subject to two constraints. As before, the agent must receive a certainty equivalent 
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income net of effort cost of at least 0 if he is to accept the contract. The agent’s certainty 
equivalent is  
 CE(w(π)) = E(w(π)) – ηV(w(π))/2  
      = E(t + sπ) – ηV(t + sπ)/2 = t + se – ηs2V(π)/2  
      = t + se – ηs2 2πσ /2.   
 When the agent’s effort is unobservable, however, the principal also faces a 
second constraint that the agent must desire to choose the optimal effort when facing the 





Max s e t− −  (2.14) 
s.t. (i) t + se – ηs2 2πσ /2 – ce
2/2 ≥ 0 and  
(ii) t + se – ηs2arg max
e
e∈ 2πσ /2 – ce
2/2.  
The IC constraint (ii) of (2.14) insures that the agent’s optimal effort choice is e under 
compensation scheme w(π) = t + sπ. In other words, constraint (ii) assures that the 
incentive scheme is consistent with the effort the principal wants the agent to choose. 
Solving constraint (ii) yields sce = . This equation implies that, for any level of e, if the 
marginal cost of effort, , is set equal to the variable compensation component, , then 
exerting any lesser effort is not a maximizing strategy for the agent. Therefore, this 
constraint induces the agent to exert the effort level intended by the principal. Using a 









/Max s c t s c− +  (2.15) 
s.t. (i) 2 2 2/(2 ) / 2t s c s wπη σ+ − ≥  
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Converting constraint (i) of (2.15) to an equality, because no alternative action can be 
optimal for the principal, substitution of the constraint obtains the problem 
2 / /(2 )Max s c s c−  – 2 2 / 2sη σ w−  with respect to s. The first-order condition with 
respect to  yields s * 1/(1 )s c 2πησ= + . Substitution for  into 
*s /e s c=  thus implies 
* * / 1/(e s c c 2 2 )cη σ= = + . Further substituting  and  into *s *e 2 2 2/(2t s ) / 2c s wπη σ+ − =  
then obtains t* = w  – (1 2 )c πη σ− / (2c+2η
2 2c 2)πσ .  Expected net profit is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( )]e E E w E t sEπ π π= − = − + π   
        testEs −−=−−= )1()()1( π ,  
or after substituting for ,  and , *s *t *e *eπ  = 
21/[2 (1 )]c c πη σ w+ − .  From these 
expressions, both effort  and the variable compensation rate  decrease when c 
(cost of effort), η (degree of risk aversion), or 
*(e ) *( )s
2
πσ  (randomness of output) increase. 
 Comparing to the case of nonstochastic technology, a fixed rental contract (s* = 1) 
is optimal when 2πσ  = 0, although the principal can also offer a fixed fee contract (s
* = 0) 
as well. With no output randomness, the principal can infer the effort from the output 
without error, which also permits the principal to pay based on the effort. Since the risk 
premium is zero when 2πσ  = 0, the agent faces no risk in his payment even if his payment 
is based on output or equivalent sharing contracts are used. That is why the first-best 
effort level, e* = 1/c, is implemented when 2πσ  = 0 and moral hazard is not a problem. 
 When the technology becomes stochastic ( 2πσ  > 0) the moral hazard problem 
becomes an issue. The only optimal solution is a risk-sharing contract. For 0 < s* < 1, the 
agent gets only a fraction of the output of his effort (or bears only a fraction of the loss of 
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output for reduced effort) at the margin. This fraction is smaller (the incentive for effort is 
weaker) the larger is the variance of the error ( 2πσ ) with which the observable output 
indicates the underlying effort. Incentives can be sharper when the agent is less risk-
averse. That is, a low η implies a high s. In the extreme case of a risk-neutral agent (η = 
0), the optimal share is s* = 1 implying that the principal sells the firm to the agent for a 
fixed fee just as in the risk neutral case of section 2.3.2.  
 More generally, this formulation emphasizes the tradeoff between the agent's risk 
and incentive. The main prediction of this simple model is that a principal operating in 
more risky environments offers her agents compensation schemes in which incentives are 
less intense, i.e., the larger the variance, 2πσ , the smaller is the share (s
*). Also, for 2πσ  > 
0, the resulting effort level is less than the first-best level e* = 1/c. Thus, effort is less the 
larger is the variance of the error ( 2πσ ). On the other hand, the resulting effort is larger 
when the agent is less risk-averse (low η implies high e*) to the point that a risk-neutral 
agent (η = 0) exerts the first-best effort, e* = 1/c.  
 These results raise the question of why the principal should not force the agent to 
bear the entire risk associated with production. In other words, why bias the optimal 
effort downward from the first-best effort?  The answer is that the agent’s required risk 
premium for bearing all the risk becomes excessive requiring the principal to offer 
excessive fixed compensation to satisfy the agent’s IC constraint. Thus, while the agent 
generally receives greater compensation for higher realized output, the agent's 
incremental output is less than the value to the principal of that additional output. In this 
sense, the agent is not the sole residual claimant in the relationship, as in the case of a 
fixed fee contract. This occurs because the agent's goals are no longer perfectly aligned 
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with the principal's goals. Since the agent no longer benefits as much from outstanding 
performance, his effort incentive is diminished, which is reflected in lower effort. Formal 
details along these lines are provided in Stiglitz (1974, 1975), Harris and Raviv (1979), 
Holmstrom (1979), and Shavell (1979). Also, Grossman and Hart (1983) and Laffont 
and Tirole (1986), among others. 
 Alternatively, these results raise the question of why the principal should not 
reduce the risk premium by paying a fixed wage to the agent. The answer is that a fixed 
wage provides no incentive for effort to the agent. Risk sharing between the principal and 
the agent acts as a form of insurance for the agent. By increasing the effort incentive, the 
agent’s risk premium increases but more ouput enables the principal to offer sufficient 
fixed compensation to bear it. 
 
2.3.5 Payments based on multiple signals 
 Thus far output, π = e + θ, has been used as the sole signal of effort. Further 
generalization can admit multiple signals as are relevant for hog contracting in chapter 5. 
Consider the case where an additional objective signal about the agent's effort level is 
available. An objective signal is one that can be verified for contractual purposes.  For 
illustrative purposes, suppose one more objective signal y is available. Signal y is 
measured as y = e + ε, where ε~N(0, ) where  is the variance in measurement error 






πσ  be the variance in measurement error of the signal π. 
Following Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), the optimal contract relating wages to these 
observed signals is assumed to be linear and given by w(π,y) = t + sππ + syy where t is the 
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agent's base pay and sπ is the piece rate on signal π previously denoted by s, and sy is the 
piece rate on signal y. 
 Solving the principal’s problem with respect to multiple signals obtains the 
relative weights of the piece rates sπ and sy. The principal maximizes expected output, 
where expected output is given by the effort of the agent e. All random variables are 
assumed to be mutually uncorrelated. Repeating the same maximization as in section 
2.3.4.2 with one additional argument in the payment scheme, w(π,y) = t + sππ + syy, the 
optimal effort  is given by e* = (sπ + sy)/c (compared to the single signal result, e* = sπ/ 
c in section 2.3.4.2). The first-best effort level, 1/c, occurs when sπ + sy = 1. Optimizing 
over the choice of payment scheme, the principal chooses piece rates of sπ = 
*e
2 2 2 2 2( )y y yπ πcσ σ η σ σ+ + , and sy = 
2 2 2 2 2( y cπ π π )yσ σ σ η σ σ+ +  (Prendergast, 1999). σ
 This model further illustrates the trade-offs between incentives and risk. For a risk 
neutral agent (η = 0), sπ + sy = 1. Thus, the first-best level of effort 1/c is exerted. 
However, if η > 0 with measurement error in both signals ( 2πσ  > 0 and  > 0), effort is 
less than the first-best level, sπ + sy < 1. Since higher variance implies higher 
measurement error, a particular signal's weight is decreasing in its variance, so noisy 
signals receive less weight. However, the weight attached to any signal is increasing in 
the noisiness of the other, although total incentives, sπ + sy, are decreasing in the noisiness 
of any signal.  
2
yσ
 An interesting question is when will the principal choose to base the agent's 
payment on both signals rather than one? Perhaps the most important observation of the 
early contributions to agency theory (Holmstrom, 1979) is what has become known as 
the informativeness principle, which implies that any measure of performance that (on 
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the margin) reveals information on the effort level chosen by the agent should be 
included in the payment scheme. This means, whenever two signals together provide 
more information about the agent's effort than does the agent's output alone, the agent's 
compensation under the optimal contract will be based on both signals. In effect, use of 
an additional imperfect signal does not impose additional risk on the agent because the 
weight of the first decreases just as a balanced portfolio attains less risk than an 
unbalanced one. 
 
2.3.6 Criticisms of linear contracts 
 The linear contract model is not without criticism. A valid criticism is that the true 
first best can be approximated arbitrarily closely by step-function schemes that offer first-
best risk-sharing (a fixed wage) for almost all outputs except extremely bad ones for 
which a severe punishment can be applied. To see this point, suppose the support of θ is 
 where . Suppose for simplicity that θ is uniformly distributed on this 
interval. Through his effort choice, the agent can then change the support of π. Under this 
specification, the agent’s moral hazard problem disappears altogether and the first best 
can always be achieved. 
]ˆ,ˆ[ θθ +− ∞<< θ̂0
 To see this, consider e*, the first-best effort, and w*, the first-best transfer, 
associated with the problem in (2.9) in section 2.3.1. With a bounded support, the 
principal can rule out certain output realizations, provided the agent chooses e*. The 
lower and upper bound for output are thus [e* – ] and [e* + , respectively, given that 
the agent has exerted effort e*. Any output realization smaller than [e* – ] results from 






 Alternatively, outputs are not perfectly informative of the agent’s effort if θ has an 
unbounded support. However, outputs may be arbitrarily informative even when θ has an 
unbounded support (Mirrlees,1975). This is the case, for example, when θ is normally 
distributed. The normal distribution has a likelihood ratio fe(π | e)/f(π | e) that can take any 
value between negative and positive infinity. Mirrlees shows that this information can be 
used to approximate the first best arbitrarily closely. That is, the principal can choose  
such that, for all , the transfer to the agent of w(π) is very low (a form of extreme 
punishment), but for  the transfer is fixed at w(π) = w* + ε, slightly higher than the 
first-best wage level, w*. Under such a compensation scheme, the agent faces a negligible 
risk of getting punished when he chooses e٭, and his IR constraint is satisfied by the 





2.3.7 Support for linear contracts 
 While the results of the last subsection raise concerns about the linear-CARA-
normal distribution formulation, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) have identified 
conditions under which linear contracts are optimal. Beyond assuming CARA 
preferences, they consider a dynamic model where effort is chosen in continuous time by 
the agent. For instance, consider a dynamic context where the agent is paid, say, at the 
end of the week, and assume he can observe his own output during the week so that he 
can adjust his effort, say labor input, as a function of the realized path of output. Then 
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step-functions will induce a path of effort that will be both erratic and, on average, low. 
Generally, the agent will bide his time to see if there is any need to work at all once the 
realized output reaches the critical level. 
 For example, if π = π  in the case of a bounded support, then the agent will not 
exert more effort because additional costly effort will bring no extra benefit. In contrast, a 
linear scheme that offers the same current incentive no matter what the output history will 
lead to a uniform choice of effort. This suggests that the optimality of a step-function 
incentive scheme is highly sensitive to the assumption that the agent chooses his effort 
only once. Laffont and Tirole (1986) illustrate this result in the case of a risk-neutral 
agent, where numerous schemes will be first best. They consider a linear scheme with 
unitary slope as well as the step-function scheme. If the agent receives noisy information 
about the technology before choosing his effort, the linear scheme is uniformly optimal. 
 More generally, the specifications of preferences and measurement errors used to 
this point are also far from innocuous. First, effort is specified as one-dimensional. A 
more general setting would allow the agent to carry out multiple activities. Second, the 
efforts of the agent can affect only the mean of the distribution of output rather than 
higher moments of the distribution. More generally, agents may be able to affect the 
riskiness of various performance measures. Finally, the exponential specification of 
preferences ignores wealth effects. The combination of normal errors and absence of 
wealth effects are critical to optimality of linear contracts. In general the sharing rule will 
not be linear. See Holmstrom (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983) for details. 
Nevertheless, the simplicity and tractability of the linear structure has led to its 
widespread practical use. 
 50
2.4 Limited Liability 
 The model in section 2.2 assumes that the principal and agent make an agreement 
at a point in time when they share symmetric beliefs about the probability distribution of 
a random state of nature, θ. It also assumes that the realization of θ is subsequently 
observed by the risk-neutral agent alone after choosing his unobservable level of effort. 
This specification follows the information asymmetry considered by Grossman and Hart 
(1983), Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979) where the agent observes the true state of 
nature after he chooses his effort. Their precontractual information structure is also 
similar to that analyzed in section 2.2 because the principal and the agent share identical 
beliefs about the true state of nature when they reach an agreement to govern their future 
interaction. Further insights about contracts can be found by relaxing these assumptions. 
 The case where the realization of θ is subsequently observed by the risk-neutral 
agent (alone) before choosing his effort is remarkable. This type of information 
asymmetry is considered by Harris and Raviv (1979), Green and Stokey (1980), and 
Sappington (1980). However, Harris and Raviv differ from the others by considering 
precontractual information asymmetry explicitly. 
 Harris and Raviv show that the self-interested principal can and will design a 
contract that induces an output in every state of nature that is Pareto efficient. They show 
that under the conditions of asymmetric information considered here (and more general 
conditions including risk aversion on the part of the principal) that the principal’s 
expected profit maximizing contract in the absence of liability restrictions is a first-best 
contract of the form w(π) = π – k* where k* is the expected net profit from efficient 
operation in excess of that required for the IR constraint of the agent. Specifically, k* = 
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*( )c eπ ∗ −
 
2.4.1 Contracting with ex ante agent information 
 An example can serve to explain Harris and Raviv’s results in the case of a 
discrete random variable, θ. For simplicity, I will use a slightly different functional 
specification. Following Sappington (1983), suppose the explicit functional form of the 
cost of effort is  where larger θ  reflects a better production environment 
and, hence, lower cost compared to lower θ. 
2( / ) / 2i ic π θ=
 When the agent has ex ante information (observes θ before choosing effort), he 
will generally have more control over output that with ex post information. With ex post 
information, the principal finds the profit maximizing effort level given the distribution 
of θ. Then he sells the firm to the risk-neutral agent at the price of the net profit from that 
effort. The agent falls short of his reservation utility (0) if he gives less effort. Hence, he 
does not have any incentive to shirk. But with ex ante information, the agent has better 
information before choosing effort than the principal. The principal can pay depending on 
both effort and the state of nature if she knows the state of nature. In absence of such 
information, she can make a payment contingent on the output, π. The principal’s 











−∑  (2.16) 
s.t. (i) , )  2
1
( ( / ) / 2)
n
i i i i
i




where wi  = w(πi) and pi is the probability that θ = θi is realized. Again, the constraint in 
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Consider the case with n = 2 where larger θ = θ2 reflects conditions of higher 
productivity compared to θ = θ1. Then (2.17) can be written as  
1 2 1 2
1 1 1 2 2 2, , ,
( ) (
w w
Max p w p w
π π
π π− + −   (2.18)   
s.t. (i) .  21 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( ( / ) / 2) ( ( / ) / 2)p w p wπ θ π θ− + −
2 0=
2
The constraint in (2.18) implies that the expected payment to the agent is equal to 
expected cost, i.e.,  p1w1 + p2w2  = [ 21 1 1 2 2 2( / ) ( / )p pπ θ π θ+ ]/2. Substitution for the expected 
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 First order conditions imply  =  and  = . Suppose  = 2 and  = 4 
so that  = 4 and  = 16. Then p1 = p2 = 1/2 implies  = 
 = 5 and expected output is  =  = 10. 
Expected net profit, k*, is 5. Irrespective of the state of nature the agent pays 5 to the 
principal and in return retains the entire (efficient) output that he chooses to produce. 
When  occurs, he receives a net payment of w1 = 4 – 5 = –1 and his utility is 
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2.4.2 Potential problems with fixed fee contracts 
 The results in section 2.4.1 assume that the agent has sufficient wealth to pay the 
fixed fee if the bad state occurs. If the fixed fee is paid ex post, the wealth constraint 
cannot bind if the good state occurs. But if the fixed fee is paid in advance, wealth can be 
insufficient in both good and bad states. 
Although the contract in section 2.4.1 promises the risk-neutral agent his 
reservation expected utility on average, when the production environment turns out to be 
less favorable than expected (when θ = θ1 is realized), the agent can do no better under 
this contract than suffer a loss in utility –3 below his reservation utility achieved in 
autarky. In such states, the agent prefers to breach the contract. Hence, such a contract is 
necessarily optimal for the principal only when institutions exist that guarantee the agent 
will not breach the contract after observing the state of nature no matter how debilitating 
compliance may be for the agent.  
One such “institution” is simply the requirement that the agent pays the lump sum 
component at the time the contract is signed. This institution may not be feasible; 
however, when the agent’s total wealth is less than the required lump sum and he cannot 
acquire income insurance. Another such “institution” could be an asset specific 
investment required by the agent before observing the state of nature. 
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For one or more reasons, such an institution may not exist in reality. Therefore, if 
the principal offers a fixed fee contract in an environment where the agent's maximum 
loss liability is limited by his option to rescind the contractual obligation, the agent will 
exert effort and remain in the principal's employ only for higher realizations of θ. For 
example, in the example of section 2.4.1, the agent would receive 11 leaving 5 to the 
principal when θ = θ2. If the agent is able to breach when θ = θ1 occurs, then the 
principal’s expected profit is (1/2)(0) + (1/2)(5) = 5/2, whereas the agent’s expected 
utility is (1/2)(0) + (1/2)(11– 8) = 3/2. Total expected surplus, 5/2 + 3/2 = 4, is less than 5 
obtained in the case of section 2.4.1 for the case where no breach can occur. This happens 
because expected surplus when θ = θ1 is 0 whereas it was (1/2)(4) – (1/2)(2) = 1 when no 
breach was possible. As a result, allowing a breach is not an efficient arrangement from 
either the perspectives of the principal or society as a whole. 
Therefore, if the principal must respect the agent's right to abrogate the terms of 
the original contract, then the principal will find it advantageous to alter the terms of the 
contract offered to the agent. In particular, the optimal contract will generally induce 
positive output (  > 0) by the agent even for less favorable realizations of the 
environment (i.e., when θ = θ1). But this expanded output will not be induced simply by 
lowering the fixed fee (k*). To do so would grant too much of the net profit to the agent in 
favorable states, thus raising the agent's expected utility above his reservation utility. 
Instead, the principal will implement a sharing of the total realized net profit. By 
promising the agent a fraction of the net profit associated with his effort, the agent can be 
induced to deliver productive effort, albeit less than the efficient level of effort in 




2.4.3 First-best limited liability contracts 
 Sappington (1983) examines the properties of the contract that emerges between 
a principal and a risk-neutral agent when limits are imposed on the maximum loss that 
the agent can be forced to bear as a consequence of contracting with the principal. 
Contracts which incorporate such limits on the ex post liability of the agent are called 
limited liability contracts. For purpose of illustration and analytic convenience, 
Sappington initially focuses on the special case of limited (zero) liability contracts in 
which the agent has the legal right to disassociate himself from the principal without 
penalty after observing θ. The force of such arrangements can be to ensure that, after 
becoming informed about the production environment, the agent never expects to receive 
less than his reservation utility level 0.14 
 It is convenient to see what happens when the first-best limited (zero) liability 
contract is offered to the agent as a benchmark case. Continuing with the two-state 
problem of section 2.4.1, the principal’s problem if effort is observable is  
1 2 1 2
1 1 1 2 2 2, , ,
( ) (
w w
)Max p w p w
π π
π π− + −  (2.19) 
s.t. (i)  21 1 1( / ) / 2 0w π θ− ≥
(ii)   22 2 2( / ) / 2 0w π θ− ≥
                                                 
14 Asset specific investments can be one such bondage that can result in the agent receiving less than his 
reservation utility part of the time. 
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(iii) . 2 21 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( ( / ) / 2) ( ( / ) / 2)p w p wπ θ π θ− + − 0≥
Constraints (i) and (ii) of (2.19) will hold with strict equality at the principal’s optimum 
since otherwise the principal can increase her profit by lowering w1 or w2 while still 
satisfying the zero limited liability constraints. Constraint (iii) of (2.19) is redundant 
because the agent’s wage is non-negative in each of the states under the limited liability 
constraints. Hence, it can be dropped.  The solution to this problem is *1π  = 4, 
*
2π  = 16, 
w1 = 2, and w2 = 8 for θ = θ1, θ = θ2, and p1 = p2 = 1/2. As a result, the agent is no longer 
the residual claimant. The principal’s expected profit is * *1 1 1 2( ) (2 2 )p w p wπ −π − + = 5 if 
the agent produces 4 when θ = θ1 and 16 when θ = θ2. The agent’s utility is 0 in either 
case. Hence, his expected utility is 0 just matching his reservation utility. 
 
2.4.4 Emergence of the adverse selection problem 
 The problem of section 2.4.3 does not apply when the principal cannot observe 
what state occurs. For example, the agent’s utility is  
 =  +  –   * 21 1 2( ( / ) / 2w π θ− )
)
* 2
1 1 1( / ) / 2w π θ−
* 2
1 1( / ) / 2π θ
* 2
1 2( / ) / 2)π θ
        = 2 2 * 2 2 22 1 1 1 2( )( ) /(2θ θ π θ θ−  = 3/2  
when he produces 4 even when θ = θ2 = 4 occurs. The term 2 2 * 2 2 22 1 1 1 2( )( ) /(2 )θ θ π θ θ−  is 
known as information rent in the incentive literature. The agent’s utility is 
= –24 when he produces 16 and θ1 = 2. Thus, the agent has an 
incentive to produce 4 when θ = θ2. His expected utility from doing so is 
p1 + p2 = 3/4. The principal’s expected profit is then 
p1 + p2 = 2 since the agent produces 4 irrespective of the state that 
* 2
2 2 1( ( / ) / 2w π θ−
* 2
1 1 1( ( / )w π θ−
*






1 1 2( ( / ) / 2w π θ−
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occurs. The moral hazard problem is thus transformed into an adverse selection problem 
because of the limited liability constraint. Therefore, the principal must design the 
contract in such a way that the agent does not have an incentive to lie about what state 
occurs. 
 The easiest way to avoid this problem is to offer the agent = * 22 2 2( ( / ) / 2w π θ− )
)2 2 * 2 2 22 1 1 1 2( )( ) /(2θ θ π θ θ− . That is w2 = + 
* 2
2 2( / ) / 2π θ
2 2
2 1( )(
* 2 2 2
1 1 2) /(2 )θ θ π−
*





2/ ) / 2)
= 8 + 3/2 = 
19/2 when θ = θ2. Then the agent has no incentive to produce 4 when θ = θ2. The agent’s 
expected utility is the same, p1 + p2 = 3/4. The 
principal’s expected profit is thus 
* 2
1 1 1/ ) / 2)π θ
*
1 1 1( )
( (w −
2p w pπ − + wπ − = 17/4. This profit is also less 
than 5, the full-information optimum of section 2.4.1. As will be shown in the following 
section, this is not the best solution for the principal. The principal can distort *1π  to 
reduce the information rent 2 22 1( )
* 2 2
1 1( ) /(2
2 )2θ θ π θ θ−  and receive an expected profit larger 
than 17/4. 
 
2.4.5 Second-best limited liability contracts 
 Another question is whether the principal can improve her profit by distorting the 
first-best contract of section 2.4.3. The answer is yes. In order to do so, the principal 
solves the problem 
 
1 2 1 2
1 1 1 2 2 2, , ,
( ) (
w w
)Max p w p w
π π
π π− + −  (2.20) 
s.t. (i)  21 1 1( / ) / 2 0w π θ− ≥
 (ii)  22 2 2( / ) / 2 0w π θ− ≥
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 (iii)  2 21 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( ( / ) / 2) ( ( / ) / 2p w p wπ θ π θ− + − 0≥
2
 (iv) . 2 22 2 2 1 1 2( / ) / 2 ( / ) / 2w wπ θ π θ− ≥ −
Constraint (i) holds as an equality at the optimum as before. Constraint (iii) can be 
ignored for the same reason as in section 2.4.3. The added constraint (iv) removes the 
incentive for the agent to lie about what state occurs. The problem in (2.20) is no more a 
direct moral hazard problem. The principal designs the compensation scheme w(π) in 
such a way that revealing the true state of nature will be optimal for the agent. The 
principal no longer provides the agent direct incentives for effort. The moral hazard 
model is thus turned into an adverse selection or asymmetric information model. 
 Constraint (iv), along with (i) and (ii), induces the agent to accept the contract 
without lying about what state occurs. Constraint (iv) will hold as an equality whenever 
the agent faces an incentive to lie about the state under a first-best contract. Substituting 
constraint (i), stated as an equality, into constraint (iv), also stated as an equality, obtains 
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2( / ) / 2 ( ) /(2 )w π θ θ θ π θ= + − θ ). Whereas the term 
2 2 2 2 2
2 1 1 1 2( ) /(2θ θ π θ θ−  in this w2 
equation is the information rent that the agent earns for misreporting the state of nature, 
the term 2 2 2 22 1 1 1 2( ) /(2 )θ θ π θ θ−  represents the information rent obtained per unit of output 
π1 produced from mimicking θ = θ1 when θ = θ2 occurs. Given θ1 and θ2, the principal can 
lower both the unit rent and the total rent by reducing π1. Substitution of w1 and w2 
implied by constraints (i) and (iv), stated as equalities, into (2.20) yields the 
unconstrained limited liability maximization problem, 
 
1 2
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2,
 ( ( / ) / 2) ( ( / ) / 2 ( ) /(2 )Max p p
π π
2 2 )π π θ π π θ θ θ π θ θ− + − − − , 
 59
 which has maximizing outputs  and21 1 2 1 1 2/[1 / (1 / )]
L p pπ θ θ θ= + − 2 2 *1π< 22 2
Lπ θ= = *2π  in 
states θ1 and θ2, respectively, where the L superscript denotes the limited liability case. 
Thus, no distortion occurs in the output  in the good state (θ = θ2) compared to the 
good-state first-best output . But the output  in the low-state (θ = θ1) is less than the 









1π θ = , 2 4θ = , and p1 = p2 = 1/2, the explicit solution 
to this limited liability problem is 1
Lπ  = 16/7, 2 16
Lπ = ,  = 32/49, and  = 416/49. 
The principal’s expected profit is  +  – 
1w
2
1 1 1 1( ( / ) / 2)
L Lp π π θ− 2 2p
2w
2
2/ ) / 2θ
* *
2( (π π−
2 2 2 2 2
2 1 1 1 2( )( ) /(2
L )θ θ π θ θ−  =  416/49 which is larger than 17/4 obtained in section 2.4.4, 
even though it is smaller than first-best profit of 5 obtained in section 2.4.3.  
 The agent’s expected utility is  +  =  
12/49 which is smaller than the  3/4 obtained in section 2.4.4, even though it is larger 
than the reservation utility 0 obtained in the first-best case described in section 2.4.3. The 
expected utility in this case is known as the agent’s limited liability rent in the contracting 
literature. Compared to the case without limited liability, this rent is the additional 
payment the principal must incur because of the conjunction of moral hazard and limited 
liability. 
2
1 1 1 1( ( / ) / 2
Lp w π θ− ) 2* 22 2 2 2( ( / ) /p w π θ−
 
2.4.6 Wealth and limited liability rents 
 An important generalization for the application in this dissertation is the case 
where the agent must undertake a significant investment, such as in plant and equipment, 
to facilitate production. Suppose the agent is required to have an asset holding 
represented byϖ  in order to participate in the contract offered by the principal. Then the 
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liability limit implies that the net transfer of the agent, taking into account his own asset 
holding A, must be no smaller than –A. If bad state occurs the agent will be paid w1 while 
his effort cost will be . He will have a deficit of  in covering 
his effort cost. He will have to use A of his own assets to cover this shortage. As a result, 
his net transfer in the bad state is –A if 
2
1 1( / ) / 2π θ
2
1 1 1( / ) / 2 wπ θ −
2
1 1 1( / ) / 2 wπ θ −  > A. Limited liability clauses may 
protect the agent by allowing bankruptcy in any state with a net transfer smaller than –A. 
In this case, the agent avoids bankruptcy even when he has to pay the optimal penalty (no 
larger than A) to the principal if a bad state occurs. The formulation in (2.20) has a zero 
liability limit meaning that only non-negative net transfers are feasible. Therefore, the 
model in (2.20) represents a contractual environment in which the agent is not required to 
own any assets at the time of contracting with the principal. 
 Limited liability rent is increasing in the liability limit. As the agent is endowed 
with more assets, the conflict between moral hazard and limited liability diminishes and 
eventually disappears. For example, if the liability limit is –3 for the formulation in (2.20) 
so that  and 21 1 1( / )w π θ / 2 3− ≥ −
2
2 2 2( / ) / 2π θ 3w − ≥ − , then the agent will earn higher 
rents compared with the zero liability limit. A liability limit of –3 means that the principal 
cannot force the agent to bear any loss larger than 3 in any state. Within this limit, the 
agent will honor a fixed fee contract even if he observes a bad state after signing the 
contract. Otherwise, he can breach the contract with a penalty equal to 3 after observing 
that the bad state has occurred. 
 A limited liability constraint on ex post rents may reduce the efficiency of ex ante 
contracting. If the limited liability constraint on the net transfer in the bad state is 
stringent enough, the principal must reduce the bad state’s output to meet the limited 
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liability constraint. The bad state output is lowered to 16/7 in (2.20) from 4 in (2.19). By 
doing so, the limited liability rent is reduced from 3/4 to 12/49. As the limited liability 
constraint is further tightened, the principal must relax the agent’s ex ante individual 
rationality constraint. More precisely, with a limited liability constraint, the optimal 
contract behaves as if the agent had an infinite risk aversion below a wealth of –A. As a 
result, the principal faces an incentive to select wealthy agents if multiple agents compete 
for the contract. 
 Thus, designing the contract in such a way that the agent is compensated for 
producing an inefficiently small output in the bad state, the principal reduces the 
magnitude of the payment needed to induce a higher level of output in good state. 
However, the principal weighs the expected benefits of setting  below  against the 
costs of inefficiency (costs which are borne if θ = θ1 is realized). As θ = θ2 becomes more 
likely and θ = θ1 is less likely (i.e., as p2/p1 becomes larger),  is set further below  in 












1θ  goes down, 
 is set further below . Also, because the benefits associated with inducing an 
inefficient output in any state are realized only when good state of nature occurs, the 
principal has no incentive to induce an inefficient output in good state of nature. When 
the technology is more general, the distribution of θ may be such that in some states the 
expected benefits of elevating  above  outweigh the expected costs. Under such 
circumstances,  and  will coincide and the limited liability contract offered to the 













 Finally, it should be emphasized why the foregoing concerns are relevant only in 
the presence of limited liability restrictions. Absent any floor on the payoff to the risk-
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neutral agent, any rent that the agent may gain when the principal expands  to its 
efficient level  can be effectively negated by demanding that the agent pay a larger 
lump sum payment in order to contract at all. Consequently, only when limited liability 






 Throughout the foregoing analysis the agent is assumed to be risk-neutral. If the 
agent is risk averse, the qualitative results described here are unlikely to change (Harris 
and Raviv, 1979). Instead, there would be an additional reason for the principal to choose 
something other than a first-best contract to take advantage of the risk-sharing 
opportunities. Properties of such contracts are discussed, for example, by Holmstrom 
(1979) and Shavell (1979). 
 
2.5 Precontractual Information Asymmetry 
 To this point, the principal and the agent have been assumed to have symmetric 
precontractual beliefs about the distribution of θ. I have considered cases (i) where the 
agent first signs the contract, then exerts effort, and then finally observes θ, and (ii) where 
the agent first signs the contract, then observes θ, and then finally exerts effort. This 
section turns to case (iii) where the agent first observes θ, then accepts or rejects the 
contract offered by the principal, and then exerts effort if the offer is accepted. In cases (i) 
and (ii), the principal and the risk-neutral agent share the same beliefs on θ before signing 
the contract, but this is not so in case (iii). 
 As described in the section 2.4, when the principal and the risk-neutral agent 
share the same beliefs before signing the contract, the optimal contract will have the 
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principal receive a lump sum payment (k*) and the agent receive, w(π)=π – k*, the 
difference between the value  of the output produced and the lump sum payment. Such is 
the case whether or not the agent receives perfect information after signing the contract 
(see, e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1979, Holmstrom, 1979, and Shavell, 1979). Because such 
fixed fee contracts induce the agent to value output ex post exactly as does the principal, 
the contract ensures that the agent supplies the level of effort that is Pareto efficient 
conditional upon his private information. Only in case (ii), when the agent is protected by 
limited liability clauses, does a fixed fee contract fail to achieve Pareto efficiency.  
 
2.5.1 Problems created by precontractual information asymmetry 
 In case (iii), in the absence of symmetric precontractual beliefs on θ, the principal 
and agent will not necessarily agree upon whether any particular contract (of the limited 
liability variety or otherwise) provides a level of expected utility for the agent that 
exceeds his reservation level. An analysis of this complication and related ones can be 
found in Sappington (1980). 
 The exact details of the optimal sharing arrangement and the number of distinct 
contracts the principal offers will depend on a number of factors, including the nature of 
the agent's precontractual information and whether he subsequently acquires better 
information. Precontractual information θ in this case can represent the productivity or 
innate ability of the agent, which may be known only to the agent. To illustrate, suppose 
that at the time a contract is signed, the agent has better knowledge than the principal 
about likely productivity and the agent's information on productivity is perfect. 
Obviously, there is no opportunity for the agent to acquire better information after a 
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contract is agreed upon in this case. When the agent's initial information about the 
productivity is superior to the principal's information, the fixed fee contract creates a 
problem similar to that of limited liability protection in section 2.4.  
 To see the connection, redefine the information structure of section 2.4 to 
introduce precontractual information asymmetry. The agent in this case knows θ even 
before signing the contract. Suppose the principal offers a basic fixed fee contract with a 
fixed fee, k* = 5, to an agent who has very accurate information about his productivity. 
This fixed fee contract is characterized by the principal’s problem in (2.18). The agent 
will reject this fixed fee contract if he knows that his productivity is low (i.e.,θ = θ1) 
because he can do no better under this contract than suffer a loss in utility, –3 below his 
reservation utility level, 0.  
 The agent will accept the contract only when he knows θ = θ2. In this state, the 
agent receives 11 leaving a fixed fee of 5 to the principal. The principal’s expected 
benefit is (1/2)(0) + (1/2)(5) = 5/2, whereas the agent’s expected utility is (1/2)(0) + 
(1/2)(11 – 8) = 3/2. This is exactly the same outcome as when the agent is protected by a 
limited liability clause but discovers the level of θ only after signing the contract. In this 
case, the agent rejects the contract when it is offered in the bad state. In the limited 
liability case, since the contract is already signed, the agent breaches the contract when he 
finds that the inferior state of nature has occurred. Anticipating this behavior, the 
principal will again modify the contract by inducing some output from the agent even in 
the inferior state, without granting the agent the entire realized profit. The upshot of such 
arrangements is that the principal must ensure that the agent never expects to receive less 
than his reservation utility level, 0, after signing a contract.  
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2.5.2 Precontractual asymmetric information contracts  
 To ensure that the agent never expects to receive less than his reservation utility 
level after signing the contract, the principal’s problem becomes  
1 2 1 2
1 1 1 2 2 2, , ,
( ) (
w w
)Max p w p w
π π
π π− + −  (2.21) 
s.t. (i) ,  21 1 1( ( / ) / 2)w π θ− ≥ 0
0
0≥
(ii)  22 2 2( ( / ) / 2w π θ− ≥
(iii)    2 21 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( ( / ) / 2) ( ( / ) / 2p w p wπ θ π θ− + −
(iv) . 2 22 2 2 1 1 2( ( / ) / 2 ( ( / ) / 2)w wπ θ π θ− ≥ −
Constraints (i) and (ii) ensure that the agent receives at least his reservation utility level, 
0, and, hence, accepts the contract irrespective of his precontractual information on θ. 
Constraint (3) is the participation constraint that is trivially satisfied once the first two 
constraints are satisfied. Constraint (iv) induces the agent not to lie about what 
information he has on θ. Thus, the problem in (2.21) is the same problem the principal 
solves in the case of limited liability. As a result, the principal faces the same qualitative 
tradeoffs when the agent's initial information about the productive environment is 
superior to the principal's information as she faces when the agent is protected by limited 
liability covenants. 
Thus, the solution of the precontractual asymmetry information case is exactly the same, 
implying 
 2 2 2 21 1 2 1 2 1 2/[1 / ( ) / ] 1






where the P superscript refers to the precontractual asymmetric information case. There 
is no distortion in the good-state output  when θ = θ2 compared to the good-state first-
best output . But the bad-state output  is less than the bad-state first-best output  










 Applications of the asymmetric precontractual information model of this section 
include problems of optimal taxation (e.g., Mirrlees, 1971), price discrimination (e.g., 
Goldman et al, 1984; Roberts, 1979; and Spence, 1977) and labor contracts (e.g., 
Azariadis, 1983, and Grossman and Hart, 1981). In these literatures, the agent 
(representing the taxpayer, the consumer, or the worker) knows his type (i.e., his earning 
ability, his reservation price, or the productivity of his labor), while the principal 
(representing the government, a monopolist, or an employer) does not. There are 
analogous models in the standard principal-agent literature (e.g., Sappington, 1983). The 
distinguishing feature of these models is that only extreme types of the agents will be 
given efficient incentives. The optimal contract will induce other types of agents to 
realize outputs that are inefficient ex post. 
 So far I have discussed contract form when the agent's initial information about 
the productive environment is superior to the principal's information in the case where the 
agent’s information is assumed to be perfect. However, the results are similar for the case 





2.6 Theoretical Predictions at Odds with Empirical Results 
 Whether risk aversion, limited liability restrictions, or precontractual asymmetric 
information complicate the basic model of section 2.3, similar qualitative effects emerge. 
The most important effect is that a fixed fee contract imposes too much risk on the agent 
or delivers too great a share of the realized profit to the agent so that the principal resorts 
to a "sharing" contract. Because the agent's compensation is less sensitive to his output 
under a sharing arrangement than under a fixed fee contract, the agent exerts less effort. 
This reduced effort results in loss for the principal relative to the benchmark optimality of 
the first-best model. 
 Standard moral hazard models stress this trade-off between incentives and risk-
sharing in the determination of contractual forms. Fixed fee contracts are relatively 
efficient from the incentives viewpoint because the agent is both the main decision maker 
and the residual claimant. However, they also generate an inefficient allocation of risk, in 
which all the risk is borne by the agent who is generally presumed to be more risk averse. 
When uncertainty is small, risk sharing matters less and fixed fee contracts are more 
likely to be adopted. On the other hand, in a very uncertain environment risk sharing is 
paramount and a sharing contract is the natural contractual form. This prediction can be 
readily tested using data on existing contracts provided that a proxy for the level of risk is 
available. 
 This section discusses briefly the correspondence of these results with empirical 
observations, first in the share cropping problem (which is the most common practical 
problem in the literature and inspired the early work), and then in the context of the 
parctial application in this dissertation to hog contracting. 
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2.6.1 Evidence from share cropping 
 Several inconsistencies between theoretical predictions and observed facts have 
been found for share cropping. The theory predicts that more risky crops are more likely 
to be grown under sharecropping contracts in agriculture. For instance, if some crops are 
known to be more risky than others, the theory predicts that these crops are more likely to 
be associated with sharecropping contracts given that available growers have common 
risk-averse preferences. 
 A number of papers have tested this prediction by regressing contract choice on 
crop riskiness. Higgs (1973) finds weak evidence consistent with this implication for 
corn and cotton in the early twentieth century in the southern United States. Rao (1971) 
finds opposing evidence for Indian farms. More recently, Allen and Lueck (1992, 1999) 
for farms and Leffler and Rucker (1991) for timberland find no relation between risk and 
the nature of contracts chosen.  
 
2.6.2 Evidence from hog contracting 
 While several factors are likely to influence decisions regarding hog contracting, 
the most important reason cited by hog growers for choosing contract farming is risk 
reduction (Rhodes, 1989; Rhodes and Grimes, 1992; Johnson and Foster, 1994; 
Kliebenstein and Lawrence, 1995; Lawrence and Grimes, 2001).  In their hog producers’ 
survey, Lawrence and Grimes (2001) found that producers cited financial risk reduction 
as the key advantage of production contracts. Martinez, Smith, and Zering (1998) 
analyzed the motivating factors behind increasing use of contracts and vertical integration 
in the hog industry and concluded that risk reduction is the most important reason for 
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contracting. The studies that emphasize the reduction of farmers’ economic risks view 
contracts as a vehicle to shift risks to integrators, which appeals to the risk sharing 
approach to modeling contracting. 
 If wealth is taken as a proxy for risk-aversion, then poorer growers are more 
likely to be more risk averse (under decreasing absolute risk aversion) and thus more 
likely to be under a sharing contract for a given production uncertainty. But the facts 
from contract hog growing do not support this theoretical prediction if risk sharing is the 
main motivation for contracting. If risk aversion is the main motivation, then more small-
scale hog producers should be contract growers. But, in fact, more large-scale producers 
are contract growers. Furthermore, this is a growing trend (MacDonald et al, 2004). 
Thus, risk reduction does not appear to be the main motivation for contracting in hog 
production. 
 However, as in share cropping, this simple casual observation of facts does not 
confirm that the theoretical predictions are altogether wrong. As explained in section 2.4 
and 2.5, sharing contracts emerge not solely because agents are risk-averse. Risk neutral 
agents may have wealth constraints that lead to sharing contracts because of necessary 
limited liability protection. Even when wealth constraints are not binding, precontractual 
information asymmetry may lead to sharing contracts. A more plausible motivation for 
hog contracting may be found from limited liability and wealth issues or from 
precontractual asymmetric information issues. Thus, this inconsistency of theoretical 
predictions and observed facts does not necessarily imply that the theory is irrelevant. 
Rather, it suggests that generalizations in the theory may be necessary to better match the 
conditions of observed facts. These possibilities are explored in chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3: 
Gains from Contracting in a Model with Heterogeneous Agents 
3.1 Introduction 
 The fundamental model described in chapter 2 has an obvious weakness for 
application in problems where principals face many potential agents. It disregards 
endogeneity in matching agents to principals. In other words, the theoretical predictions 
described in chapter 2 hold only when the characteristics of the principal and the agent 
are given. Such a model is appropriate only if the agents facing different contracts do not 
differ by relevant characteristics.15 
 This chapter examines contracting when agents facing different contracts differ in 
their characteristics. Heterogeneity in agents’ characteristics is incorporated into the basic 
model explored in detail. Because the agents are heterogeneous, an important issue is 
whether all the agents gain from contracting, or whether some agents can find only 
negative gains from contracting. The models presented in the literature do not consider 
the possibility that part of the agents may lose while others gain.  Part of the literature 
ignores this possibility by assuming agents are homogeneous in characteristics. When 
agents are homogeneous, the same contract can be offered to all agents and no agent will 
receive less than his reservation utility under the conditions of chapter 2. For this reason 
the models of chapter 2 cannot explain negative gains among only a share of contracting 
agents. 
                                                 
15 Of course, such a model is also appropriate only with a single principal. The case with multiple principals 
(who possibly differ in characteristics) is not considered here for reasons given in the application to hog 
contracting in chapter 5. 
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 Another reason the possibility of negative gains for a share of contracting agents 
is not considered is that, even when heterogeneity is assumed say in agents’ ability; 
agents are assumed to have complete knowledge of their ability. Results in this chapter 
(sections 3.3.2 and 3.4.2) show that when the agents know their ability perfectly they 
never receive less than their reservation utilities on average. But when agents have no 
knowledge of their ability or have partial knowledge of their ability, then the potential for 
some agents to lose from contracting becomes relevant. I explore this issue in detail in 
this chapter. I adapt existing models for different information structures and determine 
whether agents gain or lose from contracting. 
 Section 3.2 describes how standard theoretical predictions are modified or 
reversed once agential heterogeneity and transaction costs are introduced. The transaction 
costs considered in this chapter are incentive cost required to induce a given effort from 
an agent. They include negotiation, supervision, monitoring, and enforcement costs as 
well as costs associated with asset specific investment. Section 3.3 presents the formal 
theoretical model with agential heterogeneity and the theoretical predictions regarding 
agents’ gains from contracting under different information structures. Section 3.4 
examines contracts under an alternative form of technology and ensures that the results in 
section 3.3 are not driven by the specific functional form of the technology that is 
assumed. Section 3.5 discusses the issue of whether agents know their ability or 
productivity parameters perfectly before they enter a contract and examines contracting 




3.2 Agential Heterogeneity: Basic Theoretical Issues 
 Intuition suggests that endogeneity occurs in the matching of agents to contracts 
in reality. In chapter 2, theoretical predictions of contract choice were derived for a given 
principal with particular characteristics (degree of risk aversion, τ = 0) and a given agent 
with particular characteristics (degree of risk aversion, η ≥ 0, randomness of output 2πσ  > 
0, and cost of effort c). Optimal solutions given all these characteristics then determined 
the optimal contract form (e.g., the share of output to be given to the agent as a function 
of these characteristics. 
 For example, the optimal contract form, s* = 1/(1+cη ), in section 2.3.4.2 of 
chapter 2, implies that, if risk effects are an important determinant of contract choice, 
then risky crops (i.e., those with large ) will more likely to be associated with 
production contracts (i.e., 0 < s* <1) than with fixed fee contracts (i.e., s* = 1). Allen, and 
Lueck (1992) examine whether the inherent riskiness of a crop affects the type of 
contract used for that crop. Empirically, they do not find this correlation and conclude 
that risk sharing is not an important determinant of contract choice. In this chapter, I 
suggest that one reason a correlation of risk and share cropping is not found may be that 





 Suppose agents have heterogeneous degrees of risk aversion. For simplicity, 
assume that a fraction of the agents are risk neutral while the rest are risk averse. 
Different agents will then be drawn to different crops. Efficiency suggests that risk 
neutral agents should specialize in the more risky crops. But risk neutral agents are also 
best suited to fixed fee contracts since risk sharing is not an issue for them. Thus, given 
heterogeneous risk aversion, fixed fee contracts are conceivably associated with more 
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risky crops so the standard prediction is reversed (Ackerberg, and Botticini, 2002). This 
extreme example has an empirical implication that is exactly the reverse of Allen and 
Lueck’s(1992) arguments where fixed-fee contracts are found on the risky crops. The 
problem here is that while the “crop riskiness” may be exogenous to the landlord who 
owns the land, it is endogenous through principal-agent matching to the tenant. 
 With two types of agents characterized by high and low risk aversion, both types 
prefer a sharing contract, all else equal. However, the preferred piece rate, s* = 
1/(1+cη ), varies negatively with the degree of risk aversion. But in many cases the 
more risk-averse agents may not enter sharing contracts at all. This might occur because 




 On the other hand, a higher piece rate with lower base pay may discourage the 
more risk-averse agents from entering the contract. If this is the case, more low cost and, 
hence, less risk averse agents are likely to be contract growers. As a result, heterogeneity 
among growers can drive some seemingly peculiar contractual arrangements reversing 
the standard theoretical predictions. Also if low cost growers are risk neutral, they will 
prefer fixed fee contracts unless restricted by wealth constraints, all else equal, but a fixed 
fee contract may not be offered by contractors who cannot separately distinguish risk 
preferences. So agents may choose sharing contracts even though they are risk neutral, 





3.2.1 Multiple agents and matching  
 Preserving the risk sharing role of the payment scheme, Wright (2004) provides 
another reason why a positive relationship between risk and incentives might be 
observed. He argues that crucial factors are the existence of agents with different degrees 
of risk aversion and competition between principals for these agents. It is less costly for 
principals to induce a given effort from a less risk-averse agent than from a more risk-
averse agent because less has to be paid to compensate the less risk-averse agent for the 
risk he bears. Hence, identical principals prefer to select agents with low risk aversion, all 
else equal, by offering contracts with a high piece rate that discourages high risk-averse 
agents from contracting.This kind of selection is not considered in the standard model of 
chapter 2 because only one agent (or, implicitly, many similar agents) are considered. 
Selection preferences are considered in this chapter in the case of multiple heterogeneous 
agents. 
 Also, provision of incentives to a high risk agent is costly when 2πσ  is large. 
Under certain conditions, principals who operate in a riskier environment are prepared to 
pay more for the services of less risk-averse agents than principals operating in a less 
risky environment. Therefore, competition ensures that less risk-averse agents are hired 
by principals operating in riskier environments. This result carries over to the case of 
asymmetric information about agent types. Such matching of less risk-averse agents to 
riskier principals was hypothesized in an empirical paper by Ackerberg, and Botticini 
(2002) and further argued to be reasonable by Prendergast (2002). 
 Although, all else equal, the more risky the environment the less intense are the 
incentives, it is also true that the less risk averse the agent the more intense are the 
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incentives. If the latter effect dominates the former, then principals in riskier 
environments will offer compensation schemes with more intense incentives than those 
offered by principals in less risky environments. As a result, an observed positive 
relationship between risk and incentives is consistent with agency theory. With this 
approach, Ackerberg, and Botticini (2002) find support for agency theory after 
controlling for endogenous matching. 
 These examples mainly consider matching based on risk and risk aversion. But 
many other characteristics can also lead to matching between heterogeneous principals 
and heterogeneous agents. For example, principals with higher ability to monitor or 
measure output might prefer low-share, high-rent contracts and thus match up with agents 
with more risk aversion, more credit constraints, or a higher cost of effort (who would 
also prefer low-share or wage contracts, all else equal). This type of matching minimizes 
transaction costs associated with risk aversion. 
 
3.2.2 Transaction costs in principal-agent problems 
 One of the simplifications of standard neoclassical marginal analysis is the 
assumption that supervision, monitoring, inspection, and enforcement are costless in spot 
markets. However, spot market transactions involve significant costs. These costs can be 
reduced or avoided if firms choose to internalize certain activities. Thus, it might be 
efficient for disparate activities to be combined within a given firm. The transaction costs 
approach of Coase (1937) was a first step in seeking to understand why this happens. As 
elaborated later by Coase(1960), transaction costs can be minimized by expanding a firm 
to internalize externalities otherwise imposed on it by the actions of others. 
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 However, activities intended to avoid transaction costs carry their own costs 
because spot market attributes of clarity and focus are often obscured or absent in 
dealings within a firm. Internal costing and pricing can be problematic, so the 
management of these internalized activities can become as costly as their purchase or 
sale. Whenever transaction costs of internal (e.g., vertically integrated) organizations are 
smaller than those of spot market, vertical integration is preferred. A production contract 
is an intermediate form between the cases of vertical integration and spot markets. Thus, 
transaction costs provide a useful perspective for examining the choice among spot 
markets, production contracts, and vertical integration as devices to organize production 
(Williamson 1975, 1979; Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Joskow, 1987). 
 In a principal-agent setting, choices are made between fixed rents (i.e., markets), 
fixed wages (i.e., internal organization), and production contracts. Transaction costs arise 
because of the conflicting interests between parties (the principal and agent) when the 
agent's efforts cannot be easily monitored by the principal and where the output is not 
influenced by the agent's effort alone but by factors beyond the control of the agent. 
 Stated succinctly, with transaction costs and a risk averse agent, the production 
contract is chosen because it distributes the variance of the output among the contracting 
parties. But if savings in transaction costs from alternative contracts outweigh risk 
sharing benefits, then alternative contracts would be preferred. Thus, in the choice of 
contracts, a trade-off exists between risk aversion and transaction costs associated with 
different types of contracts.  The choice of contractual arrangement is made so as to 
maximize the gain from sharing risk subject to the constraint of transaction costs. While 
the constraint of transaction costs was not absent in the theoretical analyses of chapter 2, 
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it was assumed identical for all agents, thus ignoring the potential impact of its 
heterogeneity on contract choice.  
 When transaction costs associated with various contracts vary across agents and 
agents are heterogeneous in risk aversion, more low risk-averse than high risk-averse 
agents are likely to be observed in production contracts because of their relative 
efficiency in transactional costs. Inducing a given effort from a low risk-averse agent is 
less costly for the principal than from a high risk-averse agent because less is required to 
compensate the low risk-averse agent for the risk he bears. Thus, the transaction costs of 
effort from a low risk-averse agent are lower. Accordingly, given heterogeneous 
transaction costs and risk aversion, production contracts conceivably can be associated 
with less risk-averse agents, thus reversing the standard prediction. In the extreme, agents 
may choose production contracts even though they are risk neutral, which is contrary to 
the standard theoretical prediction. 
 
3.2.2.1 Production contracts versus spot markets and vertical integration 
 The choice of contract depends on how transaction costs associated with 
negotiation, supervision, and enforcement as well as risk vary across contracts. In 
considering the three contract forms—wage, share (of production), and fixed rent—
negotiation costs are unlikely to vary across contracts. On the other hand, supervision 
costs are likely to vary significantly by contract type. For example, supervision costs 
likely decrease as effort is more closely linked with payment. Since a tenant with fixed 
rent receives all the benefit from extra effort, incentives under fixed rents are superior to 
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those of production contracts, and hence, less supervision is required than for production 
contracts.  
 In fact, supervision costs are least under a fixed-rent contract because the 
principal receives her fixed fee regardless of the length and intensity of the agent’s effort, 
provided that the payment is made before the agent exerts effort or that the effort is 
certain to yield a sufficient output to the principal. For the similar reason, supervision 
costs are greatest under wage contracts because the payment is based on the amount of 
effort an agent spends rather than on his output. Since an agent under a production 
contract receives only a share of his marginal product, supervision costs of production 
contracts less than for wage contracts but greater than for fixed rent contracts. However, 
this simple ordering of contracts might not hold if other factors such as underreporting of 
output are considered. 
 In addition to supervising agents’ effort, the principal has an incentive to monitor 
the use of any other inputs that she supplies to the production process. Careless or 
excessive use of the principal’s work stock or equipment would result in the depreciation 
of such assets. The more inputs and the more valuable are the inputs that the principal 
supplies, the greater is the incentive to monitor. However, the marginal cost of 
monitoring inputs decreases as the number of inputs supplied increases. For example, the 
marginal cost of supervising agents’ effort may be small if the principal already monitors 
the use of her work stock by the agent.  
 Along with supervision and monitoring costs, enforcement costs also vary across 
contracts. Enforcement cost ensures that an agent honors the length of the contract, i.e., 
that he does not breach the contract before it expires. The greater the opportunity cost of 
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breaking a contract, the less likely a breach will occur. For a competitive labor market, an 
agent’s expected wage is larger under a fixed-rent contract than a production contract 
because fixed rent requires lower costs of supervision than production contracts. The 
agent receives a risk premium for bearing more risk. Since opportunity costs increase 
with the expectation of a larger ex post payment, a fixed rent contract is more likely to 
dominate. Similarly, a production contract gives the agent a higher expected payment 
than a wage contract because the opportunity cost (reflected by the expected ex post 
payment) of leaving the contract exceeds that of a wage earner who is paid on the basis of 
time, bears no risk, and requires considerable supervision. 
 Another source of transaction costs is also worth explaining. Transaction costs of 
markets may be high if there is opportunistic behavior by any of the transacting parties. 
The principal and agent might have the ability and the incentive to be opportunistic in 
misrepresenting their type and other transaction related information, for example, by 
hiding intentions on contract renewal. The principal can be opportunistic and take 
advantage of an agent’s immobility or asset specific investment. Such specific investment 
may inflict high transaction costs on the parties. This, in turn, would play a role in 
influencing the type of contract. 
 
3.2.2.2 Asset specificity and the holdup problem 
 Research since Coase’s (1937) seminal paper on the nature of the firm has 
inspired many modifications in economics, but all contributors thus far apparently agree 
upon the fact that asset-specific investment is one of the main contributing factors to a 
high level of transaction costs as defined by Williamson (1975, 1985). Williamson 
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(1975) and Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) reinvigorated the transactions costs 
approach by studying asset specificity and investments. Specificity arises when assets are 
much less useful and, hence, less valuable in any other use. Williamson (1979) defined 
asset specificity as the magnitude of economic costs associated with redeploying an asset 
to its best alternative uses and by best alternative users. An extension of the specificity 
notion is that of relation-specific investment, where an investment is more valuable in 
one business relationship than in alternative relationships. 
 Where the principal or the agent makes sizable investments in assets specific to an 
ongoing supply relationship, spot markets are unlikely. Although relation-specific 
investments facilitate total value added, the incentive structure for such investments can 
be weak. When production requires an agent to invest in an asset that is specialized to a 
particular principal, any deal made prior to investing in the specialized asset may not be 
enforceable once the investment is made. Thus, agents become vulnerable to being held 
up by the principal for shares of the quasirent once specific investments have been made. 
 The quasirent of an asset is the difference between the ex ante best alternative 
return on the capital invested in an asset and the ex post return it must receive to prevent 
alternative use of the capital invested in the asset (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian,1978). 
Thus, relation-specific investments create a divergence between the rate of return that an 
agent must expect in order to be induced into the relationship and the rate of return below 
which the agent will exit the relationship. 
  A holdup involves opportunistic behavior of one or both of the parties in a 
transaction, the intent of which is to capture quasirents arising in relation-specific 
investments or other specialized assets. Once the contract is signed and the assets are 
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deployed one of the parties may threaten to pull out of the arrangement, thereby reducing 
the value of the specific assets unless a greater share of the quasirents of joint production 
find their way into the threat-maker’s pockets. Thus, the non-investing party can seek to 
extract quasirents by use of the market power arising from the difficulty of the relation-
specific asset holder in exiting the contract and entering another relationship. 
 Wary of such opportunism, investing parties—especially parties with low 
bargaining power—might choose to invest less in such assets than is socially optimal. 
Also, they may choose less specific, i.e., less specialized and less productive, technology. 
One way to mitigate this hold-up problem is to vertically integrate the agent and the 
principal. If they pool their capital into a single enterprise for which profits are jointly 
shared, then the incentives for quasirent-seeking activities are attenuated. Because such 
integrated enterprises would choose more productive specialized technology, they would 
perform better than the contractual alternative.  
 Another way to address the holdup problem is to sign a long-term contract before 
the irreversible, asset-specific investment is made. As Williamson (1975) suggests, this 
type of solution, which is based on vertical integration, depends as much on bounded 
rationality as it does on opportunism. Opportunism serves little when information is 
perfect. In a world of certainty and unrestricted cognitive ability, enforceable long-term 
contracts could be written that preempt unproductive ex post rent-seeking behavior and 
thus obviate vertical integration. Thus, to prevent opportunism and ensure adequate 
investment in relation-specific assets, either long-term contracting designed to discourage 
opportunism or vertical integration, which eliminates the incentive for opportunism, is 
the preferred approach for organizing production (Williamson, 1979).  
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 This discussion of transaction costs based on relation-specific assets offers both 
insight into the organization of production and a puzzle. While relation-specific 
transaction costs provide a convincing explanation for the lack of spot markets, it seems 
unable to explain why one or the other (production contracts or vertical integration) is 
preferred. The choice between production contracts and vertical integration depends 
largely on the anticipated need to adapt to a changing technology or uncertain future and 
other related characteristics of the technology and the parties. As more change is 
anticipated or the future is more uncertain, contracts must either become more complex 
or less complete. Complexity adds to the cost of writing and enforcing a contract, and 
incomplete contracts retain some incentive for opportunism. The result is that vertical 
integration becomes the likely choice to organize production (Williamson, 1979). 
 However, in certain cases, asset-specific investments by agents establish 
supremacy of production contracts over vertical integration. This supremacy can result 
from lower supervision, monitoring, and enforcement costs with contracts than with 
vertical integration. An important function of an agent’s investment in specific assets is 
the inducement for self-selection by high-ability agents. Requiring agents to invest in 
specific assets acts as an entry fee and can be used in conjunction with an adjustment of 
the piece rate to discourage low-ability agents from signing contracts while 
simultaneously attracting high-ability agents. High-ability agents will remain highly 
motivated because they will find their investment more profitable than low-ability agents, 
and thus will not require much supervision and monitoring.  
 Because monitoring maintenance of specific assets is difficult, an additional 
benefit of contracts arises from providing proper maintenance incentives to agents. The 
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performance of a hired agent managing a principal-provided asset will not be assured as 
in the case where the same asset is owned by the agent unless the agent’s performance is 
supervised or/and monitored (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Production contracts 
requiring agents to provide these assets (or a faction of these assets) provide proper 
incentives for maintenance without any need for expensive supervision or/and 
monitoring.  
 Also, when agents do not provide these assets, discontinuance is not onerous to 
the agent, and thus enforcement costs are larger. Agent provision of assets creates a bond 
that assures better performance and makes the relationship a long-term one. Another 
advantage is that agent provision of these assets increases the financial leverage of the 
principal due to the substitution of agent capital for that of the principal. Reasons for 
preferring long-term contracts to vertical integration are discussed further in chapter 5 in 
the context of hog contracts. Since long-term contracts are preferred to vertical 
integration in the hog sector, the theoretical analysis in this chapter focuses only 
production contracts. 
 Because the preferred approach is long-term contracting, the imperfect 
information about agents’ productive capabilities or efficiencies becomes relevant. This 
can occur because the productivity of an agent depends on the asset-specific investments 
or because the agent has no experience with some technology-imbedded inputs supplied 
by the principal. Thus, it is not possible for an agent to know his productive capability 
before signing the contract. As will be shown in this chapter, if agents do not know their 
abilities either completely or partially, some low-ability agents earn less than their 
reservation utilities from operation under contracts. But in the case of large asset-specific 
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investments, agents earning less then their ex ante reservation utility may have no 
alternative but to continue to produce in order to recover at least part of the fixed 
investments.  
 Turning to hog contracting, in particular, competition among principals by agents 
is not practical (as explained in chapter 5). Therefore, I limit discussion to the single 
principal case. An interesting question is whether a principal will offer a single sharing 
contract with the intent that more able agents will self select it. Also, I explore the 
important issue of whether all the agents gain from contracting, or whether some of them 
are left with only negative gains from contracting. This issue has not been explored 
previously in the literature. 
 
3.3 Contracting with Heterogeneous Agents 
 Suppose an agent’s output is given by π = e + α + θ where expected output is the 
sum of the effort of the agent e and his ability α. As in chapter 2, θ is the state of nature 
where θ ~ N(0, 2πσ ). But suppose now following Prendergast (1999) that the principal 
faces multiple heterogeneous agents where agents’ heterogeneity is captured in ability α 
where α ~ N(0, 2ασ ). Assume that all the random variables are uncorrelated with one 
another. Also assume that the certainty equivalent of u  is 0 where u  is the reservation 
utility of an agent.  
 Two cases are discussed: one where agents have no knowledge of their ability 
(section 3.3.1) and one where they have complete knowledge of their ability (section 
3.3.2). The intermediate case when agents have partial knowledge of their ability is 
addressed later in section 3.5. 
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3.3.1 The case where agents do not know their ability 
 This section assumes that abilities are unknown to both the agents and the 
principal. But the ex ante distribution of abilities is known to all contracting parties. 
Therefore, contracting takes place under symmetric information. In this case, symmetric 
distributional knowledge of α drives some of the interesting theoretical predictions about 
agents’ ex post gains from contracting. Again, the principal and agent are assumed to 
write a linear contracts of the form w(π) = t + sπ where the base pay is t and the piece rate 
(i.e., the marginal payment or bonus) is s per unit of π produced.  
 
3.3.1.1 Risk neutrality 
 Again, the risk neutral case can serve as a useful benchmark. As described in 
section 2.2 of chapter 2, solving the problem as if the agent himself is the principal and is 
maximizing his own profit and then transferring the expected profit to the principal is one 
way to find the solution for the risk neutral case. Profit from an agent with ability α is  
П = π – w(π) = e + α + θ – t – s(e + α + θ) because of π = e + α + θ and w(π) = t + sπ. 
Expected profit over all α is E(П) = (1 – s)e – t. Surplus for an agent with ability α is  
S = w(π) – C(e) = t + sπ  – ce2/2 = t + s(e + α + θ) – ce2/2 because C(e) = ce2/2. Thus, 





Max s e t− −  (3.1) 
s.t. (i) t + se – ce2/2 = 0,  




From constraint (i) of (3.1), t = –(se – ce2/2). The IC constraint (ii) of (3.1)  
implies e = s/c. Substituting t and e into the objective function obtains the unconstrained 
problem of the principal, 
 ( / )(1 /2)
s
Max s c s− .  
The first-order condition with respect to s is (1 – s)/c = 0, which implies s* = 1. Similarly, 
e* = 1/c and t* = –1/(2c). The fixed fee that an agent has to pay the principal to own the 
firm is k* = – t* = 1/(2c). This is the maximized expected profit that the agent can earn if 
he owns the firm. When the agent owns the firm he maximizes expected profit E(П) = e – 
ce2/2 with respect to e. Maximizing E(П) with respect to e yields  e* = 1/c and, thus, 
maximized expected profit, E(П٭) = e*(1 – ce*/2) = 1/(2c).  
The fixed fee, k*, is same for all the agents irrespective of their ability α. Since the 
reservation wage is assumed to be zero, an agent’s expected gain from contracting is E(П
 k* = 0. Again, this assumes agents accept contracts if their ex ante expected gain – (٭
from contracting is nonnegative (i.e., E(П٭) – k* ≥ 0).  
 
 3.3.1.2 A risk neutral agent’s gain from contracting 
 This model raises the issue that some agents are left with negative gains from 
contracting on average (over all states of nature). Consider the case of a given agent j 
with ability αj. Maximized surplus for this agent is S* = t* + s*(e* + αj + θ) – c(e*)2/2 = αj + 
θ. Thus, agent j’s conditional gain from contracting (conditional on both α and θ) is S* = 
αj + θ and agent j’s unconditional expected gain is E(S* | αj) = αj. This means that the 
reservation wage of zero is met in expectations only for an agent with ability α = 0. Some 
agents will have expected gains above their reservation wage and some will be below. 
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 When a high ability agent observes an unfavorable production environment (i.e., a 
low θ indicating a bad state), he can still enjoy a non-negative S* if the realized θ is not 
extremely low. On the other hand, when a low ability agent observes a favorable 
production environment (i.e., a high θ indicating a good state), he can still receive a 
negative S* if the realized θ is not extremely high. Thus, even though agents accept ex 
ante contracts depending on their expected gain without knowledge of their α, they may, 
in fact, have a negative expected gain that for some will occur for most or all possible 
states of θ. 
 When contracting relationships between the principal and the agents are repeated, 
the agents observe more than one realization of these random variables. If θ can be 
observed separately from α, then both the agent and principal can know α after one round 
of contracting. Alternatively, if θ cannot be observed separately but only as combined 
with α in a sum, α + θ, then α can be determined only with error. From the agent’s 
standpoint, however, if his ability is fixed over time then using E(α) as his expected 
ability is not reasonable after one round of contracting. 
 With each additional round of contracting θ’s will occur both below and above 
E(θ ) but observations on αj + θ will obey the law of averages enabling increasingly 
accurate assessment of αj + E(θ). Thus, after many rounds of contracting, the agents ex 
post expected gain from contracting, which will serve as the ex ante expectation for 
future contracting, will become the true conditional expectation, E(S* | αj) = αj. Ex post, 
agent j realizes this gain on average. For any strictly positive realization of αj, agent j’s 
E(S* | αj) is positive while for any negative realization of α agent j’s E(S* | αj) is negative. 
Thus, any agent with realized α greater than its mean has a positive gain from contracting 
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on average, and any agent with realized α less than its mean has a negative gain from 
contracting on average.  
 
3.3.1.3 Risk aversion 
 Now consider the case where agents are risk-averse with absolute risk aversion η. 
Where utility follows the negative exponential form assumed in chapter 2, the agent’s 
certainty equivalent is CE(S) = E(S) – ηV(S)/2 = t + se – ηs2 2 2( )π ασ σ+ /2 – ce
2/2, given 





Max s e t− −  (3.2) 
s.t. (i) t + se – ηs2 2 2( )π ασ σ+ /2 – ce
2/2 ≥ 0 
  (ii)  t + se – ηs2arg max
e
e∈ 2 2( )π ασ σ+ /2 – ce
2/2 
 Constraint (ii) of (3.2) yields the simple result, ce = s. What this equation implies 
is that if the marginal cost of effort, ce, is set equal to the piece rate, s, for any level of e, 
then exerting any lesser effort by the agent is not a maximizing strategy for him. 
Therefore, this constraint induces the agent to exert the effort level that is optimal for the 





/Max s c t s c− +  (3.3) 
s.t. (i) 2 2 2 2/(2 ) ( ) / 2t s c s wπ αη σ σ+ − + = . 
With further substitution into (3.3), the principal solves the unconstrained problem 
2 2 2 2 / /(2 ) ( ) / 2
s
Max s c s c s wπ αη σ σ− + + +  (3.4) 
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The first-order condition of (3.4) with respect to  requires 1/c – s/c – ηss 2 2( )π ασ σ+ = 0. 
Further manipulation yields s* = . The complete solution to this 
problem yields optimal agent effort e* = , optimal base pay  
2 21/[1 ( ]c π αη σ+
1/[c cη σ
)σ+
(+ 2 2 2 )]π ασ+
t* = , and optimal expected output,  2 2 2 2 2[1 ( )] /[2 2 ( )]c c cπ α π αη σ σ η σ σ− + + +
2
*
eπ  = 
2 2 21/[2 2 ( )]c c π αη σ σ+ + . 
  This simple model illustrates how the tradeoff between risk and incentives are 
modified by the introduction of heterogeneous agents with risk aversion. A high degree 
of risk aversion mutes incentives even more than with homogeneity. Even with no 
randomness in the state of nature (i.e., 2πσ  = 0), a fixed fee contract is not optimal. That 
is, even if 2πσ  = 0, effort cannot be inferred from the realized output with certainty 
because even with a nonstochastic θ, one part of the agent’s output is explained by the 
ability variable α that is not observable. A low output may be due to either low ability or 
low effort from the agent. As a result, an agent with low ability making normal effort will 
be paid less for the lower output just as if he exerted low effort with normal ability. Thus, 
he will not be compensated enough to reach his reservation utility. Sensing this problem, 
agents will exert less effort. 
 As a result, the effort level, already distorted downward by risk aversion to e* = 
 from its first-best level e* = 1/c is further distorted downward to e* = 
 because of heterogeneity in agents’ ability. Also, the piece rate s* = 
 is distorted downward to s* = , which reduces the 
punishment for lower outputs resulting from lower ability. However, some agents fall 
short of their reservation utilities unless the piece rate is set to zero. 
2 21/( )c c πη σ+




2 21/(1 ( ))c π αη σ σ+ +
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3.3.1.4 A risk-averse agent’s gain from contracting 
 In this model, some risk-averse agents receive a negative gain from contracting on 
average ex post. The conditional certainty equivalent surplus (conditioned on α) is       
CE(S | α) = t + se + sα – ηs2 /2 – ce2/2 because E(w(π) – ce2/2 | α) = t + sE(π | α) – 
ce2/2 = t + sE(e + α + θ) – ce2/2 = t + se + sα – ce2/2 and V(w(π) – ce2/2 | α) =                
V(t + s(π | α)) = V(s(e + α + θ)) = s2 . After maximization, CE(S* | α) = t* + s*e* + s*α – 
η(s*)2 /2 – c(e*)2/2.  From condition (i) in (3.2), CE(S*) = t* + s*e* – η(s*)2(  )/2 
– c(e*)2/2 = 0. Thus, after maximization, CE(S *| α) = s*α + η(s*)2 /2. This is the ex post 
gain from contracting on average for an agent with realized ability α. This is negative if  












 Therefore, only those agents whose ability is α = α̂  gain exactly 0 on average 
from contracting. Agents with α > α̂  have a positive average gain from contracting while 
those with α < α̂  have a negative average gain from contracting. Another interesting 
result is that, all else equal, the higher the piece rate s* the smaller is the threshold ability 
α̂ . Thus, by offering a higher piece rate the principal can ensure positive ex post gains to 
a larger pool of agents, and vice versa.  
 Also, with a higher piece rate, agents with α > α̂  will have a larger postive gain 
from contracting. In an optimal solution, however, the principal will try to shrink the gain 
of agents. For this reason, whenever agents differ substantially in their abilities, the 
optimal piece rate s* is smaller. This is clear because s* = 2 21 (1 ( ))c π αη σ σ+ +  is 
decreasing in the variance of ability . As a result, the smaller is the piece rate s*, the 
larger is the threshold ability
2
ασ
α̂ . Thus, by offering a smaller piece rate, the principal 
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imposes negative ex post gains on a larger pool of agents. Compared with the risk neutral 
case, the qualitative result that agents with below (above) average abilities have 
conditional expected gains from contracting that are negative (positive) is unaltered 
except that the threshold α moves down from 0 to α̂ . 
 
3.3.2 The case where agents know their ability 
 Assume now that abilities have a positive mean and are known privately only to 
the agents. Consider a definition of the critical value of ability α = αC  that leaves an agent 
with exactly zero conditional expected gain from contracting. For the linear contract 
where w(π) = t + sπ and E(w(π) | αC) = t + sE(π | αC) = t + sE(e + αC + θ) = t + s(e + αC), 
only those agents whose ability is equal to αC will earn exactly w  implying 
. Rearranging obtains (Prendergast, 1999)  * 2 2 *( ) / 2 ( )Ct s e s C eπα η σ+ + − − = 0
*e−2 */ 2 / ( ) /C s t s C e sπα η σ= − + . 
 Thus, agents with α < αC have a negative expected gain from contracting. When 
agents know their ability before signing contracts, only agents with α ≥ αC will elect to 
sign contracts. This outcome demonstrates how compensation contracts can have 
selection effects such that higher piece rates are relatively more attractive to more able 
agents. By offering greater pay for performance, firms can hire a better distribution of 
agents because the more able benefit more from these contracts than the less able 
(Prendergast, 1999).  
 The primary focus of the agency literature has been on how contracts induce 
certain behaviors from a given set of agents. However, contracts can also play a central 
role in recruiting agents that better serve the principal’s objectives. Often, an important 
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component of the principal's task is to select the best agent or agents. The procurer of an 
item wants to select the least-cost supplier. Banks seek to identify the most reliable loan 
applicants. In general, principals seek to design contracts not only to induce certain 
behaviors but also to influence the type of agents that they hire. Lazear (1986) 
investigated selection effects in a multiple agent setting with tournaments. According to 
his finding, the average quality of worker is increased by a firm shifting from a fixed 
wage scheme to one with piece rates.    
 Accordingly, this may change the design of the optimal contract because contracts 
now fulfill a dual role of both inducing effort and aiding the selection of better agents. As 
a result, in order to select certain types of agents, the principal may distort the effort 
decisions from the otherwise optimal choices derived above. This selection effect of 
contracting is an important one when agents know their ability but the principal does not. 
However, if both the parties are unaware of agents’ types, such as at the beginning of a 
contracting problem, then this selection issue is not relevant. But when agents are 
unaware of their type, some low ability agents do not get paid enough to match their 
reservation utilities.  
 
3.4 Exploring Different Specifications 
 Even though some of the agents are left with less than their reservation utilities 
irrespective of their risk preferences in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, optimal effort is not 
distorted when agents are risk neutral because of the additive specification of the 
technology. Even with a multiplicative specification of the technology, such as π = eα + 
θ, agents with low ability are left with negative expected gains from contracting. 
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However, this specification introduces a distortion in optimal effort choices, and thus 
reduces the principal’s surplus.  
 
3.4.1 The case where agents do not know their ability 
 To consider the implications of the multiplicative specification of the technology, 
a useful starting point is the optimal contracting problem when ability is known both to 
the principal and the agent. 
 
3.4.1.1 The first-best case  
 Suppose the principal can design the contract and calculate the surplus conditional 
on known ability α of the agent. Then she calculates her total expected surplus over all 
the agents (over all α’s). For a given α, π = eα + θ, and taking expectations over θ implies 
E(π) = eα, w(π) = t + sπ = t + s(eα + θ), E(w(π)) = t + seα and E(π) – E(w(π)) = eα – t – 





Max e t seα α− −   (3.5) 
s.t. (i) , 2 / 2 0t se ceα+ − ≥
where for simplicity the agent’s reservation wage w  is normalized to zero. In the optimal 
solution, (i) of (3.5) holds as equality, i.e., t + seα = ce2/2. Substitution into the objective 
function of (3.5) yields the unconstrained optimization problem . The 
associated first-order condition requires e* = α/c. The principal thus receives E(π) – 
E(w(π)) = α 2 /c – α 2 /(2c) = α 2 /(2c) from an agent with ability α. The agent with ability α 
receives E(w(π)) = t + seα = α 2 /(2c). The agent’s effort cost is C(e*) = c(e*)2/2 = α 2 /(2c). 
Thus, the agent’s expected gain from contracting is E(w(π)) – C(e*) = α 2 /(2c) – α 2 /(2c) 
2 / 2
e
Max e ceα −
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= 0. None of the agent receive a negative expected gain from contracting in this case. The 
agent’s effort is increasing in α, and hence, the agent’s payment must be increasing in α 
to cover effort cost. 
 
3.4.1.2 The second-best case when both effort and ability are unobservable 
 Suppose now that the principal does not know either α or e whereas the agent 
knows only e. Then E(π) = eE(α), E(w(π)) = t + seE(α), and E(π) – E(w(π)) = eE(α) – t – 
seE(α). The principal now solves 
 
, ,
 ( ) ( )
e t s
Max eE t seEα α− −  (3.6) 
s.t. (i)  2( ) / 2 0t seE ceα+ − ≥
e
 (ii)  2arg max  ( ) / 2.
e
e t seE ceα∈ + −
Solving  implies e = sE(α)/c. Substituting this value of e  
into the objective function and constraint (i) of (3.6) and using further substitution yields 
the unconstrained optimization problem 
2arg max  ( ) / 2
e
e t seE cα∈ + −
2( ) / ( ) /(2 )
s
Max sE c s E cα α− . The first-order 
condition requires s* =1 and  e* = E(α)/c and implies t* = –(s*e*E(α) – c(e*)2/2) = –
(E(α))2/(2c). 
 In this case, the agent owns the output and pays (E(α))2/(2c) to the principal for 
the right of ownership. As a result, from the principal’s perspective, selling the project to 
the agent solves the moral hazard problem that arises from the unobservability of effort. 
Optimal effort for all agents is e* = E(α)/c. From this expression, agents with above 
average ability will exert less effort than in the first-best case whereas agents with below 
average ability will exert more effort than in the first-best case. 
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 Since he owns the project, the expected earning of agent j is αe* = αE(α)/c and his 
expected gain from contracting (i.e., his expected earning net of effort cost and the 
principal’s fee) is E(α)[α-E(α)]/c. Thus, E(α)[α – E(α)]/c > 0 for α > E(α) and E(α)[α – 
E(α)]/c < 0 for α < E(α). This implies expected gains from contracting are negative for 
agents with below average ability, while they are positive for agents with above average 
ability (and zero for agents with average ability). 
 Because V(α) = E(α2) – (E(α))2, a positive variance of α implies E(α2) > (E(α))2 
and, hence, E(α2)/(2c) > (E(α))2/(2c). Thus, the principal earns more when she observes α 
along with the agent as in the first-best case. In this case, it is in the interest of the 
principal to induce different efforts for different abilities rather than the same effort 
depending on E(α). This result contrasts with the linear specification, π = e + α + θ, in 
section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, where the optimal effort was not dependent on α. But the 
multiplicative case confirms that the result with negative expected gains for agents with 
below average abilities is not driven by linearity of the agent’s output. 
 
3.4.2 The case where agents know their ability 
 In this section, the multiplicative ability model of the section 3.4.1 is adapted for 
expositional purposes to the case with two types of abilities. Suppose the ability types of 
agents are either α1 or α2 (where α2 > α1 > 0) with probabilities p1 and p2, respectively (p2 
= 1 – p1). Suppose at the beginning of the contractual relationship that agents know their 
abilities and the principal does not. But the principal knows that the agents know their 
abilities. Therefore, the principal can design the contract in such a way that the agents 
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reveal their type to the principal through their choices of contracts. In this case, the 
principal solves the following problem: 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2, ,  ( ) (j j jt s e





s.t. (ia)  21 1 1 1 1 / 2 0t s e ceα+ − ≥
 (ib)  22 2 2 2 2 / 2 0t s e ceα+ −
 (ii)  2 22 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1/ 2 / 2t s e ce t s e ceα α+ − ≥ + −
 (iii)  
1
2
1 1 1 1 1arg max  / 2
e
e t s e cα∈ + −
 (iv) ,  
2
2
2 2 2 2 2arg max  / 2
e
e t s e cα∈ + −
where tj, sj, and ej are the base pay, bonus pay and effort for agents with ability αj, 
respectively.  
 Constraint (ii) of (3.7) guarantees that high ability agents will not choose the 
contract offered for low ability agents. For low ability agents, the principal can set  
. Thus, low ability agent’s expected gain from contracting is zero. 
From (ii) we obtain,  
2
1 1 1 1 1 / 2 0t s e ceα+ − =





         = s1e1(α2 – α1).  
That is, the principal has to offer at least a rent of s1e1(α2 – α1) to each high ability agent. 
Otherwise, the high ability agent will choose the contract (t1, s1, e1) intended for the low 
ability agent. Thus, high ability agent’s expected gain from contracting is s1e1(α2 – α1) 
which is positive if positive effort is exerted by low ability agents. 
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 Solving constraint (iii) and (iv) of (3.7) for both e1and e2 obtains e1 = s1α1/c and e2 
= s2e2/c. Substituting e1and e2 into the objective function and constraints (ia), (ib), and (ii) 
of (3.7), and further substitution from these constraints into the objective function of (3.7) 
yields the unconstrained principal’s problem, 
 
1 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1,
 [ / /(2 ))] [ / /(2 ) ( ) / ]
s s
Max p s c s c p s c s c s cα α α α α α α− + − − − . (3.8) 
The first-order conditions of (3.8) with respect to s1 and s2 yield  = 1/[1 + 2(p2/p1)(α2 – 
α1)/α1] and  = 1. Thus,  = α1/[c + 2c(p2/p1)((α2 – α1)/α1)],  = α2/c, t1 = – α1 + 
c /2, and t2 = – α2 + c /2 + (α2 – α1). This is a separating contract because 
effort and transfer are different for each ability type. In section 3.4.1, the contract is not a 
separating contract because effort, e* = E(α)/c, and transfer, t* = –E(α))2/(2c), are the 
same for every agent irrespective of their ability. The principal is not able to offer 

















 Obviously, under agential heterogeneity, a sharing contract emerges for all but the 
highest-ability agents even in the case of risk neutral agents. This is the same result found 
in sections 2.3.5 and 2.4.2 with limited liability and pre-contractual information 
asymmetry models, respectively. In this separating case, none of the agents are left with a 
negative expected gain from contracting. Only agents with high ability receive a positive 
expected gain from contracting while agents with low ability have a zero expected gain 
from contracting. 
 The case of the multiplicative specification under risk aversion is not examined 
here because it reveals no qualitative differences compared to the additive specification 
(π = e + α + θ) except that the threshold ability level moves downward from 0. Low 
ability agents receive a negative ex post gain from contracting on average if they do not 
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know their ability ex ante as described in section 3.3.1. Thus, negative ex post gains from 
contracting on average for low-ability agents are the consequences of their lack of 
knowledge of their abilities. 
 As this and previous sections make clear, a central question is whether agents 
know their abilities before entering a contract. Section 3.5 discusses the results when 
abilities are known partially. Intuitively, partial knowledge of abilities is derived from 
past performance. 
 
3.5 The Case Where Agents Know Their Ability Imperfectly 
 When two parties engage in a contracting relationship, often they have partial but 
incomplete knowledge about abilities. Uncertainty about a particular agent’s ability is 
represented by a subjective distribution, which may be different for the agent than for the 
principal. Both the principal and the agent can gain additional information with each 
period of production, but the clarity of additional information depends on explicit 
observability of the state of nature, which follows a distribution assumed to be common 
knowledge. (Laffont, and Martimort, 2002). The initial contract may be characterized as 
an agent choosing whether to make a costly investment in technology. As a result, the 
agent has to decide whether to accept or reject a contract before knowing his ability to 
use the technology efficiently. 
 Likely, the assumption that agents or employees have no information about 
abilities is extreme. Likewise, the assumption that agents know their abilities perfectly 
before commencing production is extreme. In this section, I consider whether agents with 
low ability receive negative ex post gains from contracting on average when they have 
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partial information about their abilities. The extent of partial information is critical in 
determining what share of agents receive negative gains from contracting. 
 The risk neutral and risk averse cases in section 3.3.1 suggest no qualitative 
differences regarding low-ability agents’ negative gains from contracting on average. The 
only difference that occurs under risk aversion is in the threshold ability level, which is 
smaller in case of risk-averse agents. Obviously, since agents get only a fraction of the 
profit they generate, they get only a fraction of the benefits (or losses) associated with 
their realized abilities. Therefore, this section focuses on the risk neutral contracting case.  
 
3.5.1 The imperfect information model 
 Following Harris and Townsend (1981) and Sappington (1984), suppose the 
random ability α can follow any one of D possible distributions rather than a single 
distribution with n states of α. Consider the information structure where the agent knows 
the actual distribution at the time the contract is signed but the principal has only a 
nondegenerate prior defined over these D distributions. Thus, the agent’s information is 
better but imperfect, and the principal is aware of this fact. Thus, the principal’s problem 
is to solve  
 
, , 1
 [ ( ) ( ) ] ( )
D
d
e t s d
dMax e t s e f dφ α α α α α
=
− −∑ ∫ α  (3.9) 
s.t. (i)  2[ ( ) ( ) / 2] ( ) 0dt s e ce f dα α α α α+ −∫ ≥ ,,...1 Dd =∀  
 (ii) 2 2[ ( ) /2] ( ) [ ( ) /2] (d rt se ce f d t se ce f d)α α α α α α+ − ≥ + −∫ ∫ α α ,,...1 Dd =∀  
 (iii) 2arg max  [ ( ) ( ) / 2] ( )d
e
e t s e ce f dα α α α α∈ + −∫  ,,...1 Dd =∀  
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where  is the probability that the actual distribution is fd(α), s(α) is the share of output 
that goes to the agent with ability α under distribution fd(α), and t(α) is the base payment 
to the agent with ability α for exerting effort e under distribution fd(α), d = 1,…,D.  
dφ
 The individual rationality constraints in (i) of (3.9) guarantee that any contract 
selected by the agent achieves an expected utility that (weakly) exceeds his reservation 
level, which is normalized to zero for simplicity. The self-selection among contracts 
constraint (ii) of (3.9) guarantees that the agent selects contract [t(α),s(α)] when fd(α) is 
his actual distribution of α. The self-selection-within-contracts constraint (iii) of (3.9) 
ensure that the agent chooses the maximizing effort e under the contract [t(α),s(α)]. If D = 
1, then (3.9) reduces to the typical principal-agent model in which the principal and agent 
share the same pre-contractual beliefs (where a single distribution is applicable).  
 Sappington (1984), building on an idea suggested by Harris and Townsend 
(1981), has shown that the optimal strategy for the principal is to design at most D 
distinct contracts from which the agent is permitted to make a binding choice. The 
rationale is that, if the contracts are designed appropriately, then agents can be induced to 
use their private information under some distributions to select contracts that the principal 
prefers to the single contract that the principal would design in the absence of structural 
information about the distribution of α.  
 However, Sappington’s distributions are considered over the random states θ 
rather than abilities α. His model does not focus on agents’ gains from contracting and 
has no heterogeneity in agents’ characteristics. I adapt his model to the case of 
heterogeneity in agents’ characteristics, and determine whether agents gain or lose from 
contracting when they have partial knowledge of their ability. 
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3.5.2 The discrete case 
 For simplicity, I solve the discrete version of this problem where D = 2 and n = 2. 
Suppose ability distribution 1 (denoted by P) has probability p1 of ability α11 and 
probability p2 of ability α12 (p2 = 1 – p1) while distribution 2 (denoted by Q) has 
probability q1 of ability α21 and probability q2 of ability α22 (q2 = 1 – q1). Also assume 
that E(α1) < E(α2) where E(α1) = p1α11 + p2α12  and E(α2) = q1α21 + q2α22. Let r1  and r2  
represent the principal’s subjective probability that the agent is from distributions P and 
Q, respectively, whereas the agent knows whether his ability distribution is P or Q. The 
principal solves 
         
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1 1 11 1 1 1 11 1 2 1 12 1 1 1 12 1, , , , ,
{ [ ( ) ( )]
t t s s e e
Max E r p e t s e s p e t s e sα θ α θ α θ α θ+ − − − + + − − − +  
            2 1 2 21 2 2 1 21 2[ ( )r q e t s e sα θ α+ − − − θ 2 2 22 2 2 2 22 2( ]q e t s e s }α θ α θ+ + − − −  (3.10) 
s.t. (ia)  2 21 1 1 1 11 1 2 1 1 1 12 1 1{ ( / 2) ( / 2) } 0E p t s e ce p t s e ce sα α+ − + + − + ≥θ
θ ≥(ib)  2 21 2 2 2 21 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2{ ( / 2) ( / 2) } 0E q t s e ce q t s e ce sα α+ − + + − +
(ii) 2 21 2 2 2 21 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2{ ( / 2) ( / 2) }E q t s e ce q t s e ce sα α θ+ − + + − + ≥   




1 1 1 1 1 11 1 2 1 1 1 12 1arg max {[ ( / 2) ( ) / 2] }
e






2 1 2 2 2 21 2 2 2 2 2 22 2arg max {[ ( / 2) ( / 2)] }
e
e E q t s e ce q t s e ce sα α θ∈ + − + + − + .  
Because E(θ) = 0, problem (3.10) boils down to 
 
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1 1 11 1 1 1 11 2 1 12 1 1 1 12, , , , ,
[ ( ) ( )]
t t s s e e
Max r p e t s e p e t s eα α α α− − + − − +  
  2 1 2 21 2 2 1 21[ ( )r q e t s eα α− − 2 2 22 2 2 2 22(q e t s e )]α α+ − −  (3.11) 
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(ib)  2 21 2 2 2 21 2 2 2 2 2 22 2( / 2) ( / 2) 0q t s e ce q t s e ceα α+ − + + −
(ii)   2 21 2 2 2 21 2 2 2 2 2 22 2( / 2) ( / 2)q t s e ce q t s e ceα α+ − + + −




1 1 1 1 1 11 1 2 1 1 1 12arg max  ( / 2) ( ) / 2
e




2 1 2 2 2 21 2 2 2 2 2 22arg max  ( / 2) ( / 2)
e
e q t s e ce q t s e ceα α∈ + − + + −
Since agents do not know their exact ability, the principal cannot induce them to 
reveal it. But the principal can induce them to choose the contract that is intended for 
their distribution. As a result, the principal induces only one effort for each distribution, 
say, e1 for P and e2 for Q. This is done by choosing a transfer and piece rate for each 
distribution type, say, t1 and s1 for P, and t2 and s2 for Q, respectively. 
Constraint (ia) of (3.11) is the individual rationality constraint for agents from 
distribution P. Constraint (ib) of (3.11)  is individual rationality constraint for agents 
from distribution Q. The self-selection-between-contracts constraint (ii) of (3.11) ensures 
that agents with the high ability distribution Q will not choose the contract intended for 
agents with the low ability distribution. Constraint (ia) is redundant when both (ia) and 
(ii) are satisfied. The self-selection–within-contracts constraints (iii) and (iv) of (3.11)  
require that agents with both distributions choose the effort that is profit maximizing for 
them. At the optimum, constraint (ii) will hold as an equality for the same reason that 
constraint (ia) will hold as an equality. Thus, problem (3.11) can be written as 
 
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2, , , , ,
[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )
t t s s e e
Max r e E t s e E r e E t s e Eα α α− − + − − α  (3.12) 
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s.t. (i)  21 1 1 1 1( ) / 2 0t s e E ceα+ − =
1e
2e
 (ii)  2 22 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1( ) / 2) ( ) / 2)t s e E ce t s e E ceα α+ − = + −
 (iii)  
1
2
1 1 1 1 1arg max  ( ) / 2
e
e t s e E cα∈ + −
 (iv) .  
2
2
2 2 2 2 2arg max  ( ) / 2
e
e t s e E cα∈ + −
 Solving constraints (iii) and (iv) of (3.12) yields e1 = s1E(α1)/c and e2 = s2E(α2)/c, 
respectively. Constraint (ii) of (3.12)  implies  
 t2  + s2e2E(α2) – c /2 = t1 + s1e1E(α1) – c /2 + s1e1E(α2) – s1e1E(α1)  22e
2
1e
              = s1e1(E(α2) – E(α1)).  
Substituting for t1, t2, e1, and e2 from the constraints into the objective function obtains 
the unconstrained problem 
 
1 2
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2,
 [ ( ( )) / ( ( )) /(2 )] [ ( ( )) /
s s
Max r s E c s E c r s E cα α α− +  
   (3.13) 2 2 22 2 1 1 2 1( ( )) /(2 ) ( )( ( ) ( ))]s E c s E E Eα α α− − − α
First-order conditions of (3.13) with respect to s1 and s2 yield 
  = 1/[1 + 2(r2/r1)(E(α2) – E(α1))/E(α1)] *1s
  = 1.  *2s
Thus,  
  = E(α1)/[c + 2c(r2/r1)(E(α2) – E(α1))/E(α1)] *1e




3.5.3 Gains from contracting 
 Now consider whether some agents are left with negative gains from contracting. 
The fixed fee for an agent whose ability is from the distribution P is t1 = – E(α1) + 
c( )2/2. If the agent’s ability is α11, then his surplus is α11 + θ – c( )2/2 and his 











 α11 + * *1 1s e
*
1s θ  – c( )






1s θ  + (α11 – E(α1)).  
* *
1 1s e
His ex post gain from contracting on average is (α11 – E(α1)) < 0. This happens 
because ability α11 is worse than expected and constraint (ia) sets the expected gain from 
contracting to zero for expected ability. Alternatively, if the agent’s ability is α12 then his 




1s θ  + (α12 – E(α1)). His ex post gain from contracting on 





 The gain from contracting for an agent with high ability expectations (distribution 
Q) is (E(α2) – E(α1)). If the ability distributions satisfy E(α1) < α21 < α22, then all 
agents with high expected ability receive a positive ex post gain from contracting on 
average because (α22 – E(α1)) > (α21 – E(α1)) > 0. Agents with highest ability 
receive the highest ex post average gain, (α22 – E(α1)). However, for ability 
distributions such that α21 < E(α1), agents with high ability expectations but low ex post 














 In this chapter, heterogeneity in agents’ characteristics is incorporated into the 
basic model of chapter 2. Some important standard theoretical predictions are reversed 
once agential heterogeneity is introduced. As a result, an observed positive relationship 
between risk and incentives is consistent with agency theory. The important issue of 
whether all agents gain from contracting under heterogeneity is explored in detail. Three 
cases have been discussed depending on whether agents have no knowledge of their 
ability, complete knowledge of their ability, or partial knowledge of their ability.  
 For the case when the agents are risk neutral and have no knowledge of their 
ability, agents with realized ability greater than their expectations receive positive gains 
from contracting on average and agents with realized ability less than their expectations 
receive negative gains from contracting on average. When agents are risk averse under 
this information structure, essentially the same qualitative results apply except that the 
threshold where low ability agents receive negative ex post gains from contracting on 
average is lower than the ex ante expected ability level. For the intermediate case when 
agents have partial knowledge of their ability, some low ability agents receive negative 
gains from contracting on average. However, none of the agents receives negative gains 
from contracting when they have complete knowledge of their ability before signing the 
contract. 
 These results raise the concern about what actions low ability agents can take 
when they realize their ability is lower than expected and, consequently, their gain from 
contracting will be negative on average. Do they simply abandon the contract after one 
period or do they try to negotiate a revised contract with the principal? If for some reason 
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the principal will not or cannot make significant changes in the contract terms after first 
period, such agents may terminate the contract unless binding terms prevent doing so, or 
if they have sunk investment costs in capital that has no attractive alternative use. 
 To explore the implications of negative ex post gains from contracting (i.e., 
earning less than reservation utilities), the principal-agent relationship must be examined 
in a repeated contracting framework. The relevant question is whether the insights from 
one-period models are altered in a multi-period setting. This, of course, requires explicit 
modeling of dynamic contracts. This issue is addressed in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 4: 
Intertemporal Aspects of Agential Heterogeneity 
4.1 Introduction 
Most principal-agent relationships develop over a period of repeated contracting 
during which the agent exerts efforts several times and the principal observes output and 
other effort-related signals several times. Both the principal and the agents have several 
opportunities to update their contractual information. This generates new possibilities for 
incentive schemes. Thus, an important question is whether the insights from studying 
one-period models are significantly changed with multi-period contracting. An important 
issue relates to low ability agents who receive negative ex post gains from contracting on 
average in early periods. Do they leave the contract or renegotiate the contract terms with 
the principal? To explore this negative gain issue in detail, this chapter considers the 
principal-agent relationship in a two-period model. 
Section 4.2 briefly explains the implications of long-term commitments in a two-
period setting. Section 4.3 explores the dynamic setting where the principal and agent 
commit to a long-term contract in which contract terms are not changed in response to 
better information throughout the ongoing relationship. Section 4.4 explores dynamic 
contracts when the commitments of the principal and agent are limited and the contract 
can be renegotiated if either or both of them want to do so. Section 4.5 compares derived 
predictions for the agent’s gain from contracting between the static models described in 
chapter 3 and dynamic models described in this chapter. Section 4.6 considers contractual 
issues when the agent must make an irreversible asset-specific investment before the 
initial contract is signed. 
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4.2 The Commitment Issue 
When interaction between the principal and agent is repeated, friction caused by 
the principal's limited intertemporal commitment becomes important. To illustrate this 
friction, suppose the productive environment (for example, the productivity or innate 
ability of the agent) is the same in each period, and is known to both the agent and the 
principal at the beginning of the repeated contracting relationship. For simplicity, 
suppose also that the amount of output produced is a deterministic function of the agent's 
effort and ability. With a deterministic production function, the moral hazard problem 
vanishes. Whenever ability and output is known to the principal, effort can be deduced 
with certainty. However, this cannot happen when the principal has imperfect 
information on ability. In this situation, the agent faces a temptation not to reveal his 
information on ability to the principal. Thus, the moral hazard model is turned into an 
adverse selection or asymmetric information model.  
In this setting, the agent will realize that if the principal can determine the true 
ability, then she will be in a position to extract all the rents from him from that point 
forward. Recognizing this fact, the agent will be reluctant to let his performance reveal 
his true ability. Therefore, truthful revelation by high-quality agents will no longer be 
obtained in equilibrium. Thus, in a two-period adverse selection problem, if the principal 
cannot commit herself to a contract for both periods, the agent will not necessarily reveal 
his information on ability in the first period. 
 Alternatively, the principal may choose to offer a sufficiently high rent in the first 
period to induce revelation of ability. A high-quality agent hides his information on 
ability in the first period to obtain rent in the second period. But the agent will reveal his 
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information to the principal if she offers him a rent equivalent to his two-period 
discounted rents. But the discounted rent may be so high that she chooses to offer instead 
a common or pooling contract regardless of type (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Thus, the 
agent may be asked simply to produce the same minimal harvest regardless of the ability, 
thereby ensuring that the principal cannot infer ability from output (Weitzman, 1980; 
Freixas, Guesnerie, Tirole, 1985; Sappington, 1986; Baron and Besanko, 1987; 
Laffont and Tirole, 1988). 
Realizing the fact that superior performance (i.e., high output) will be rewarded 
by "ratcheting up" future targets, agents have limited incentive to perform up to their 
potential. This under performance (i.e., low output) of an agent is a fundamental problem 
of no-commitment or limited commitment dynamic contracts. Thus, the remainder of this 
chapter explores these dynamic aspects of contracting assuming different commitments 
of the principal under various information structures. 
 
4.3 Dynamics under Full Commitment 
The purpose of this section is to compare the optimal long-term contract with its 
static counterpart and derive further insights regarding low ability agents’ potential 
negative gain from contracting. This is done by considering simple repetition of the 
heterogeneous agent model described in section 3.3 of chapter 3. 
Assume that both the principal and agent commit to a two-period contract and 
have the ability to fulfill it.  Assuming both agents fulfill their commitments, the principal 
and agent then abide by the same mechanism regardless of what information is gained 
from the first round of contracting. This assumption is important because endogenous 
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changes in the information structure may arise in a repeated relationship, which could 
facilitate valuable renegotiation as time passes.  
 
4.3.1 The case where the agent does not know his ability 
Consider the simplest case where the ability variable α is the same in both 
periods. As described in section 3.3 of chapter 3, the agent’s output is given by πt = et + α 
+ θt where expected output is given by the sum of the effort of the agent et and his ability 
α. As in chapter 3, θt is normally distributed with zero mean and variance 
2
tσ . Agents’ 
heterogeneity is captured in the ability α, which is assumed to be unknown initially to 
both agents and the principal. However, a prior distribution over α, α  ~ N(0, 2ασ ), is 
common ex ante knowledge to all contracting parties (the case where it is privately 
known is considered in section 4.3.2 of this chapter). Therefore, contracting takes place 
under symmetric information.  
All random variables are assumed uncorrelated with one another. The reservation 
utility of an agent is normalized to zero for simplicity. Hence, the reservation certainty 
equivalent is zero. 
 
4.3.1.1 The risk-neutral case 
The case of risk neutrality provides a useful benchmark. As described in section 
2.2 of chapter 2, solving the problem as if the agent owns the project and maximizes his 
own surplus, and then transferring the expected surplus to the principal, provides the 
solution for the risk neutral case. For period 1, profit from an agent is  
П1 = π1 – w(π1) = e1 + α + θ1 – t1 – s1(e1 + α + θ1)  
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and expected profit is 
E(П1) = e1 – t1 – s1e1.  
For period 2, profit from the agent is  
П2 = π2 – w(π2) = e2 + α + θ2 – t2 – s2(e2 + α + θ2)  
and expected profit is 
E(П2) = e2 – t2 – s2e2.  
The principal’s objective is to maximize expected discounted profit,  
E(П) = E(П1) + δE(П2)  
         = e1 – t1 – s1e1 + δ(e2 – t2 – s2e2)  
         = e1 + δe2 – t1 – δt2 – s1e1 – δs2e2 where δ is a discount factor, δ ≥ 0.  
Where the agent has the same discount factor as the principal, his objective is to 
maximize discounted surplus  
S = S1 + δS2 = t1 + s1(e1 + α + θ1) – c /2 + δ(t2 + s2(e2 + α + θ2) – c /2)  21e
2
2e
   = t1 + δt2 + s1e1 + δs2e2 – c /2 – δc /2 + s1(α + θ1) + δs2(α + θ2)  21e
2
2e
where first-period surplus is  
S1 = w(π1) – C(e1) = t1 + s1π1  – c /2  21e
    = t1 + s1(e1 + α + θ1) – c /2  21e
and second-period surplus is  
S2 = w(π2) – C(e2)  
    = t2 + s2π2  – c /2  22e
    = t2 + s2(e2 + α + θ2) – c /2.  22e
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Here, tt and st are the base payment and piece rate for period t, respectively, and C(et) = 
c /2 is the cost of effort et in period t. But the agent does not know his ability α and 
states of nature θ. Thus, he maximizes expected discounted surplus 
2
te
 E(S) = t1 + δt2 + s1e1 + δs2e2 – c /2 – δc /2.  21e
2
2e
The principal’s problem is 
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 1 2, , , ,e e t t s s 2
Max e e t t s e s eδ δ δ+ − − − −  (4.1) 
s.t. (i)  2 21 2 1 1 2 2 1 2/ 2 / 2t t s e s e ce ceδ δ δ+ + + − − 0≥
 (ii) .  maxarg, 21 ∈ee
2 2
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2[ /t t s e s e ce ceδ δ δ+ + + − −2 / 2]
).
The incentive compatibility condition (ii) of (4.1) implies e1 = s1/c and e2 = s2/c. 
Constraint (i) of (4.1) holds as equality at the optimum because, otherwise, the principal 
can lower the payment and still get the agent to agree to the contract. Thus,  
t1 + δt2 = –(s1e1 – c /2 + δs2e2 – δc /2)  21e
2
2e
           =   2 21 2[ ] /(2s s cδ− +
Substituting for t1 + δt2 and the effort levels in the objective function obtains the 
unconstrained problem of the principal, 
1 2
2 2
1 2 1 2 (2 ) (2 )s sMax s c s c s c s cδ δ+ − − . 
The first-order condition with respect to s1 is (1 – s1)/c = 0, which implies  = 1. 
Similarly,  = 1,  = 1/c,  = 1/c, and t1 + δt2 = –(1 + δ)/(2c). Thus, where agents are 
risk neutral and abilities are constant over time, the optimal long-term contract with full 
two-period commitment simply imposes the optimal static contract described in section 










The agent with realized ability α receives maximized discounted surplus  















    = –(1 – δ)/(2c) + 1/c + δ/c – 1/(2c) – δ/(2c) + (1 + δ)α + (θ1 + δθ2)  
    = (1 + δ)α + (θ1 + δθ2).  
On average an agent with ability α receives discounted surplus E(S *| α) = (1 + δ)α. Since 
the reservation wage is assumed to be zero, this is the ex post gain from contracting on 
average for an agent with realized ability α. Thus, any agent with ability α smaller than 
the mean (which is zero) receives a negative ex post gain from contracting on average in 
this two-period, full-commitment contract. In effect, the optimal two-period contract 
implements the same effort levels and the same intertemporal ex post gain from 
contracting on average as the optimal static contract in section 3.3.1 of chapter 3 repeated 
twice. 
 However, some indeterminacy remains concerning the intertemporal distribution 
of these gains. This indeterminacy is resolved when the principal decides how much of 
total transfer, + δ = (1+δ)/(2c), she collects in the first period. For instance, when the 
principal collects = 1/(2c) in the first period and, hence, = 1/(2c) in the second 










4.3.1.2 The risk-averse case 
For the risk-averse case, the agent’s objective function is  
EU(S) = E[–exp{–η(t1 + δt2 + s1e1 + δs2e2 –   2 21 2( )c e eδ+ /2
+ s1(α + θ1) + δs2(α + θ2))}]  
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and intertemporal utility is assumed to be multiplicative. Although this is not an 
innocuous assumption, it is widely used in the relevant literature (Laffont and 
Martimort, 2002). The certainty equivalent of EU(S) is  
CE(S) = E(S) – ηV(S)/2 = t1 + δt2 + s1e1 + δs2e2 –    2 21 2( )c e eδ+ /2
.α
]
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2[ ( ) ( ) 2 ] / 2s s s sα αη σ σ δ σ σ δ σ− + + + +   
The principal solves 
 
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2, , , ,
[
e e t t s s
Max e e t t s e s eδ δ δ+ − − − −  (4.2) 





    2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 2 2 1 2( ( ) ( ) 2 ) / 2 0,s s s sα α αη σ σ δ σ σ δ σ− + + + +
 (ii)  maxarg, 21 ∈ee
2 2
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2( )t t s e s e c e eδ δ δ+ + + − +
    2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 2 2 1 2( ( ) ( ) 2 ) / 2s s s sα αη σ σ δ σ σ δ σ− + + + +
where constraint (i) of (4.2) holds as equality because, otherwise, the principal can lower 
the payment while the agent is still induced to accept the contract. The incentive 
compatibility condition (ii) of (4.2) requires e1 = s1/c and e2 = s2/c. Substituting these 
values into (i) of (4.2) yields  
(t1 + δt2) = –[ /(2c) + δ /(2c) – η21s
2
2s
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2( ( ) ( ) 2 )s sα α ασ σ δ σ σ δ σ+ + + + /2]. 
Substituting for e1, e2, and t1 + δt2 in the objective function thus obtains  
1 2
2 2
1 2 1 2/ / /(2 ) /(2 )s sMax s c s c s c s cδ δ+ − −  
  .   2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 2 2 1 2[ ( ) ( ) 2 ] / 2s s s sα αη σ σ δ σ σ δ σ− + + + + α
  The first-order conditions with respect to s1 and s2, respectively, require 
(1 – s1)/c – ηs1( 21σ  +
2 2
2) sα ασ δη σ−  = 0 
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δ(1 – s2)/c – δ2 ηs2( 22σ  + 
2 2
1) sα ασ δη σ−  = 0. 
Solving these two first-order conditions simultaneously yields maximizing values 
1
SBs  = (1 + δηc 22σ ) /(1 + ηcΩ) 
2
SBs  = (1 + ηc 21σ ) /(1 + ηcΩ) 
1
SBe  = (1 + δηc 22σ ) /(c + ηc
2Ω)  
2
SBe  =  (1 + ηc 21σ ) /(c + ηc
2Ω) 
where  




























 + η 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 2 2 1 2[( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ]
SB SB SB SBs s s sα α ασ σ δ σ σ δ σ+ + + + /2. 
Thus, with risk-averse agents for whom abilities remain constant over contracting 
periods, the optimal long-term contract with full two-period commitment simply applies 
the optimal static contract to both periods.  
At the optimum, contraint (i) of (4.2) requires 
2 2
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2[( ) ( ) ]/2
SB SB SB SB SB SB SB SBt t s e s e c e eδ δ δ+ + + − −  
–   2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 2 2 1 2[( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ]/2 0.
SB SB SB SBs s s sα αη σ σ δ σ σ δ σ+ + + + =α
Using this expression, certainty equivalent income of an agent with ability α is 
CE(S | α) =  2 21 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2[( ) ( ) ]/2
SB SB SB SB SB SB SB SB SB SBt t s e s s e s c e eδ α δ δ α δ+ + + + + − −
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2[( ) ( ) ] / 2
SB SBs sη σ δ σ− +   
 = 1 2( )
SB SBs sδ α+  + .  2 2 2 21 2 1 2[( ) ( ) 2 ]/ 2
SB SB SB SBs s s sαησ δ δ+ +
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This is the ex post gain from contracting on average for an agent with realized ability α. 




SB SBs sαησ δ+ ) / 2
α  < α̂  receive a negative gain from contracting on average in this 
intertemporal case.  
The dynamic nature of the optimal contract with full commitment was first 
analyzed by Roberts (1983) and Baron and Besanko (1984). The applicability of the 
revelation principal in a dynamic context was demonstrated by Myerson (1986) and, at a 
more abstract level, by Laffont and Tirole (1988). These studies do not consider the issue 
of individual agents’ gains from contracting. I adapt these models for heterogeneity in 
agents’ characteristics, and determine whether individual agents gain or lose from 
contracting when they have complete, partial, or no knowledge of their ability when the 
principal-agent relationship is repeated twice. My purpose is to show that the results 
derived in the static cases are unaltered in this dynamic setting. Low ability agents who 
receive negative gains from contracting on average in the one-period case also receive 
negative gains from contracting on average in a dynamic setting.  
Again, compared with the risk neutral case, no qualitative differences for low 
ability agents emerge. Regardless of risk preferences, some low ability agents receive a 
negative gain from contracting on average. The only difference is in the critical ability 
level which is smaller under risk aversion because α̂  < 0.  Therefore, for the rest of this 
chapter, I focus only on the risk neutral case of the intertemporal contracting problem. 
My intent is to avoid complexities without losing qualitative insight. Also, because risk 
neutrality will be assumed, there is no loss in generality by assuming a nonstochastic 
technology, i.e., omitting θ from the problem. 
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4.3.2 The case where the agent knows his ability 
Consider next the case where agents know their abilities before signing a contract. 
In sections 3.3.and 3.4 of chapter 3, the additive specification of the technology led to the 
same optimal level of effort irrespective of agents’ abilities whereas the multiplicative 
specification induces a different effort for agents of different abilities. For the static case 
of the additive specification (π = e + α + θ), the principal does not have an incentive to 
separate agents by ability because the marginal benefit of effort is same (equal to 1) for 
all agents. As a result, they are induced to exert the same level of effort 1/c. The principal 
thus receives the first-best expected surplus with fixed fee contracts. High ability agents 
receive positive ex post gains from contracting at the expense of low ability agents 
receiving negative ex post gains. 
For the multiplicative specification of π = eα + θ, the marginal benefit of effort 
(which is α) increases in ability α. Given that the cost of effort ( ) does not vary 
across agents, the principal has an incentive to induce higher effort from agents with 
higher abilities. As discussed in section 3.5 of chapter 3, omission of θ from the 
functional form π = eα + θ creates a slight difference in how the gain from contracting is 
interpreted. Thus, to represent incentives to the principal for separating agents of different 
abilities, the multiplicative specification of the technology (πt = etα) will be used for the 
rest of this chapter.  
2 / 2ce
Suppose at the beginning of the first period that the agent knows his ability and 
the principal does not. But the principal knows that the agent knows his ability. 
Therefore, the principal may design a contract such that the agent will reveal his ability 
through his contracting choice. However, the agent may be unwilling to reveal his ability 
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if the contracting relationship will last more than one period. To illustrate, consider a 
two-period problem where each of two agents have different abilities, α1 and α2, with α1 < 
α2. The principal’s problem is 
2
1 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2, , 1
{ [( / 2) ] [( / 2) ]}
jt jt jt
t
t t t tt s e t
Max p e ce U p e ce Uδ α α−
=
− − + − −∑  (4.3)  
s.t. (ia) ,  
2
1 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
( /t t t t t
t
U t s e ceδ α−
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( )t t t
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= + −∑  














where pj is the probability that the agent’s ability is αj, ejt is effort of the agent with ability 
αj in period t, and tjt and sjt are the base payment and piece rates for the agent with ability 
αj in period t, respectively. Conditions (iii) and (iv) of (4.3)  imply e11 = s11α1/c, e12 = 
s12α1/c, e21 = s21α2/c, and e22 = s22α2/c. Substituting these values into the objective 
function of (4.3), solving constraints (ia) and (ii) of (4.3) as equalities, noting that 
constraint (ib) of (4.3)  is redundant, and making further substitutions, the principal’s 
unconstrained problem is 
 
2
1 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
1




M ax p s sδ α α−
=
−∑ 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1[ / 2 ( )/ )]}t t tp s s s cα α α α α+ − − −  (4.4) 
For the agent with ability α2, first-order conditions of (4.4) require  and 
 = α2/c. For the agent with ability α1, first-order conditions require  = 
* *







1/(1 + 2p2/p1(α2 – α1)/α1) and  =  = α1/[c(1 + 2p2/p1(α2 – α1)/α1)]. Again, the 
optimal long-term contract with full commitment for two periods simply repeats the 




A sharing contract is thus used for all but the agent with highest ability even in 
this risk neutral agent case. In this separating case, similar to that in section 3.4.2, none of 
the agents are left with less than their reservation wages. However, only high ability 
agents earn positive rents while low ability agents earn exactly their reservation wage. 
Furthermore, when the ability differential, α2 – α1, is large compared to the low ability, 
i.e., when (α2 – α1)/α1 is large, and the proportion of low ability agents p1 is small, then 
the principal may set one sharing contract that targets high ability agents while excluding 
low ability agents from contracting. If (α2 – α1)/α1 is small and the proportion p1 of low 
ability agents is large, then the principal may set one sharing contract targeting low 
ability agents while excluding high ability agents from contracting. Further, for certain 
combinations of (α2 – α1)/α1 and p1, the principal may offer a single pooling contract. In 
this case, low ability agents who have negative gains from contracting will select not to 
enter into the contract. 
 
4.3.3 The case where the agent knows his ability imperfectly 
This section extends the static model in section 3.5 of chapter 3, where the agent 
knows his ability imperfectly, to the two-period case. Thus, the agent does not know his 
ability perfectly as in section 4.3.1, but he has more specific knowledge about his ability 
than does the principle, unlike the case in section 4.3.2. As in section 3.6 of chapter 3, 
suppose an agent’s random ability α may follow any one of D possible distributions rather 
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than one distribution with n states. When a contract between a principal and agent is 
signed, the principal has a nondegenerate prior defined over these D distributions 
whereas the agent knows the actual distribution. Thus, the agent’s information is better 
but imperfect, and the principal is aware of this fact.  Again, for simplicity, I consider 
only the case where D = 2 and n = 2. 
Assume ability distribution 1 (denoted by P) has probability p1 of ability α11 and 
probability p2 of ability α12 while distribution 2 (denoted by Q) has probability q1 of 
ability α21 and probability q2 of ability α22 . Also assume that E(α1) < E(α2) where E(α1) = 
p1α11 + p2α12  and E(α2) = q1α21 + q2α22. Let r1 and r2 be the principal’s subjective 
probability that the agent has ability distribution P and Q, respectively. In this 
information structure, any agent whose distribution is P knows his ability is either α11 or 
α12 and any agent whose distribution is Q knows his ability is either α21 or α22. But the 
principal, who does not know agents’ actual distributions, knows only that an agent’s 
ability is any of four possibilities (i.e., α11, α12, α21, or α22). The principal solves 
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where e1t is effort of an agent with distribution P in time t, e2t is effort of an agent with 
distribution Q at time t, t1t and t2t are base payments at time t for agents with distributions 
P and Q, respectively, and s1t and s2t are piece rates at time t for agents with distributions 
P and Q, respectively. Constraint (ii) of (4.5) is necessary so that an agent with 
distribution Q will not mimic one with distribution P. 
 After some manipulation, the problem in (4.5) can be rewritten as   
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Problem (4.6) is similar to problem (4.3) except that r1 here is the probability that the 
agent is from distribution P whereas in (4.3) p1 is the probability that agent’s ability is α1. 
Also, α1 and α2 of problem (4.3) are replaced by E(α1) and E(α2), respectively. Whereas 
agents know their ability exactly in (4.3), in this case they know their expected ability 
exactly. And whereas the principal knows only the probability distribution of agents’ 
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abilities in (4.3), in this case the principal has a probability associated with each 
distribution of agent abilities.  
As a result, the solution of problem (4.3) can be adapted to obtain the solution of 







 = 1 
*
21 22e e=  = E(α2)/c 
11 12
SB SBs s=  = 1/(1 + 2r2 /r1(E(α2) – E(α1))/E(α1)) 
11 12
SB SBe e=  = E(α1)/[c(1 + 2r2 /r1(E(α2) – E(α1))/E(α1))].  
Again, the optimal long-term contract with full two-period commitment simply repeats 
the optimal static contract of section 3.5 of chapter 3.   
In the optimal solution, constraint (ia) of (4.6) holds as an equality so that 
2 2
11 11 11 1 11 12 12 12 1 12( ) ( ) / 2 ( ( ) ( ) / 2) 0
SB SB SB SB SB SB SB SBt s e E c e t s e E c eα δ α+ − + + − . 
Thus, the expected transfer to an agent with distribution P is equal to 
2 2
11 12 11 11 1 11 12 12 1 12[ ( ) ( ) / 2 ( ( ) ( ) /
SB SB SB SB SB SB SB SBt t s e E c e s e E c eδ α δ α+ = − − + − .  
Agents with abilities α11 and α12 receive the same transfer T* = 11 12
SB SBt tδ+
12 12 11
SB SBs eδ α+ −
. This negative 
payment is the fixed fee that the agents pay to the principal. However, the surpluses they 
receive are not the same even though they pay the same fixed fee. The surplus received 
by an agent with ability α11 is S* = . 
His net surplus is S* + T* = 
2
11 11 11 11[( ( ) / 2)
SB SB SBs e c eα −
11 1( ( ))E
2
12( ( )
SBc e / 2)]
11 11
SB SBs e α α− 12 12 11(
SB SBs eδ α+ 1( )),E α−  which is negative 
because 11 1( ).Eα α<  This is his ex post gain from contracting with realized ability α11. 
Similarly, the ex post gain from contracting for an agent with realized ability α12 is 
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11 11 12 1( (
SB SBs e E ))α α−
21 22
SB SBt t
12 12 12 1( (
SB SBs e Eδ α α+ − )),  which is positive because α12 > E(α1). Thus, 
agents with the lowest realized ability receive negative gains from contracting. 
Net surplus for an agent drawn from distribution Q is equal to U2. From constraint 
(ii) of (4.6), U2 ≥ U1 + s11e11(E(α2) – E(α1)) + δs12e12(E(α2) – E(α1)). This constraint holds 






 without violating the incentive compatibility constraint. The net surplus of 
an agent drawn from distribution Q whose realized ability is α22 is (α22 – E(α1)) + 
δ (α22 – E(α1)) > 0. The net surplus of an agent drawn from distribution Q whose 
ability is α21 is s e (α21 – E(α1)) + δ (α21 – E(α1)). The sign of this expression 
depends on the sign of the term α21 – E(α1). For α21 < E(α1), agents with realized ability 







Furthermore, if the ability differential, E(α2) – E(α1), is very large compared to 
E(α1), i.e., when (E(α2) – E(α1))/E(α1) is large, and the probability r1 is small, then the 
principal may set one sharing contract targeting only agents from distribution Q while 
excluding agents from distribution P. But if (E(α2) – E(α1))/E(α1) is small and r1 is large, 
then the principal may set one sharing contract targeting only agents from distribution P 
while excluding agents from distribution Q. However, for certain combinations of (E(α2) 
– E(α1))/E(α1) and r1, the principal may find it more profitable to offer a single pooling 
contract. In this case again, agents with low ability from both distributions will receive 




4.4 Dynamics under Limited Commitment 
A credible optimal dynamic contract in a multi-period setting is characterized by a 
full commitment from both contractual partners to stick to the agreed contract, ruling out 
any renegotiation of their initial agreement. The assumption that economic agents have 
the ability to commit to non-renegotiation is an extreme assumption about the perfection 
of the judicial system. In practice, it is impractical to expect fulfillment of a commitment 
not to renegotiate when gains are possible from doing so. Starting with Dewatripont’s 
(1989) paper, the literature has considered the implications of this institutional 
“imperfection” that corresponds to the inability to commit to non-renegotiation. 
 
4.4.1 The ability to renegotiate and limited commitment 
A primary reason for limited commitment arises when the principal can 
renegotiate the contract offered to the agent during the course of actions. Renegotiation is 
a voluntary act that may benefit both the principal and the agent. This is in contrast to a 
breach of contract, which can hurt one of the contracting parties. The possibility of 
renegotiation can be viewed as the ability of the contracting partners to achieve a Pareto 
improving trade if any become feasible during the course of actions. 
For instance, consider the case described in section 4.3.2 where the agents know 
their abilities but the principal does not. The principal designs the contract in such a way 
that the agents truthfully reveal their abilities by choosing the contracts designed for each 
possible ability type. In the first period, agents with high ability (i.e., α2) reveal their 
ability to the principal by selecting the first-best contract ( , ) while agents with low 










their abilities, the principal may propose renegotiation to avoid the allocative inefficiency 
he has imposed on inefficient agents’ efforts because *11 11





The gain from this renegotiation comes from raising the second period’s 
allocative efficiency for the inefficient type and thus moving effort from the second best 
level  = α1/[c + 2cp2/p1(α2 – α1)/α1] to the first-best level  = α1/c by increasing the 
piece rate from second best  = 1/(1 + 2p2/p1(α2 – α1)/α1) to the first best  = 1. To 
induce low-ability agents to renegotiate, the principal must share these gains from trade 
with the low-ability agent by offering him at least the same utility level as without 





A high-ability agent can expect that, once the inefficient agents reveal their types 
to the principal in first period, the principal will revise the inefficient agents’ contracts in 
the second period, offering the first-best contract instead. Since a high-ability agent’s 
rent, U2 = U1 + (α2 – α1) + δ (α2 – α1), is increasing in s12 and e12, increasing 
s12 and e12  tighten the incentive compatibility constraint associated with high-ability 
agents. A high-ability agent knows that if he truthfully reveals his type he will receive 
(α2 – α1) + δ (α2 – α1) as rent. But if he lies, he can receive (α2 – α1) + 
δ (α2 – α1), which is larger than the former. Thus, a high-ability agent is better off 
hiding his type so that he can obtain more rent. Therefore, truthful revelation by high-
ability agents is no longer obtained in equilibrium. Thus, there is a fundamental trade-off 
















4.4.2 Renegotiation-proof separating contracts 
Moving away from full commitment contracts raises other numerous issues, such 
as how to model the renegotiation game, how agents update their beliefs dynamically, 
and how to design and characterize executable contracts. The nature of the difficulty due 
to imperfect commitments in repeated contracting models with adverse selection is 
discussed in this section. The discussion assumes that the principal cannot commit to 
non-renegotiation. The agent is assumed to know that any information he reveals in the 
first period will be fully utilized by the principal in the second period if renegotiation is 
feasible. But the principal is assumed to have all the bargaining power at the 
renegotiation stage, which takes place before the second-period output is realized.  
Since the first-period contract fully separates agents by ability, the second-period 
outputs are efficient for agents of both abilities and are thus given by  (inducing ) 
and  (inducing ) for respective agent abilities α1 and α2. This requires an 
intertemporal incentive constraint for agents of high ability, which must be satisfied to 
induce information revelation in the first period, U2 ≥ U1 + s1e1(α2 – α1) + δ (α2 – α1). 
If this constraint is not satisfied, then high ability agents will mimic low ability agents, 
and thus separation will not be possible. The principal must offer the low-ability agent at 











With such a separating contract, high-ability agents earn the highest possible rent 
of δ (α2 – α1) in the second period, and hence, they have no incentive to renegotiate 
the terms of the second-period contract  Given this initial commitment, coupled with the 
fact that the principal is fully informed of agents’ abilities at the renegotiation stage, the 















Therefore, the principal solves the following problem for the renegotiation-proof 
and separating (RPS) equilibrium contract: 
1 2 1 2
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Problem (4.7) solves for the first-period equilibrium and then sets the high-ability agent’s 
discounted second-period rent, δ (α2 – α1), at least as high as the rent received with 






RPSs  =  = 1 
22
RPSs  =  = 1 
1
RPSs  =  = 1/(1 + 2p2/p1(α2 – α1)/α1) 
12
RPSs  =  = 1. 
The only remaining distortion is in the low-ability agent’s first-period contract. None of 
the agents receive less than their reservation wages for both periods combined. 
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4.4.3 Renegotiation-proof pooling contracts 
Suppose instead that agents in period 1 choose the same behavior irrespective of 
their abilities. In this case, the principal learns nothing from the first-period contract. The 
continuation contract for period 2 is thus equal to the optimal static contract, conditional 
on the prior beliefs represented by p1 and q1. In this case, the second-period contracts are 
defined by  =  = 1 and  =  = 1/(1 + 2p2/p1(α2 – α1)/α1). The principal thus 
offers a single contract in the first period which induces full pooling between both 
abilities. The intertemporal incentive constraint of the high-ability agent is U2 ≥ U1 + 
se1(α2 – α1) + δ (α2 – α1). The principal’s problem, which consists of finding the 
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Constraints (iii) and (iv) of (4.8) imply that e1 = sα1/c and e2 = sα2/c. To consider 
the effort level chosen in this case, let pu(t,s,e) denote the principal’s posterior (updated) 
probability after first-period performance that the agent’s ability is α1. Perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium requires strategies and beliefs to be consistent, i.e., that the strategies are 
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optimal given the beliefs and that the beliefs are derived from strategies using Bayes rule. 
The optimal first-period action of the low-ability agent in dynamic equilibrium can only 
be the optimal one-period action because, regardless of beliefs, pu, the principal will not 
allow the low-ability agent to receive a strictly positive rent in the second period. Thus, a 
low-ability agent simply maximizes his first-period rent, which leads to optimality at s* = 
1 and  = α1/c. *1e
Because  belongs to the support of the high-ability agent’s effort, Bayes rule 
and the fact that  is optimal for low-ability agents implies that the principal’s posterior 
beliefs, pu, must be zero unless e =  However, if agents of both abilities choose , 
then the pooling equilibrium is obtained and the principal’s posterior belief is pu(t*, s*, 
) = p1. Then the principal’s second-period maximization is done with the initial prior 
represented by p1, which leads to a second-period static solution with , and  = 
1/(1 + 2p2/p1(α2 – α1)/α1). Therefore, the complete solution with a renegotiation proof 




















Comparing the principal’s surplus between the RPS and RPP cases, there is a 
critical value, δ0, of the discount factor δ such that RPS (RPP) is preferred if δ < (>) δ0. 
However, this problem is aggravated to some extent if moral hazard enters the problem. 
Moral hazard makes the critical value of δ0 smaller and thus makes a separating 
equilibrium less likely. For example, if the production process is stochastic, then the 
information on ability and output does not allow the principal to infer effort conclusively. 
As a result, both moral hazard and adverse selection enter the problem. The dynamic 
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problem changes because greater effort in the first period allows the principal to infer 
abilities better and thus offer less rent in the second period (Meyer and Vickers, 1997). 
As a result, agents may distort effort more and, sensing this potential problem, the 
principal may resort to pooling contracts instead. 
When a pooling contract is offered, agents with low ability receive negative gains 
from contracting. But if low-ability agents know their abilities, they will not contract with 
the principal. In the more general case where agent abilities vary continuously and agents 
know their abilities imperfectly before signing contracts, some agents with low ability 
will not sign contracts while others with low ability will sign contracts because of 
imperfect knowledge of their ability and then be left with negative gains from contracting 
ex post. These agents may not be able to cover their losses from contracts through future 
renegotiations. 
 
4.4.4 Renegotiation for the imperfect information case 
 Renegotiation matters can be even worse when the agents know their type 
imperfectly. In this case, complete separation of agents by their abilities is not possible, 
although separation of agents according to their ability distributions is possible. However, 
because an additional discounted future rent has to be paid to separate the agents 
according to distributions P and Q, separation of agents according to their ability may be 
too costly for the principal. In this case, the loss from contracting may be even greater for 
agents compared to the full commitment case.  
As described in section 4.3.3, agents from distribution Q reveal their abilities to 




while agents from distribution P reveal their abilities by choosing the second best 
contract, which yields  = 1/(1 + 2r2/r1(E(α2) – E(α1))/E(α1)) and  = E(α1)/[c + 
2cr2/r1(E(α2) – E(α1))/E(α1)]. Once agents reveal their abilities to the principal by contract 
selection, the principal may propose renegotiation to reduce the allocative inefficiency 
imposed on low-ability agents because  <  and  < . Allocative efficiency in 
the second period is reduced for agents from distribution P by increasing the piece rate 
from  to  = 1, which changes effort from the second best  to the first best  = 
E(α1)/c. To share these gains with agents that have the P distribution, the principal must 


























Since agents with ability distribution Q receive rent  
U2 = U1 + s11e11(E(α2) – E(α1)) + δs12e12(E(α2) – E(α1))  
     = s11e11(E(α2) – E(α1)) + δs12e12(E(α2) – E(α1)),  
which is increasing in s12 and e12, this action tightens the incentive compatibility 
constraint for agents with ability distribution Q. A high-ability (Q distribution) agent 
knows that if he truthfully reveals his high-ability distribution, then he receives rent 
(E(α2) – E(α1)) + δ (E(α2) – E(α1)), but if he lies he can receive the greater 
rent (E(α2) – E(α1)) + δ (E(α2) – E(α1)). Obviously,  <  Thus, a 
high-ability agent receives this greater increment in second-period rent without giving up 










* * .s e
His first period expected rent is (E(α2) – E(α1)). He can earn this rent by 
either truthful or deceitful action. Thus, he is indifferent between telling the truth and 




However, in this case breaking the tie in favor of lying gives him more rent in the second 
period. So, he will lie because lying has no first-period cost.  Because agents with ability 
distribution Q may prefer to hide their ability knowledge to earn more rent later, truthful 
revelation of ability distributions is no longer obtained in equilibrium. 
In this case, if the principal wants to separate agents she has to pay rent 
(E(α2) – E(α1)) + δ (E(α2) – E(α1)) to agents with distribution Q. If α12 < α21, 
then both ability types α21 and α22 from distribution Q earn positive rent. However, if α21 
< E(α1), then α21 – E(α1) is negative and (α21 – E(α1)) + δ (E(α2) – E(α1)) < 0. 
Thus, the sign of the rent of the low-ability agents from distribution Q depends on the 
relationship of the distributions P and Q.  For agents from the P distribution, agents with 










4.5 Asset Specificity and the Holdup Problem 
A number of papers have tested the main predictions from the transactions cost 
literature developed by Williamson (1975, 1985, and 1996). One of the best-known 
results from the transactions cost literature is that contracts with a longer duration are 
likely when relationship-specific investments matter more (so as to reduce holdup 
problems). Asset specificity and the holdup problem are discussed in a one-period setting 
in section 3.2.2.2 of chapter 3. This section extends the holdup problem to illustrate why 
inadequate investment may occur in relation-specific assets in a dynamic setting. 
Suppose the agent’s productivity of effort is determined by his nonreversible 
asset-specific investment. In this case, the principal cannot commit to reward the agent 
for his effort because she does not know the productivity of effort before the investment 
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is in place. When the principal offers the contract, the agent’s investment has already 
been sunk. The principal thus loses the role as Stackelberg leader in the design of 
incentives for effort, and so the Nash equilibrium16 between the principal and the agent 
must be examined. The principal offers a contract anticipating an effort productivity 
associated with a particular choice of investment by the agent. Anticipating the contract 
he will receive from the principal, the agent chooses an investment level, and, hence, 
indirectly an effort productivity to maximize his utility (Laffont and Martimort, 2002).   
 For each value of the effort productivity chosen by the agent at t = 0, the 
principal can implement the first-best contract at period t = 1 since she has all the 
bargaining power (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). Thus, as shown in numerous cases in 
chapters 2 and 3, and in this chapter, the agent obtains his reservation utility with a first-
best contract aside from the sunk cost of investment. In the principal-agent models 
considered thus far, the principal moves first, announcing a payment schedule, and the 
agent decides on effort to maximize his utility after observing the payment schedule. The 
agent then adjusts his effort to changes in payment schedule in succeeding contracting 
periods. But in this case, once an effort productivity is chosen with an investment, the 
agent cannot reverse it depending on the offer he receives from the principal at t = 1. 
Anticipating this, the agent will undertake the minimum required investment at t = 0. 
This is how the holdup problem leads to a Nash equilibrium with underinvestment in 
specific assets (Laffont and Martimort, 2002).  
However, if the agent determines his distribution of effort productivity by an 
investment, then the agent is not assured of his investment cost in contracting periods 
                                                 
16 In a Nash equilibrium, each player’s strategy choice is a best response to the strategies actually played by 
his/her rivals (Nash, 1951). Nash equilibrium applies to simultaneous–move games, in which all players 
move only once and at the same time.  
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beginning at t = 1. Even with a minimum investment of zero, the agent will be left with 
less than his reservation utility if his realized productivity falls below his expectations. In 
this case, the agent will be left with the same utility level in future contracting periods 
unless both the principal and the agent renegotiate the contract.  
As discussed in section 4.4, the principal and the agents may be able to 
renegotiate initial contracts to improve efficiency in mutually beneficial ways. As section 
4.4 of this chapter shows for renegotiation-proof separating equilibrium, raising the 
efficiency or payment of the low-ability agents tightens the incentive constraints of high-
ability agents. Thus, a fundamental trade-off arises between raising low-ability agents’ ex 
post efficiency and tightening incentives for high-ability agents when renegotiation is 
possible. This trade-off may discourage the principal from renegotiating the initial long-
term contract. Furthermore, because the low ability agent is merely unable to recover his 
fixed cost, renegotiation may not alter marginal behavior and thus may not have benefits 
for the principal. In this case, the principal may not have an incentive to renegotiate. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Results in this chapter have shown that, when agents do not know their abilities, 
full-commitment, long-term contracts have the same problems as short-term contracts as 
far as possibilities that agents can face negative ex post gains from contracting on 
average. Alternatively, when the agents know their abilities, they earn at least their 
reservation wages irrespective of abilities (although some may do so by choosing not to 
contract). These conclusions are not qualitatively different from those obtained in the 
static cases with similar information structure. But, again, the assumption that an agent 
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knows his ability exactly is extreme. The assumption that agents know their abilities 
imperfectly is more practical. 
When agents do not know their abilities, the long-term contract is simply a 
repetition of the static contract. Without knowledge of abilities, the pooling contract is 
thus optimal for the first period. In this case, the principal has the same prior at the 
beginning of the second period as she had at the beginning of the first period. However, 
the agent then knows his ability perfectly (assuming no measurement error) so the 
principal can offer a separating contract that attains efficiency for agents with high ability 
and inefficiency for agents with low ability. 
If the agent knows his ability imperfectly, then a qualitatively similar pooling 
equilibrium occurs in the first period. But the principal can induce separation of agents 
according to their ability distributions while pooling agents within ability distributions. 
As a result, for each distribution, some low-ability agents will receive less than their 
reservation wages. Also, because agents do not know their abilities perfectly, a fraction of 
low ability agents receive negative gains from contracting even when renegotiation-proof 
long-term contracts are in place for each ability distribution. 
The likelihood that long-term contracts will be renegotiated as information 
becomes available raises the question of why parties should not sign one-period contracts 
before moving to long-term relationships. In the theoretical simplicity of this chapter, the 
advantage of a one-period contract is that the agent can learn his ability and then sign a 
long-term contract that permits efficiency. However, if the agent makes an irreversible 
asset-specific investment before signing the contract, then he losses his bargaining power. 
He may be more likely to ensure returns on his investment and effort with a long-term 
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commitment from the principal before investment. Nevertheless, even with asset-specific 
investment, parties can renegotiate the contract beneficially for both sides after 
information on abilities becomes more apparent, provided that both sides agree. 
Based on the numerous theoretical results of the general principal-agent models 
developed in this and previous chapters, chapter 5 turns to discussion of the relevance 




Contract Theory Applied to Hog Contracts 
5.1 Introduction 
To see how the general theory of incentives sketched thus far relates to practices 
in US hog sector contracting, this chapter reviews features of hog contracting, and 
considers how they differ from the principals and agents for which the theory was 
initially developed. Many differences between the actors of the theoretical models and 
hog contractors and contractees are differences of degree, rather than of kind. Also, the 
hog sector is large, complex, and diverse; many of the theoretical predictions reviewed 
and derived apply only partially to hog contracting and perhaps none of them apply 
precisely. However, by modifying the hog contract slightly to place it in the standard 
contract format, conclusions regarding agents’ gains from contracting appear to be quite 
relevant to contract hog growers.   
Section 5.2 begins by discussing and reshaping hog contract features in detail 
while comparing the hog compensation scheme with the standard linear one of contract 
theory. Section 5.3 discusses the reasons why the contracting parties in the hog sector 
prefer production contracts or vertical integration to the spot market and whether the 
reasons for this preference are similar to those in standard contract theory. This section 
also discusses asset-specific investments and their implications for hog contracting 
parties. Section 5.4 explains why production contracts are preferred to vertical integration 
in the hog sector. Section 5.5 explains how the holdup problem in this sector is solved 
using long-term contracts.  
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Finally, section 5.6 concludes that, because of imperfect information on grower 
productivity and pooling contracts for different grower types, some contract growers earn 
less than their reservation utilities. 
 
5.2 Hog Contract Features 
5.2.1 Description of the hog contract payment scheme 
A hog production (grow-out) contract is an agreement between a contractor and a 
grower that binds the grower to specific production practices. The contractor is often 
called an integrator, characterized as a large conglomerate or corporate organization that 
contracts with many growers to produce hogs. Integrators typically market hogs through 
marketing contracts or other arrangements with slaughter plants. Input suppliers and 
packers are other distinct types of contractors that use contract production to vertically 
integrate business activities, such as feed or hog processing. Growers can also be 
contractors that employ other producers as growers in order to expand or specialize in 
their hog operations (Tsoulouhas and Vukina, 2001). 
According to contractual arrangements, the grower cares for piglets to be grown 
out, and usually provides land and housing facilities, utilities, labor, and other operating 
expenses, such as repairs and maintenance. The contractor provides piglets to be grown 
to slaughter weight, feed, veterinary supplies and services. Expenses for fuel and litter 
can be shared or paid by either party, depending on the nature of the contract 
(Tsoulouhas and Vukina, 2001). Most hog finishing contracts have fairly similar 
payment structures, taking the form of a fixed performance standard, 
( / )it it it it itR bQ s C Q Qβ= + − ,      (5.1) 
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where Rit is the total payment to the ith contract grower for the tth batch, i indexes 
growers, t indexes batches, b is the base payment per pound of live meat produced, Qit is 
the amount of hog weight produced (in pounds), β is a bonus factor measuring the 
intensity by which the fixed standard influences the total payment the grower receives, s 
represents a fixed feed-conversion ratio, and Cit is the amount of feed used by grower i to 
produce Qit. 
Performance is determined largely by the feed-conversion ratio, which is 
measured in pounds of feed used to produce a pound of live weight. Frequently, 
performance is measured by the so-called settlement cost which is obtained by combining 
feed cost with other contractor’s costs (piglets, medication, etc) divided by the total 
pounds of live meat produced. For a feed-conversion ratio below standard s the grower 
receives a positive amount over the base payment, and for a feed-conversion ratio above 
standard s he receives a penalty. 
 
5.2.2 Payment based on multiple signals 
 One of the important features of a hog contract is that the growers’ payment 
depends on multiple signals of growers’ effort. Equation (5.1) can be rewritten as 
it it itR Q Cγ β= − , (5.2) 
where γ = (b + βs). For this contract the grower’s payment is not based on his effort 
directly. The agent’s payment in standard contracting models is also not based on the 
agent’s effort directly, but rather on the output produced by the agent. Output is a signal 
of the agent’s effort. For hog contracts, in addition to output, the grower’s payment 
depends on the feed provided by the contractor. The format of the hog payment scheme 
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in equation (5.2) corresponds to the standard payment scheme as discussed in section 
2.2.9.3 of chapter 2 in the context of multiple signals. 
Section 2.2.9.3 of chapter 2 explains how additional signals are helpful and how 
the weights on additional signals should be determined. The informativeness principle 
described in that section states that any measure of performance that (on the margin) 
reveals information on the effort level chosen by the agent should be included in the 
payment scheme. That means, whenever two signals together provide more information 
about the agent's effort than does the agent's output alone, the agent's compensation under 
the optimal contract will be based on both the signals.  
It is important to understand why hog payment schemes use two signals of 
grower’s effort rather than one, i.e., why one of the production inputs in addition to 
output is used to determine a hog grower’s payment. Using both total output Qit and total 
feed use Cit is not beyond the theoretical insight as described in section 2.2.9.3. Hog 
output, Qit is a function of both the grower’s inputs and contractor provided feed Cit. The 
grower’s effort in the hog contracting problem can be regarded conceptually as grower 
provided inputs (including labor) in addition to contractor provided feed that jointly 
determine the weight gain. Thus, the same amount of output Qit could have been 
produced with a different combination of grower’s inputs and contractor’s feed Cit. Any 
given output Qit produced with a relatively smaller amount of contractor’s feed signals a 
larger amount of grower’s input use. Alternatively, the same output Qit produced with a 
relatively larger amount of contractor’s feed signals a smaller amount of grower’s input 
use. As a result, total output Qit alone may not be a sufficient statistic for the grower’s 
input. Since contractor provided input Cit is observable with virtually no cost, contractor 
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provided input Cit is used as one of the signals to measure grower’s inputs. Using 
contractor provided feed Cit along with Qit thus provides better information on the 
grower’s input use.  
 
5.2.3 The base payment 
Apart from multiple signals, another feature of the hog contract payment in (5.2) 
is that the intercept with respect to output is zero. Hog contracts with a zero base payment 
are reasonable because the opportunity cost of not producing any output is zero unless 
there is some unforeseen disaster that severely affects the output. Thus, under a 
reasonable assumption of constant returns to scale the linear scheme with scaling by 
output quantity seems reasonable for a typical production environment where zero output 
implies zero effort and zero feed use and, hence, deserves zero payment.  
Further manipulation of equation (5.2) reveals that one base pay is built into the 
payment scheme for unit production. To see this, equation (5.2) can be written as 
( / )it it it it it itr R Q C Q cγ β γ≡ = − = − β ,     (5.3) 
where the grower payment for per pound of live meat produced is rit and cit is contractor 
supplied feed used for per pound of live meat produced. The unit payment, rit, makes the 
payment a function of two signals of the grower’s input, pounds produced and feed used 
to produce it. The feed use per pound of live meat produced, cit, which combines the 
information from both signals, is used to determine the unit payment, rit. This rit can be   
compared with the piece rate s in earlier models. This reveals the similarity in the linear 
payment structure, w = t + sπ, described in the theoretical model of section 2.2.9.2 in 
chapter 2, and the linear payment structure it it itR Q Cγ β= − .  
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Based on the fact that hog contracts use a similar (linear) payment scheme as the 
standard theory, is it valid to conclude that the standard theoretical predictions derived in 
last two chapters apply to the contract hog growers? To answer this question requires 
knowing whether these similar linear contracts have resulted from the reasons described 
in the standard theory of chapters 2, 3, and 4. Otherwise, the similarities may be a 
coincidence. 
 If dissimilar reasons are behind the motivation for contracts in hog sector, then 
applying the standard theoretical predictions of agent’s gains from contracting to 
conclude that hog growers gain from contracting may not be valid. In order to see 
whether similar motivations are behind production contracts in the hog industry, the 
potential reasons for both the parties to enter the hog contracts must be examined. 
 
5.3 Reasons for Hog Contracting 
A major deficiency of the discussion thus far is that it deals mainly with a given 
structural relationship where a grower is contracting with a contractor. It can, in itself, 
say little about the evolving structure of the relationship, specifically, about why the 
grower is using the contractor technology, inputs, and production practices through a 
production contract in his own production facilities rather than remaining an independent 
grower. Why certain tasks are given to the grower, why the two parties do not interact 
through the marketplace, and why they do not vertically integrate remains unclear.  
Section 3.2 of chapter 3 suggests that transactions cost along with risk determine 
the optimal form of contracts. As discussed in that section, the size of the transactions 
cost of using spot markets, production contracts, and vertical integration explains why 
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one of them dominates the others. Of course, risk cannot be ignored because it affects the 
transaction costs. Since production contracts dominate others at least in part of the hog 
sector, transactions cost might be lower when production takes place under production 
contracts. The theoretical results of section 3.2 of chapter 3 suggest that transactions cost 
resulting from asset specific investment may be the prime motivating factor for 
contracting in hog sector. This specific component of transactions cost also explains why 
hog production contracts are long-term contracts. This section considers transactions cost 
in the hog sector related to bearing of risk, consistent quality demands of consumers, and 
asset-specific investment.   
 
5.3.1 Risk reduction 
One strain of the hog contracting literature considers risk reduction as one of the 
main reasons why growers are motivated to contract production (Rhodes, 1989; Rhodes 
and Grimes, 1992; Johnson and Foster, 1994; Kliebenstein and Lawrence, 1995; 
Lawrence and Grimes, 2001). This point of view emphasizes the stochastic nature of 
prices and production that growers face and views production contracts as a vehicle to 
shift (or share) these risks. According to this view, the important benefit of production 
contracts is the reduction of risk-bearing costs. Transferring these uncertainties and risks 
onto risk-averse growers is costly. Optimality requires removing risks from the risk-
averse growers. Since this approach emphasizes the reduction of growers’ economic risks 
by viewing contracts as the vehicle to shift risks to the contractors, this is known as the 
risk-sharing approach. 
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Emphasizing the benefits of shifting risk presumes that impediments prevent 
direct risk-shifting opportunities for hog growers, such as trading risks in insurance 
markets. Production contracts are viewed as a second-best technique to reallocate these 
risks of hog operations. In their hog producers’ survey, Lawrence and Grimes (2001) 
found growers citing financial risks reduction as the key advantage of production 
contracts. However, one problem of the risk-sharing approach is its failure to recognize 
that there is a limit on how much risk production contracts can shift from the growers to 
the contractors. For example, Johnson and Foster (1994) ignore any incentive effects 
and evaluate the desirability of hog production contracts to growers in terms of the risks 
that growers must bear. They find that a broad choice of contract terms allow hog 
growers with different degrees of risk aversion to find suitable tradeoffs between risk and 
expected returns. 
The interests of the growers and contractors diverge, and thus it might be 
impossible to construct an incentive mechanism that simultaneously reduces grower’s 
risks and maximizes total potential surplus when the inputs and/or outputs of the growers 
are not observable by the contractor. Growers’ efforts cannot be easily monitored by 
contractors because output is influenced not only by the growers’ effort but also by 
factors beyond their control. Because of the nonobservability of growers’ efforts, 
complete removal of growers’ risks mutes their incentives to exert high effort. 
This risk incentive trade-off is discussed in section 2.2.9.2 of chapter 2. 
Transaction costs, i.e., costs of providing incentives, arise because of this conflicting 
interest of the parties. Because of this trade-off, common incentive structures exclude 
fixed wage contracts and include a payment scheme consisting of a small base fee and a 
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large piece rate implying high incentives. Thus, part of the risk must be passed on to 
growers to provide incentives. Thus, complete risk shifting from the growers is not 
possible. 
However, even if partial risk reduction is the prime motivation for growers to 
enter a contract, and the benefits from reduction of the risk premium is the prime 
motivation for the contractor, then a contractor would prefer more risk-averse rather than 
less risk-averse hog growers. Equations (2.4) and (2.5) of chapter 2 show that the 
principal pays more to the risk neutral agent, ( )u c e+ , than she pays to a risk-averse 
agent, 1( (v u c e− + )) , for the same task. Because effort observability eliminates the 
incentive problem in that case, the principal acts essentially as an insurer. Due to the 
curvature of the v function, the risk-averse agent’s payment is lower as agent’s risk 
aversion is higher. Thus, the principal’s profit increases as the agent’s risk aversion 
increases.  If the contractor acts as an insurer, then benefits from shifting higher risk 
premiums should motivate her to contract with more risk-averse hog growers. 
However, that is not what is observed in hog operations. Because absolute risk 
aversion is believed to be decreasing and because contracting hog growers tend to be 
large while independent growers tend to be small, the risk motivation appears to be 
inconsistent with the facts. If wealth is taken as a proxy for risk-aversion, then small-
scale growers are more likely to be more risk averse (under decreasing absolute risk 
aversion) and thus more likely to be under a production contract for a given production 
risk. But small-scale growers are mostly independent hog operators. In fact, more large-
scale producers are contract growers. 
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For example, contract hog finishing operations had an average of more than 5,000 
hogs removed in 1998, compared with an average of about 1,500 head sold from 
independent operations. The distribution of hog finishing farms by typology shows that 
67 percent of contract operations were among the large farm groups, while 64 percent of 
independent operations were in the small farm categories (McBride and Key, 2003). 
Furthermore, this is a growing trend in the hog sector (MacDonald et al, 2004). Martin 
(1994) estimates the extent of risk shifting afforded by production contracts for hog 
production. But she does not find the evidence of substantial risk shifting in her study. 
Since this is the case, risk reduction does not appear to be the main underlying motivation 
for contracting in hog production.  
A more reasonable conclusion is that risk reduction is one of the important 
motivations for growers’ to enter into contracts. But whether growers enter into contracts 
solely because of risk-sharing inducements offered by contractors may not explain why 
contracting occurs. In fact, a payment scheme with high incentives, and thus consisting of 
a low base pay and a high piece rate, may discourage more risk-averse hog growers from 
entering production contracts, particularly when the risk involves risk associated with 
unknown grower abilities that cannot be shifted by contracting. As discussed in detail in 
section 3.2 of chapter 3, when the transactions cost (of providing incentives) associated 
with various contracts vary across growers and growers are heterogeneous in risk 
aversion, more low risk-averse growers are likely to be in production contracts than high 
risk-averse growers because of their relative transactional efficiency. It is less costly for 
contractors to induce a given effort from a low risk-averse grower than from a high risk-
averse one because less has to be paid to compensate the low risk-averse grower for the 
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risk he bears. If this is true, many more hog growers with low transactions cost (less risk-
aversion) are likely to be contract growers. 
Given heterogeneous transactions cost and risk aversion, production contracts are 
likely to be more prevalent among less risk-averse growers. Nevertheless, the growers 
who enter contracts may cite risk-sharing as the major reason for doing so because, from 
their perspective, risk-sharing is the inducement that persuades them to enter an 
agreement that reduces transactions cost for the contractor. Thus, instead of risk aversion 
as the primary underlying motivation for contracting, the predominance of contracting 
depends on how transactions cost (i.e., negotiation, supervision, and enforcement costs) 
vary across contracts and growers. However, even if only less risk-averse hog growers 
self select to contract, a considerable amount of risk shifting from hog growers to 
contractors may be observed.  
Presuming that risk shifting is not the primary motivation for contracting, 
production contracts are often analyzed under risk neutrality, explicitly ignoring any risk-
bearing effects. Once the parties enter a contract, however, contract parameters are 
determined partly by the risk bearing costs due to mechanisms necessary to preserve 
incentives. For example, in the context of broiler contracting, Knoeber and Thurman 
(1995) state that risk reduction is the end result of contracting, not the cause of it. 
Similarly, I conclude that risk sharing does not explain why hog contracting occurs. 
Therefore, understanding the role of other transactions cost is necessary to explain why 




5.3.2 Quality consistency and efficiency 
Consumers today are concerned primarily about quality hogs at a low cost. They 
are demanding leaner pork, which requires different genetics. They do not want the 
variability of quality that is inevitable when hogs of various breeds are produced under a 
variety of production processes and the resulting pork products are intermingled in the 
marketing system. On the question of quality, consumers want consistent quality but they 
do not necessarily want the same quality. They want to know when they buy the center-
cut pork chop today that it will be pretty much the same as the center-cut pork chop they 
bought last week. People have different tastes and preferences, and so all consumers do 
not want the same quality. Some want their pork chops to be larger and others smaller. 
Some want theirs to be leaner and others well-marbled. Some want theirs darker in color 
and others lighter. Some like their chops firm and others want theirs to be moister, and so 
on. 
Smaller family hog operations simply cannot provide consumers with the 
consistent quality of pork they demand at as low a cost as the large-scale contractor can. 
Of course, some large family hog farms are as efficient as hog contractors. But corporate 
operations by contractors are far more efficient than the average family hog operation 
(McBride and Key, 2003; MacDonald et al, 2004). The large-scale contractor who 
operates through production contracts or vertically integrated operations can provide 
consistent quality meat with variety through basic genetic selection, uniform feed supply, 
climate controlled facilities, drugs and hormones, and controlling animals for same age, 
weight, and size. Further, contractors, who are mostly processors, can operate their 
processing units and slaughter houses efficiently ensuring a steady flow of slaughter hogs 
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to them with the help of production contracts or company-owned hog operations (i.e., 
vertical integration). 
The important benefit of these production arrangements is the reduction of 
transactions cost and production cost afforded by specialization, easier access to capital, 
quality control, and the incentives that contracts provide for effort and information 
revelation. For example, under production contracts, tying a grower’s payment more 
closely to production outcomes provides an incentive to improve these production 
outcomes. The focus is thus on how contract design affects the incentives of growers (and 
contractors) and ultimately the transactions cost. As described in section 5.3.1, the 
grower’s aversion to risk limits the extent to which incentives can be provided. Risk is 
treated as a cost of providing better incentives entailing lower transaction costs. In this 
context, higher risk and risk aversion implies higher transaction costs. Risk at a very high 
level might call for company-owned hog operations as an alternative to production 
contracts. Thus, the transaction cost of a consistent supply of quality pork and steady 
flow of animals to slaughter houses are lower under these production arrangements than 
would prevail with spot market arrangements. 
 
5.3.3 Asset specificity and the holdup problem 
As explained in section 3.2 of chapter 3, transactions cost of spot (or auction) 
markets may be large if opportunistic behavior is undertaken by any of the transacting 
parties. Where the principal or the agent makes sizable relation-specific investments in 
assets specific to an ongoing supply relationship, spot markets are less attractive. For an 
agent, when production requires investing in an asset that is specialized to a particular 
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principal, any deal made prior to investment may not be enforceable once the investment 
is undertaken, at least when competing contractors are not available to the agent. Specific 
investments make agents vulnerable to being held up by the principal for a share of the 
associated quasirent. That is, opportunistic behavior by the principal can take advantage 
of agents' immobility or asset-specific investments. These possibilities may inflict high 
transactions cost on the parties, which would influence the type of contract. The 
remainder of this section considers asset-specific investment in the hog sector the 
implications it has for growers and contractors in the hog sector.  
 
5.3.3.1 Asset specificity in the hog sector 
The hog industry has been moving toward more specialized hog production and 
processing operations for over 60 years and the trend appears to have accelerated in the 
1990s (Hurt, 1994). Modern hog facilities used in the larger hog operations are equipped 
with state-of-the-art technology dedicated only to pork production. These new 
technologies require large investments that are specific to hog production. 
Williamson (1979) delineates several types of asset specificity that are relevant to 
the hog sector. Site specificity is one. Site specificity involves location-specific 
advantages favoring a particular relationship that might be due to some unique cost-
reducing or revenue-enhancing characteristics of the location. The costs of transporting 
feed and feeder pigs and mature hogs have led growers and contractors to locate near one 
another. For example, hog contractors might concentrate production near a feed mill or 
packing or processing plant to reduce transportation costs and stress on hogs from 
transportation (Hennessy and Lawrence, 1999). Thus, contractors indirectly restrict the 
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location of contract growers to within a certain distance of feed mill and processing 
facilities. As a result, most growers have only one or perhaps a few contractors with 
whom they can contract. Thus, contractors likely have the monopsony power (or a close 
approximation) attributed to the principal in typical principal agent problem within a 
given geographical area. That is, growers may have limited if any opportunity to contract 
with other contractors. In this case, site specificity translates into market power.  
Similarly, specialized processing facilities depend upon purchases by nearby 
growers. These, too, are site-specific assets. Using Williamson’s (1985) categorization, 
both the hog facilities provided by growers within a certain distance of the contractor, 
and the feed mills and processing facilities provided by contractors within a certain 
distance of growers, are relation-specific assets because of their site specificity 
(Hennessy and Lawrence, 1999).  
Another type is physical asset specificity involves the specification of asset form 
to accord with the needs of other parties to a transaction. Examples of specific assets 
include the specialized equipment required for hog production, such as manure storage 
facilities, or equipment for manure handling, barn ventilation, or equipment to deliver 
feed and water to hogs. Contracts require that grower facilities are constructed to conform 
to the contractor’s requirements. The contractor may require, for example, a one-
thousand-head modern confinement building that meets her building standards. She may 
require growers to construct specific, highly automated finishing barns including 
ventilation systems beyond what growers had contemplated; specified roads on the 
grower’s farm to provide access for feed and live-haul semi-trucks; adequate loading and 
unloading areas; an automatic-switch stand-by generator capable of running the water, 
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feed, lighting, and other equipment; a small portable scale for weighing pigs (to her 
specifications) in each facility, and so on (Swinton and Martin, 1997). 
In brief, the contractor’s specifications must be followed for land, buildings, 
equipment, water, power, fuel, electricity, and other facilities because the contractor may 
consider them necessary to properly care for and raise pigs to marketable age. As a result, 
the value of these facilities depends upon an ongoing supply relationship with the 
particular contractor. These facilities are valuable assets within a contract with the 
particular contractor, whereas outside the contract they may be of limited value or require 
modification before a contract with another contractor could be undertaken. 
Human asset specificity, which involves the acquisition of skills and information 
that facilitate a particular firm-to-firm relationship, is also important. Although difficult 
to quantify, this type of specificity undoubtedly exists in the hog industry. Opportunities 
for legal disputes abound in contractual arrangements. Parties to an ongoing business 
relationship might establish from past performance that the other party is honest, 
reasonable, and fair (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983, and Winfree and 
McCluskey,2005). This might also discourage the grower from shopping around for 
alternative contractors (Hennessy and Lawrence, 1999).  
However, all of the significant management decisions—selection of facilities 
design, genetic stock, health program, breeding dates, when to place on feed, feeding 
system, when to price, when to deliver—are made by the contractor rather than the 
grower. Growers follow a company-structured feed and management plan. Even though 
considerable animal raising skills are required to implement a company management plan 
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profitably, these skills are not be company specific and, hence, growers may have little 
human capital that is relation-specific.  
 
5.3.3.2 The holdup problem in hog contracting 
Because of all the specificities mentioned above, the growers’ assets are sources 
of potentially appropriable quasirents in the sense that they have low salvage value 
outside the bilateral contractual relationship. This constitutes a holdup problem that can 
manifest itself in two ways. First, according to Williamson (1985), appropriable 
quasirents affect the level of investments. Often, because of economies of scale, there is 
only one local hog contractor, and transporting the hog product to an alternative market is 
costly. Thus, a hog producer who makes a costly investment in a specific asset is 
vulnerable to holdup. Growers vulnerable to holdup will be reluctant to invest in specific 
assets. Being aware of the possibility that they may be held up by contractors, growers 
will cautiously invest in specific assets even if they do so. These investments are likely 
suboptimal compared to the situation where contractors and growers vertically integrate. 
The magnitude of the underinvestment problem may vary with factors determining the 
salvage value of the investment, which in turn affects the magnitude of quasirents.  
Second, after housing facilities have been constructed, the contractors may exploit 
their advantageous bargaining position by frequently requesting upgrades and 
technological improvements as conditions for contract renewal. Growers may be held up 
because physical specificity could effectively reduce the growers’ compensation without 
causing additional moral hazard problems. That is, when a contract involves physical 
asset specificity, the fear of contract termination can induce the agent to exert high effort 
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without the need for efficient compensation (Lewin, 1998; Vukina, and Leegomonchai, 
2006). The problems of suboptimal investment and opportunistic behavior would seem to 
make the parties favor vertical integration as an alternative.  
In addition, anticipation of a changeable or uncertain future should tend toward 
vertically integrated production. As inputs (e.g., animals to be grown, feed) become 
increasingly more productive, contracts are likely to require constant renegotiation and so 
become subject to opportunism. Anticipating this problem, hog producers might be 
discouraged from contract production. Beyond this, there is considerable risk in hog 
production. If this risk is borne by growers, contracting costs need not be large, but 
grower risk-bearing costs will be. To reduce these risk-bearing costs by shifting them to 
the contractors (a cheaper risk bearer), however, would seem to require complex 
contingent contracts. Again, the costs of such complex contracting would seem to favor 
vertical integration. But reality is puzzling. Vertical integration is rare, and contract 
production dominates the hog sector. 
 
5.4 Vertical Integration versus Production Contracts 
The discussion of section 5.3 under a transactions cost framework offers both 
insight into the organization of hog production and a puzzle. As predicted by the 
transactions cost framework, the importance of relation-specific assets provided by 
growers and the contractor explain why spot markets are not an economically efficient 
device for organizing hog production. However, while transactions cost provides a 
convincing explanation for the replacement of spot markets in hog production, it remains 
to explain why production contracts are used to grow hogs rather than vertically 
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integrated company farms. This section considers how contracting provides positive 
advantages relative to vertical integration. 
 
5.4.1 Capital constraints 
As demonstrated in chapters 2, 3 and 4, other factors beyond risks motivate agents 
to enter into contracting. Even with no concern for risks or agential effort, a wealth 
constraint or asymmetric information may motivate the design of contracts. Section 2.3 of 
chapter 2 explains how a wealth constraint can impose a sharing contract on the parties 
even if the agents are risk neutral. One such constraint in the hog sector is the capital 
constraint, i.e., capital required to finance the investment in hog facilities (Kliebenstein 
and Lawrence, 1995).  
A resource-providing contract that reduces the grower’s initial investment is a 
better alternative for a grower compared to private operation with spot markets. But an 
arrangement where growers provide capital reduces the capital requirement for the 
contractor for the purpose of acquiring a consistent supply of quality meat compared to 
financing company-owned farms in a vertically integrated operation. Financing a single 
standard (e.g., one-thousand-head) modern confinement building, which costs roughly 
$150,000 to $200,000, is difficult for most hog growers (Swinton and Martin, 1997), but 
would require a staggering investment for a contractor financing many farms. Potential 
lenders often require a production/ marketing contract to ensure stable revenue. By 
providing a resource-providing production contract to growers, the contractor can relax 
binding credit constraints for growers without taxing credit constraints faced by the 
contractor.  
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5.4.2 Moral hazard and performance 
 Another important feature of hog contracts is the requirement that growers must 
provide their own time as effort but also capital in the form of hog facilities. Hog 
facilities, i.e., capital specific to the contracting relationship between growers and the 
contractor, act as a bond to assure growers’ effort and performance. Upon the failure of a 
grower to comply with any of the terms of a production contract agreement, the 
contractor typically has the right at her option, without legal process, to (i) reduce 
payments to the grower, (ii) take immediate possession of the delivered pigs and raise 
them to maturity on the land and with the facilities of the grower, or (iii) to remove pigs 
from the possession of the grower and raise them to maturity elsewhere. Growers agree in 
the contract that any expense and cost incurred by contractors in raising the pigs to 
maturity will be paid by the growers. Likewise, upon failure of a grower to comply with 
any of the terms of the agreed contract, the contractor has the right to terminate the 
contract (Swinton and Martin, 1997).  
Production contracts typically state that contracting with a grower will be 
discontinued if performance is consistently well below average. If a grower does not 
provide hog houses, discontinuance would not be onerous to the grower, which would 
thus provide little incentive to the grower to perform. But this is not the case if growers 
provide capital in the form of hog houses and other hog facilities. Discontinuance would 
imply a loss of investment. Thus grower capital provides an incentive to meet some 
minimum level of performance. Most important, since the skills necessary to raise hogs 
are widely available and techniques (a feed and management plan) and advice are 
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provided by the company, there is little relation-specific human capital that might also 
serve this purpose. 
The absence of relation-specific human capital explains why a monetary 
performance bond from a hired grower cannot be used instead of grower-provided capital 
to induce performance, i.e., why a hired grower managing a contractor-owned hog 
operation would not assure performance. Performance bonds are commonly used in other 
sectors and industries to assure the performance of hired managers (see, for example, 
Lazear, 1979). The use of hog houses, however, has two desirable characteristics not 
associated with performance bonds. 
First, if the bond accrues to the contractor in the event that a grower does not 
perform, the contractor may have an incentive to obstruct grower performance. This 
would be the case if the performance bond is greater than the loss to the contractor from 
poor performance. This is a moral hazard problem where the contractor behaves 
opportunistically. Grower-provided hog houses are not transferred to the contractor if 
performance fails as is a performance bond. Rather, the value simply dissipates. Thus, an 
incentive for grower performance is provided without simultaneously creating an 
incentive for the contractor to obstruct grower performance. 
Second, since hog houses are long-lived assets, ending the contractual relationship 
between grower and contractor for any reason (poor performance or not) imposes a cost 
on the grower which reduces enforcement costs. Enforcement cost is discussed in section 
3.2.2.1 of chapter 3. Grower provision of hog houses not only bonds performance but 
also ensures that the contractual relation will be a long-term relationship. According to 
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Knoeber (1989), this is one of the important reasons why contractors in the broiler 
industry use chicken houses rather than any other monetary bond. 
An additional effect of grower-provided capital is the provision of proper 
maintenance incentives to growers. If it is difficult to monitor maintenance, hired 
managers using facilities provided by the contractor on company farms will have too 
little incentive to maintain them (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Careless or excessive use 
of these facilities would result in the depreciation. Thus, in addition to supervising 
growers’ efforts, the contractor would have to monitor the use of hog facilities along with 
other inputs that she supplies to the production process. Requiring growers to provide hog 
facilities provides proper incentives for maintenance without any need for expensive 
monitoring, and thus saves monitoring costs. Monitoring cost is also discussed in section 
3.2.2.1 of chapter 3. In summary, grower provision of hog facilities creates a bond that 
assures grower performance, better maintenance, and a long-term contracting 
relationship. 
 
5.4.3 Selection of high-ability growers 
As described in section 2.4 of chapter 2, where agents differ in ability and other 
characteristics, choosing agents to match productive circumstances is important. When 
agents know their ability but the principal does not, the principal can design contracts to 
induce agents to self-select into more efficient arrangements. In hog operations, large 
facilities employ large amounts of capital and high-ability growers are required to reap 
the full potential benefits of large facilities. Thus, self-selection of high-ability growers is 
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important for the contractor. One important dimension of grower ability is the ability to 
adapt quickly to rapid technical change. 
Technical change in hog production includes improved genetics and advances in 
nutrition, housing and handling equipment, veterinary and medical services, and 
management practices that improve the efficiency of operations. For example, farrowing 
and weaning performance improved substantially between 1992 and 1998. The number of 
pigs farrowed and weaned per litter increased by 8 and 12 percent, respectively, over the 
1992-98 period. Labor and feed efficiency gains for that period were also substantial. 
Labor efficiency on hog farms was nearly 60 percent higher in 1998 than in 1992. 
Technical change in hog production also contributed to a decline in real production costs 
during that period. Average operating and ownership costs per hundred weight (cwt) of 
gain, expressed in 1998 dollars, were about 16 percent lower in 1998 than in 1992 among 
all U.S. hog growers (McBride and Key, 2003).  
Thus, ongoing technical change provides a reason to prefer high-ability growers 
over low-ability growers. An important function of the requirement that growers provide 
hog facilities (especially hog houses) is the inducement for self-selection by high-ability 
growers. Requiring growers to provide hog houses acts as an entry fee and can be used in 
conjunction with an adjustment of the piece rate (payment per pound of live meat 
produced) to discourage low-ability growers from signing contracts while simultaneously 
attracting high-ability growers. With proper contract parameters,high-ability growers find 
the investment profitable while those with low-ability do not. Also, high-ability growers 
are more capable of making large asset- and site-specific investments in hog facilities to 
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exploit the benefit of economies of size and scale in these operations. So the contractors 
can extract higher profits from high-ability growers with larger operations. 
The contractor’s screening out of low-ability growers through requiring a larger 
entry fee (larger hog facilities) may be one reason why larger hog operations are observed 
for contract hog growers. A similar reasoning apparently explains the form of the contract 
used for broiler growers. Knoeber (1989) notes that broiler companies claim that an 
important reason for the use of contract growers is the refusal of high-quality growers to 
work for wages. That is, contract production selects for high-quality growers. He proves 
that hired managers indeed perform less well than contract growers in broiler production. 
In summary, credit and capital sharing, performance assurance, and self-selection 
of high-ability growers explains the preference for production contracts compared to 
vertical integration. Even though these added benefits from production contracts solve the 
puzzle of why production contracts are chosen over vertically integrated company farms, 
they do not explain how the likely holdup problem is solved by these contracts.  
 
5.5 A Solution to the Holdup Problem 
 This section addresses the holdup problem in hog contracting. Before developing 
a solution, however, its existence and nature requires discussion. 
 
5.5.1 Arguments for and against holdup in hog contracting 
Arguments have been advanced both supporting and rejecting the existence of a 
significant holdup problem in bilateral hog contracting. The empirical testing of 
transactions cost theory suggests that the direct evidence of one party being held up by 
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the other is rather rare. This is because the parties in transactions are aware of such 
problems and have already adopted suitable institutional arrangements to address the 
problem of expropriation in advance. Without those mechanisms, the parties would be 
reluctant to invest, or their investment level would be suboptimal. As Joskow (1987) 
shows, coal mines eventually sign long-term contracts or vertically integrate with 
electricity firms in order to avoid the holdup problem. The empirical evidence of holdup 
in franchising contracts, which are similar to livestock production contracts 
organizationally, appears to be quite rare as well (Beales and Muris 1995). However, by 
using the cross-sectional national survey of broiler growers, Vukina  and Leegomonchai 
(2006) show moderate empirical support for the presence of holdup in broiler industry 
production contracts. 
 For hog operations, insignificance of holdup may not be the case because a 
suboptimal level of asset-specific investment in hog facilities is mitigated by the fact that 
contractors enforce investment of growers by other means. This enforcement comes 
through contractors’ screening out of low-ability growers, which in effect requires a 
larger entry fee (i.e., larger hog facilities). The contractor may require, for example, a 
one-thousand-head modern confinement building that meets her building standards. If 
they decide to contract, they have to build a one-thousand-head modern confinement 
facility. 
However, holdup may take place in some non-apparent ways. When contracts are 
up for renewal, which implicitly happens whenever a new batch of feeder pigs is 
delivered to the operation, the bargaining power of the grower can be substantially 
diminished, depending on the degree of asset specificity. The contractor may exploit this 
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situation by not changing the nominal payment to growers even if the period has 
experienced significant cost inflation. Alternatively, the contractor may require frequent 
upgrades of facilities and equipment without necessarily making adequate provisions in 
the contract that will secure the grower’s market rate of return on this additional 
investment. After several rounds on contracting in this mode, the grower’s capital may 
not appear to be suboptimal as would otherwise evidence a holdup problem. 
Some suggest that the holdup problem can be symmetric. Production contracts 
that require both parties to invest in assets specialized to the other (or an exchange of 
hostages as described in standard theory by Williamson, 1985), as is the case where 
growers invest in hog facilities and contractors invest in breeding facilities, feed mills, 
and processing plants, help to alleviate the holdup problem. This role for livestock 
production contracts is emphasized by Knoeber (1989), Frank and Henderson (1992), 
Barry, Sonka and Lajili (1992) and Sporleader (1992). But the weakness in applying 
this argument to hog production is that specific investments from both sides alone do not 
cancel out the opportunistic intents and consequences.  
Rather, the extent of the stakes that each party has in the other’s specific 
investment must be weighed in drawing such a conclusion. For example, when a 
contractor is contracting with hundreds of growers in the vicinity, opportunistic behavior 
by the contractor and a specific grower may not be offsetting. The contractor can run her 
processing unit at almost full capacity with one less grower, whereas terminating the 
contract may be disastrous for a single grower. Thus, resisting opportunistic behavior by 
the contractor may require uniting a large number of the growers, which also has its 
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costs. Furthermore, clauses in typical contract agreements prevent such a concerted effort 
of the growers. 
Some argue that physical asset specificity of hog grower facilities may not be as 
significant as others claim, i.e., hog facilities may have substantial salvage value outside 
the bilateral contractual relationship, contrary to the discussion in section 5.3.3.1. 
However, the holdup problem may not be solved even in this case. Site specificity may 
still exist whereby the contractor can exploit growers locally. As a result, a simple 
production contract cannot solve the holdup problem.  
 
5.5.2 Long-term contracts as solutions to holdup  
As explained in section 5.3, the main arguments for extensive bilateral contractual 
arrangements in hog operations are based on transactions cost and production risk. Asset-
specific investments and risk are the main contributing factors to a high level of 
transactions cost as defined by Williamson (1975, 1985), all of which explain 
requirements of alternative institutional arrangements as opposed to spot markets. Given 
the problem of suboptimal investment associated with holdup, the parties in a hog 
transaction might be attracted to vertical integration. But as argued in section 5.4, lower 
supervision, monitoring, and enforcement costs seem to explain a preference for 
production contracts compared to vertical integration. However, it has been widely 
recognized that simple short-term contracts do not solve the problem. Only long-term 
production contracts can minimize transactions cost for two parties engaging in a 
commitment involving significant specific assets if vertical integration is not feasible. 
Empirical research on the energy sector lends support to asset specificity theory (Joskow, 
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1985, 1987, and 1990) and suggests that substantial efficiency gains from asset-specific 
investments might be prime motives behind long-term contractual relationships. 
Short-term contracts are for a single period, where a period is defined as the 
length of time within which the grower performs his tasks, the outcome is realized, and 
he receives payment. In the context of hog production, one period typically corresponds 
to a calendar year. Long-term contracts are agreements that last more than one period.  
Long-term contracts that incorporate requirement clauses, fee indexation, liquidated 
damages, arbitration, and other provisions are possible means of overcoming the holdup 
problem without vertical integration. In fact, these provisions are observed in hog 
contracts as, at least in part, a solution to the holdup problem. But other reasons may 
motivate growers to prefer long-term contracts. For example, asset specific financing by 
lenders may require long-term production/ marketing contracts to ensure stable revenue 
compared to the instability of frequent switching or renegotiation of contracts.  
 
5.5.3 Length of hog production contracts 
Given the importance of long-term contracts, remaining issues are optimal 
contract duration and provisions for contract renegotiation. What is the duration of the 
production contract that solves the holdup problem of hog growers? Hog production 
contracts are generally written with five to twelve years duration and often require an 
advance notice of termination, usually by about six months. Provisions often exist to 
extend the initial terms for an additional time period subject to mutual consent (an 
evergreen clause) or to give the contractor the right of first refusal (i.e., the right to match 
a competing offer). In addition, the contracts sometimes provide for renegotiation of 
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terms if new technologies or regulations arise, thus reducing the de facto contract length 
(Hennessy and Lawrence, 1999; Swinton and Martin, 1997). 
Perhaps the most important problem associated with long-term contracts is that 
unforeseen circumstances can arise over time. The initial motivation to enter a contract 
may depend on the temporal assessment of contract costs and benefits (Hennessy and 
Lawrence, 1999). Also, parties may prefer to be locked into reasonable contract terms. 
However, as time passes, conditions underlying written contracts change. It may become 
clear to one party, or even to both, that gains would be higher outside the contract. So an 
opportunity to terminate the contract might be welcome. In these cases, an incentive to 
renegotiate the contract exists as well. Thus, a trade-off typically exists between welfare 
gains from risk-sharing associated with a longer-term contract and flexibility gains 
arising from shorter-term contracts (Hennessy and Lawrence, 1999). In the context of 
this trade-off, Short-term production contracts are also observed in hog production. 
The 2003 ARMS questionnaire included questions on the prices and fees growers 
received under contracts, the process used to determine prices and fees, and contract 
terms. Contract terms included the length of time covered by contracts as well as the 
quantities and the set of production tasks growers commit under contract. From this 
survey data, duration of production contracts for hogs is shown in Table 1. While only 37 
percent of contract hog producers reported that they had a contract of at least 5 years 
duration, these operations accounted for more than half (56 percent) of contract hog 




   Table 1: Hog Contract Length 
Length of contract Percent of 
Contracts 
Percent of  
Contract Production 
No length specified17  30.1 19.4 
Short term: 12 months or less 27.9 21.1 
Medium term: 13-59 months 5.1 3.5 
Long term: 60 months or more 36.9 56.0 
    Source: Compiled by USDA’s Economic Research Service using data from the 2003 Agricultural 
    Resource Management Survey. 
 
5.6 Gains from Contracting 
As demonstrated in chapter 3, when a principal contracts with a group of 
heterogeneous agents, the imperfect information of an agent’s productive capability or 
productive efficiency is extremely important. Whenever agents do not know their abilities 
(whether perfectly or imperfectly), some low-ability agents have negative average ex post 
gains from contracting. In a multi-period setting, these agents can be expected either to 
renegotiate contract terms with the principal or terminate the contract. As demonstrated 
in chapter 4, however, this does not happen when agents make considerable investments 
in assets that are specific to the ongoing relationship with the principal. The question 
addressed in this section is whether these results apply to the case of contract hog 
growers in US agriculture.  
                                                 
17 The ARMS questionnaire asked respondents to state the length of their contract, in months, and to report 
zero for those contracts that did not specify a length. 
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The reasons for contracting in the hog sector are similar to those described and 
identified in the theoretical survey and derivations in chapters 2 and 3. That is, the 
transactions cost associated with asset-specific investments in hog facilities have 
motivated parties representing the majority of the US hog sector to enter into long-term 
contractual relationships. The linear contract payment schemes that contractors use for 
paying contract hog growers are similar to those identified in the theoretical principal 
agent literature. To measure contract growers’ gains from contracting and to conclude 
whether some contract growers earn less than their reservation utilities requires modeling 




An Explicit Model of Separation in Hog Contracting 
6.1 Modeling Hog Contracts 
Thus far, attempts have made to understand the factors that might explain contract 
hog growers’ gains from contracting based on the standard models of the contract 
literature presented in chapter 3. This chapter models hog contracts explicitly with 
separating contract parameters and they might apply to hog contractors. Results show that 
some growers are left with negative gains from contracting on average with this 
separation. Possibilities are also explored for uniform contracts based on payment 
parameters.    
 
6.2 The Model 
 Suppose following Tsoulouhas and Vikina (2001) and GIPSA (2007) that the 
total payment to hog grower i is 
 ( / )i i i i i i i iR b Q s C Q Qβ= + −  
where  is the base payment per pound of live meat produced, Qi = niqi is the total 
weight gain, qi is the weight gain per animal, ni is the size of facility in numbers of hogs 
required by the contractor, βi is a bonus factor measuring the intensity by which a fixed 
feed-conversion ratio standard si influences the total payment the grower receives (βi > 
0), and Ci is the amount of feed used by grower i to produce Qi. Thus, the total payment 
equation becomes   
ib
i i i i i i i i i iR b n q s n q n cβ β= + −  
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    ( / )i i i i i in q c qγ β= −     
where γi = bi + βisi and c is cost per animal (all animals are assumed to receive the same 
inputs under the contractor’s requirements so c is constant). Suppose the contractor can 
offer a three-parameter contract ( iγ , iβ , ni) where ni also measures the facility size agreed 
upon with the grower. Also suppose weight gain depends on the grower’s effort 
following qi = λieic + θi, where ei is grower effort, for which the grower incurs a cost of 
, λi represents grower ability (λi > 0), and θi is a random production shock with 2/2i in e
~ (i N
20, )θ .θ σ  This specification parallels the one explored in section 3.4 of chapter 3.  
The total payment to grower i is 
( / )i i i i i i i i i i i iR n q c q n e c n cγ β γ λ= − = − β . 
Thus, the expected total payment to grower i is  
( ) ( )i i i i i i i i i i i iE R n E q n c n e c n cγ β γ λ β= − = − . 
Effort ei represents all grower-provided inputs such as labor including labor used to raise 
feeder pigs, dispose of dead animals, and manage manure as well as other variable inputs 
such as fuel, lubricant, and electricity. 
Growers provide a hog facility of size ni, which is observable by the contractor. 
Let  represent the annualized cost of building a facility of size ni, which generates 
an increasing marginal facility cost proportional to ni, α > 0. Suppose that the growers are 
risk averse and that grower i has absolute risk aversion parameter 
2/2inα
0.iφ >  The price of 
hogs is assumed to be normalized at 1.  
The income of grower i is thus   
2 2 2 2/2 /2 ( ) /2 /2i i i i i i i i i i i i i i iR n e n n e c n c n e nπ α γ λ θ β= − − = + − − −α ,     
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which generates expected income 
 2 2( ) /2 /2i i i i i i i i i iE n e c n c n e nπ γ λ β α= − − −  
and certainty equivalent income 
2 2 2 2/2 /2 /2i i i i i i i i i i i i iCE n e c n c n e n n θγ λ β α φ γ σ= − − − −
2 . 
Surplus for the contractor from contracting with grower i is 
( ) (1 )( )i i i i i i i i i i i i iS n e c R n e c n cλ θ γ λ θ= + − = − + + β
i
,     
which yields expected surplus 
 ( ) (1 )i i i i i iE S n e c n cγ λ β= − +  
Expected surplus also serves as the certainty equivalent for the contractor since she is risk 
neutral.  
 
6.3 The Case Where the Contractor and Growers Know Ability 
 Establishing the first-best solution provides a useful benchmark. To examine 
contractor behavior when grower effort is observable, suppose reservation utilities 
possibly differ across growers depending on grower ability as represented by R(λi). That 
is, if a grower chooses not to contract, the sensible alternative for a grower with 
exceptional ability will be to grow hogs as an independent grower, in which case he 
makes a greater profit than does an average independent grower. In this case, the 
contractor’s problem is 
 
, , , 0
 ( ) [ (1 )
i i i i
i i i i i ii ie n
]iMax E S n e c n cβ γ γ λ β> = − +∑ ∑  
s.t. (i)  ( )iCE R iλ≥  for all i 
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 (ii)  for all i. arg max  i i
e
e C∈ E
In this problem, contacting with many growers reduces to separate contracting problems 
with individual growers because all surplus can be extracted from each grower to the 
point where constraint (i) holds with equality. The individual problems are 
 
, , , 0
 ( ) (1 )
i i i i
i i i i i i ie n




= − +  
s.t. (i)  ( )i iCE R λ≥ , 
 (ii) . arg max  i i
e
e C∈ E
The first order condition that satisfies (ii) implies 0i i ie cγ λ= >  if γi > 0. 
Substituting this implication of the second constraint, the problem reduces to 
 2 2
, , 0
 ( ) (1 )
i i i
i i i i i i in
Max E S n c n c
β γ
γ γ λ β
>
= − +  
s.t. (i)  2 2 2 2 2 2 2/2 /2 /2 ( )i i i i i i i i i i iCE n c n c n n Rθγ λ β α φ γ σ= − − − ≥ λ
)c
.  (6.1) 
Constraint (i) always binds at a solution to this problem; otherwise, the contractor can 
reduce the growers’ payment while still inducing the grower to accept the contract. 
Equality in constraint (i) implies  
so that upon substitution the problem reduces to 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2[ / 2 / 2 / 2 ( )] /(i i i i i i i i i in c n n R nθβ γ λ α φ γ σ λ= − − −
 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
,
 (1 ) /2 /2 /2 ( )
i i
i i i i i i i i i i i in
Max L n c n c n n Rθγ γ γ λ γ λ α φ γ σ λ= − + − − −  
(except that a contract would not be offered if βi ≤ 0). This problem has first-order 
conditions 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
(1 ) /2
   (1 /2) 0
n i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i




γ γ λ γ λ α φ γ σ
γ γ λ α φ γ σ
= − + − −
= − − − =
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2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
(1 2 )
   (1 ) 0
i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i




γ λ γ λ φ γ
γ λ φ γ σ
= − + −
= − − =
σ
, 
assuming that the reservation utility does not depend on either ni or γi. This is plausible 
since these are contract parameters that are inapplicable if the grower chooses not to 
contract.  
Eliminating the solution with ni = 0, these conditions can be rearranged as 
2 2
2 2























Equation (6.3) verifies that γi ≤ 1 for an interior solution with ni > 0 while the former 
verifies that ni > 0 if γi ≤ 1. From (6.1),  
which implies 
2 2 2 2 2( /2)( ) ( ) /2i i i i i i i i in c n R n c nθγ λ φ σ λ β α− ≥ + + ,
2 2 2.i i ic n θλ φ σ>  Substituting this in (6.3) implies that γi > 0.5, which 
together with γi ≤ 1 (from above) bounds γi to the interval 0.5 < γi ≤ 1. Within this bound, 
/i in 0γ∂ ∂ >  in (6.2) and / 0i inγ∂ ∂ <  in (6.3) so the solution is unique.  
Second-order conditions require  
2 2 0,nn i iL θα φ γ σ= − − <   (6.4) 
2 2 2 2 0,i i i iL n c nγγ θλ φ σ= − − <  (6.5) 
2 0nn nD L L Lγγ γ= − >  (6.6) 
where 
2 2 2 2(1 ) 2 0n n i i i i i i i iL L c n nγ γ θ θγ λ γ φ σ γ φ σ= = − − = − <  (6.7) 
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where the last equality in (6.7) follows upon substituting from (6.3) or the second first-
order condition. The first conditions in (6.4) and (6.5) obviously hold. To examine 
condition (6.6), substitution of (6.4), (6.5), and (6.7) yield  
  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
( )( ) (
   ( ) 0.
i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
D n c n
n c n n c
θ θ
θ θ
α φ γ σ λ φ σ γ φ σ
α λ φ σ λ φ γ σ
= + + − −
= + + >
)n θ
λ
Thus, second-order conditions hold unambiguously. 
However, equations (6.2) and (6.3) do not yield explicit solutions for either ni or 
γi. To understand the marginal effects of grower ability or risk aversion on these contract 
parameters requires comparative static analysis. Marginal effects can be found from  
nn i n i n i n iL dn L d L d L dγ φγ φ λ+ = − −   
and  
n i i i iL dn L d L d L dγ γγ γφ γλγ φ λ+ = − − ,  





nn n n n ni i
n ni i
L L L L L Ldn d
L L L L L Ld d D nn
γ φ γγ γ φ
γ γγ γφ γ γφ
φ
γ φ
− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤
= − = −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
  




nn n n n ni i
n ni i
L L L L L Ldn d
L L L L L Ld d D nn
γ λ γγ γ λ
γ γγ γλ γ γλ
λ
γ λ
− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤
= − = −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
  
if 0idφ = . Thus, 
/ (1/ )(i i n ndn d D L L L L )γγ φ γ γφφ = − −  (6.8) 
/ (1/ )(i i nn n nd d D L L L L )γφ γ φγ φ = − −  (6.9) 
/ (1/ )(i i n ndn d D L L L L )γγ λ γ γλλ = − −  (6.10) 
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/ (1/ )(i i nn n nd d D L L L L )γλ γ λγ λ = − −  (6.11) 
where 
2 2 0n i iL nφ θγ σ= − <  (6.12) 
2(2 ) 0n i i iL λ γ γ λ= − >c  (6.13) 
2 2 0i iL nγφ θγ σ= − <  (6.14) 
22(1 ) 0i i iL n cγλ γ λ= − > . (6.15) 
Under risk neutrality ( 0),iφ =  equation (6.3) implies that γi = 1 so that Lnγ = 0. In 
this case, the second right hand terms vanish in (6.8)-(6.11) so that (6.4), (6.5), and 
(6.12)-(6.15) imply /i idn d 0,φ < d d / i 0,γ φ <  /i idn d 0,λ >  and / 0.id dγ λ >  Relaxing risk 
neutrality, the second right hand terms would add to these effects if Lnγ > 0. However, Lnγ 
< 0 from (6.7) so each of these effects is attenuated under risk aversion. 
To show that these effects are not reversed under risk aversion, substitute 
equations (6.5), (6.7), (6.12) and (6.14) into (6.8) reveals that 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
/ (1/ )(( )( ) ( ))
           (1/ ) 0.
i i i i i i i i i i i
i i i
dn d D n c n n n n
D n c n
θ θ θ
θ
φ λ φ σ γ σ γ φ σ γ
λ γ σ




Thus, a contractor will unambiguously offer a contract with a smaller facility size to a 
more risk averse grower. This is a plausible action undertaken to balance the efficiency 
loss associated with risk aversion among growers.  
Substituting equations (6.4), (6.7), (6.12), and (6.14) into (6.9) yields 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
/ (1/ )[( ) ]
           (1/ ) 0.
i i i i i i i i i i i
i i




θγ φ α φ γ σ γ σ φ γ σ γ
αγ σ





Thus, a contractor will offer a lower incentive to grower with higher risk aversion. This is 
plausible because the incentive does not yield as much payoff in this case. 
Substituting equations (6.5), (6.7), (6.13), and (6.15) into (6.10) verifies that 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
/ (1/ )(( )((2 ) ) ( )(2(1 ) ))
           (1/ )((2 ) (2 ) 2(1 ) )
           (1/ )((2 )
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
dn d D n c n c n n c
D n c c n c n n




λ λ φ σ γ γ λ γ φ σ γ λ
γ λ γ λ γ φ σ γλ γ γ φ σ λ
γ λ γ λ γ φ σ
= + − − −
= − + − − −





Thus, a contractor will offer a contract for a larger facility size to a grower with greater 
ability. This is plausible because greater ability will tend to make up for the higher risk 
inefficiency incurred with a larger facility size. 
Substituting equations (6.4), (6.7), (6.13), and (6.15) into (6.11) shows that 
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
/ (1/ )[(2(1 ) )( ) ((2 ) )( )]
            (1/ ) [2(1 )( ) (2 ) ]
            (1/ ) [2(1 )(1 /2) (2 )(1 ) ]
  
i i i i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i
d d D n c c n
D c n n n
D c c c
θ θ
θ θ
γ λ γ λ α φ γ σ γ γ λ γ φ
λ γ α φ γ σ γ γ φ σ
λ γ γ γ λ γ γ γ λ
= − + − −
= − + − −
= − − − − −




where the third equality follows by substituting 2 2 2(1 /2)i i i i i i in n θα φ γ σ γ γ λ+ = −  and 
 which follow from (6.2) and (6.3), respectively. Thus, the 
incentive offered by the contractor does not vary with ability. This is plausible because, 
holding other factors constant, the contractor’s payoff is constant at the margin when 
productivity is proportional to ability. 






6.4 The Case of Imperfect and Asymmetric Information 
 The most plausible information structure is where none of the parties know ability 
exactly but the growers have better information. This section examines the implications 
of this information structure regarding the growers’ gains from contracting. 
 
 6.4.1 The imperfect information set up 
 Suppose ability iλ  can follow either one of 2 possible distributions rather than a 
single distribution. Suppose ability distribution 1 (denoted by P) has probability p1 of 
ability λ11 and probability p2 of ability λ12 (p2 = 1 – p1) while distribution 2 (denoted by 
Q) has probability q1 of ability λ21 and probability q2 of ability λ22 (q2 = 1 – q1) where λij > 
0 for i,j = 1,2. Also assume that 1 2λ λ<  where 1λ = p1λ11 + p2λ12 and 2λ = q1λ21 + q2λ22. 
Consider the information structure where the growers know the actual distribution at the 
time the contract is signed but the contractor has a nondegenerate prior defined over these 
2 distributions. Thus, the grower’s information is better but imperfect, and the contractor 
is aware of this fact. 
 Let r1 and r2 represent the contractor’s subjective probability that the grower is 
from distributions P and Q, respectively. This information structure was examined for a 
simpler stylized problem in section 3.5 of chapter 3. Since growers do not know their 
exact abilities, the contractor cannot induce them to reveal their exact abilities. But the 
contractor can induce them to choose a contract intended for their distribution. As a 
result, the contractor induces only one effort for each distribution, say, e1 for P and e2 for 
Q distribution growers. This is done by choosing payment parameters 1β , 1γ  and facility 
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size  for P and payment parameters1n 2β , 2γ  and facility size  for Q distribution 
growers.  
2n
For a grower from distribution P, expected income is  
 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 /2 1( ) /2E n e c n c n nπ γ λ β α= − −e− , 
and certainty equivalent income is 
 2 2n− 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 /2 /2CE n e c n c n e n θγ λ β φ γ σ= − − −α , 
where 1 1 11 2 12p pφ φ= + φ  is average absolute risk aversion among growers with the P 
distribution, 1 11 12, , 0φ φ φ > .
18 The respective expected and certainty equivalent incomes of 
a grower from distribution Q are 
 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 /2 2( ) ) /2E n e c n c nπ γ λ β α= − −n e−  
 2 2 2 2 2 , 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2/2 /2CE n e c n c n n n θγ λ β φ γ σ= − − −2 /2e− α
where 2 1 21 2 2q q 2φ φ= + φ is average absolute risk aversion for a grower with the Q 
distribution, 2 21 22, , 0φ φ φ > .  An assumption that high ability growers have lower absolute 
risk aversion 1 2( )φ φ>  may be plausible, but a weaker condition, 1 2 2 ,rφ φ>  suffices for 
most results here and is assumed henceforth. 
 The contractor solves the problem           
 1 1 1 11 1 2 1 12 1 1 1, , , 0 ( ) [ (1 ]i i i i ie n 1







  2 1 2 21 2 2 22 2 2 2[ (1 (1 )r q n e c e c n2nλ γ λ+
1 1
γ β+ − − +
1 1i
  
s.t. (ia) 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 ( /2 /2i ii 1 /2) )p n e c n e n ERθγ λ α φ σ= − − ≥∑ c n nγβ− −  
                                                 
18 Although risk aversion is not regarded as changing because a grower realizes ex post that he has above or 
below average ability, the risk aversion levels of groups with above or below average productivity may 
differ a priori.  
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(ii)   
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21
( /2 /2i i ii q n e c n c n e n n θγ λ β α φ γ σ= − − − −∑
    2 2 2 2 2 21 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 11 ( /2 /2i i ii q n e c n c n e n n θγ λ β α φ γ σ=≥ − − − −∑
 (iiia)  2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11argmax ( /2 /2 /2)i i ii
e
e p n e c n c n e n θγ λ β α φ γ σ=∈ − − − −∑
 (iiib)  2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21argmax ( /2 /2 /2)i i ii
e
e q n e c n c n e n n θγ λ β α φ γ σ=∈ − − − −∑
where ER1 is the reservation utility of growers with the P distribution and ER2 is the 
reservation utility of growers with the Q distribution. After collecting terms, this problem 
can be written as  
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2, , , 0 [(1 ) ] [(1 ) ]i i i ie n
Max r n e c n c r n e c n c
β γ
γ λ β γ λ
>
− + + − + β    
s.t. (i) 2 2 2 2 2/2 /2 /2 0,j j j j j j j j j j j j jn e c n c n e n n ERθγ λ β α φ γ σ− − − − − ≥  j = 1,2, 
(ii) 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2/2 /2 /2n e c n c n e n n ERθγ λ β α φ γ σ− − − − −   
  2 2 2 2 21 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2/2 /2 /2n e c n c n e n n ERθγ λ β α φ γ σ≥ − − − − −   
(iii) 2 2 2 2 2arg max  /2 /2 /2,j j j j j j j j j j j j j
e
e n e c n c n e n θγ λ β α φ γ σ∈ − − − − n  j = 1,2. 
 Individual rationality constraint (ia) always binds at a solution to this problem for 
the similar reason described in last section. The self-selection-between-contracts 
constraint (ii) guarantees that the growers from ability distribution Q will not choose the 
contract offered for the growers of ability distribution P. The self-selection–within-
contracts constraints (iiia) and (iiib) require that growers with both distributions choose 
the effort that is profit maximizing for them.  
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 However, unlike the standard contracting problems of chapter 3 that have zero 
reservation values, this problem can further simplify in two different ways. If the 
reservation utility for high-ability growers is not too much higher than for low-ability 
growers, then constraint (ii) will be binding as when reservation utilities are zero. But if 
the reservation utility for high-ability growers is much higher, then constraint (ib) is 
binding while constraint (ii) is slack. In this case, the contracting problems simplifies to 
the case where contracting is considered separately with each group because neither 
group will prefer to enter the contract offered to the other group. The case appears to be 
less interesting compared to the standard problem, and has straightforward comparative 
static results, so henceforth constraint (ib) is assumed to be nonbinding. Constraint (ii) 
holds as an equality whenever the growers of ability distribution Q face incentives to lie 
about their ability distribution under a first-best contract. In this case, constraint (ib) is 
redundant when both (ia) and (ii) are satisfied. Substituting the implications of these 
constraints, the problem simplifies to 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2, , , 0 [(1 ) ] [(1 ) ]i i i ie n
Max r n e c n c r n e c n c
β γ
γ λ β γ λ
>
− + + − + β   
s.t. (ia) 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 /2 /2 0n e c n c n e n n ERθγ λ β α φ γ σ− − − − − =  
(ii) 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2/2 /2 /2n e c n c n e n n θγ λ β α φ γ σ− − − −
2   
 2 2 2 21 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1/2 /2 /2n e c n c n e n n θγ λ β α φ γ σ= − − − −
2   
(iii) 2 2 2 2 2arg max  /2 /2 /2,j j j j j j j j j j j j j
e
e n e c n c n e n θγ λ β α φ γ σ∈ − − − − n  j = 1,2. 
 Solving the constraints in (iii) yields 0j j j j jn c n eγ λ − = , or equivalently,  
0,j j je cγ λ= >  if γj > 0, j = 1,2. After substitution for ej, constraints (ia) and (ii) can be 
solved for β1 and β2 to obtain 
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 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( /2 /2 /2 ) /(n c n n ER nθβ γ λ α φ γ σ= − − − )c  
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2
[ /2 /2 /2
                    ( ) ( ) /2] /( )
n c n n
n c ER n n c
θ
θ
β γ λ α φ γ σ
γ λ λ λ φ φ γ σ
= − −
+ − − + −
 
(if either βj is negative, then a separating contract is not offered to induce participation 
from both groups). Substituting for e1, e2, 1β  and 2β  as implied by the constraints into the 
objective function obtains the unconstrained problem  
 1 2 1 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2, , , 0
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1
(1 /2) /2 (1 /2) /2
                    /2 ( ) ( ) /2
n n
Max r n c r n r n c r n
r n r n c r n E
γ γ
θ θ
γ λ γ α γ λ γ α
φ γ σ γ λ λ λ φ φ γ σ
>
− − + − −
− − − − − R−
 
 First-order conditions with respect to n1, n2, γ1 and γ2 yield 
 
1
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1(1 /2) ( ) ( ) 0nL r c r n r c r n θγ λ γ α γ λ λ λ φ φ γ σ= − − − − − − =   
 
2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2(1 /2) 0nL r c r n r n θγ λ γ α φ γ σ= − − − =  
 
1
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1(1 ) 2 ( ) ( ) 0L r n c r n c r nγ θλ γ γ λ λ λ φ φ γ σ= − − − − − =  
 
2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2(1 ) 0L r n c r nγ θλ γ φ γ σ= − − = . 
These conditions can be rearranged as  
 
2
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1
1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1




cλ γ γ λ λ γ λ





















1 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 12 ( ) ( )
r c
r c r c r n θ
λγ
λ λ λ λ φ φ σ
=













.  (6.19) 
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 Equation (6.17) yields an internal solution (n2 > 0) if γ2 ≤ 2 and (6.19) assures an 
internal solution with γ2 ≤ 1. Also, upon substitution of 2 2 2 ,e cγ λ=  constraint (ib) implies 
that 2 2 22 2 2c n θλ φ σ>  verifying that 0.5 ≤ γ2 ≤ 1. To verify that (6.18) yields an internal 
solution for γ1, using the assumptions 2 1λ λ>  and 1 2r 2φ φ>  reveals that 0 ≤ γ1 ≤ 1. The 
latter assumption also shows that the denominator of (6.16) is positive. Removing the 
term associated with risk aversion from the denominator of (6.18), which is positive, 
shows that 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1/[ 2 ( )],r r rγ λ λ λ λ≤ + −  which can be rearranged to show that 
1 1 1 2 1 2 1(1 ) 2 ( ) 0.r rλ γ γ λ λ− − − ≥  Thus, the numerator of (6.16) must be positive because the 
term in brackets in the numerator of (6.16) exceeds this by 1 1.rλ . Thus, (6.16)-(6.19) 
provide an internal solution with n1, n2, γ1, γ2 > 0 in the interesting case with β1, β2 > 0. 
 
6.4.2 Comparative static effects 
 As in the first-best solution of Section 6.3, equations (6.16)-(6.19) do not yield 
explicit solutions. To derive the marginal effects of ability and risk aversion on contract 
parameters, note that 
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 21 2 1 2 1 2 1n n n n n n n n n n
L dn L dn L d L d L d L d L d L dγ γ φ φ λ λ 2γ γ φ φ λ+ + + = − − − − λ  
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 21 2 1 2 1 2 1n n n n n n n n n n
L dn L dn L d L d L d L d L d L dγ γ φ φ λ λ 2γ γ φ φ λ+ + + = − − − − λ  
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 21 2 1 2 1 2 1n n
L dn L dn L d L d L d L d L d L dγ γ γ γ γ γ γ φ γ φ γ λ γ λ 2γ γ φ φ λ+ + + = − − − − λ  
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 21 2 1 2 1 2 1n n
L dn L dn L d L d L d L d L d L dγ γ γ γ γ γ γ φ γ φ γ λ γ λ 2γ γ φ φ λ+ + + = − − − − λ  
where   
1 2 2 1
0,n n n nL L= = 1 2 2 1 0,L Lγ γ γ γ= = 1 2 2 1 0,n nL Lγ γ= =  2 1 1 2 0,n nL Lγ γ= =  2 1 0,nL φ =  
2 1




1 1 2 2 1( )n nL r r θα φ φ γ σ= − − − < 0  (6.20) 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 12 ( ) 2( )n nL L r c r c r c r nγ γ θλ γ λ γ λ λ λ φ φ γ σ= = − − − − −  
2
1 2 2 1 1                ( ) 0r n θφ φ γ σ= − − <  by (6.18) (6.21) 
1 1
2 2
1 1 0nL n θφ γ σ= − <  (6.22) 
1 2
2 2
2 1 1 0nL r n θφ γ σ= >  (6.23) 
1 1
2




2 1 1 0nL r cλ γ λ= − <  (6.25) 
2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2 0n nL r r θα φ γ σ= − − <  (6.26) 
 
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2








2 2 2 2(2 ) 0nL r cλ γ λ γ= − >  (6.29) 
 
1 1
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 12 ( ) ( )L r n c r n c r nγ γ θλ λ λ λ φ φ σ= − − − − −  












1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1[ (1 ) ( 2 )]2L r r nγ λ λ γ γ λ λ= − − − c  




2 1 1 12L r n cγ λ γ λ= − < 0
                                                
 (6.34) 
 
19 The term in brackets here exceeds the term in brackets in the numerator of (6.16), which is positive, by 













2 2 2 22 (1 )L r n cγ λ λ γ= − 0> . (6.37) 
In matricial form, these results can be written as 
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 21 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2








0 0 0 0
n n n nn n n
n n n n n
n
n
L L L LL Ldn dn d
L LL Ldn dn d
A
d dL L L L L L d
d dL L L L
φ φ λ λγ
γ φ
γ γ γ γ φ γ φ γ λ γ λ

















1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1













L Z L Z
L Z L Z
A
L Z L ZA








−⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦n
 
1 2A Z Z= , and  j = 1, 2.  
2( )
j j j j j jj n n n
Z L L Lγ γ γ= − ,
Second-order conditions consist of (6.20), (6.26), (6.30), (6.35), Zj > 0, j = 1,2, 
and 0.A >  To verify that Zj > 0, j = 1,2, which implies 0,A >  combining (6.20), (6.21), 
and (6.30) implies 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1
2 2
1 2 2 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1
2 2 2 2
1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2
( ( ) )( 2 ( ) ( )
               (( ) )
   ( 2 ( ) ( ) )
               ( ) ( 2
Z r r r n c r n c r n
r n
r r n c r n c r n





α φ φ γ σ λ λ λ λ φ φ σ
φ φ γ σ
α λ λ λ λ φ φ σ
φ φ γ σ λ
= + − + − + −
− −
= + − + −
+ − + 21 1 2 1( )) 0c λ λ λ− >
 
and combining (6.26), (6.27), and (6.35) implies 
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2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
( )( ( )) (
    [ ( ) ] 0.
Z r r r n c n r n
r n c n c
θ θ
θ θ
α φ γ σ λ φ σ γ φ σ
α λ φ σ φ γ λ σ
= + + −
= + + >
)θ
 
Thus, all second-order conditions hold unambiguously. 
Where 2 0,dφ =  1 0,dλ =  and 2 0,dλ =  these results imply 
1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1










n n n n
L Z L L L Ldn d
dn d
A
L Z L L L LAd d
d d
γ γ γφ φ






−⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎢ ⎥ = − = −⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎢ ⎥ −
⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎢ ⎥








which upon substituting (6.21), (6.22), (6.30), and (6.31) yields  
1 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1
/ (1/ ) ( )
           (1/ ) [( / )( ) (( ) )( )]
           (1/ ) [ 2 ( )] 0
                  
nndn d A Z L L L L
A Z n r c n r n n
A Z n r c r c




θλ γ γ σ φ φ γ σ γ σ
γ σ γ λ γ λ λ λ
= − −
= − − −
= − + − <
 (6.38) 
and upon substituting (6.20), (6.21), (6.22), and (6.31) yields   
1 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 2
2 2 2 2
2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1
2 2 2
1 2 2 1 1 1 1
2 2
2 1 1 1
/ (1/ ) ( )
            (1/ ) ( ( ) )( )
                            (( ) )( )
            (1/ ) 0
n n n nd d A Z L L L L
A Z r r n
r n n






α φ φ γ σ γ σ
φ φ γ σ γ σ
α γ σ
= − −




where the latter equality of (6.38) follows by substitution of (6.18). Thus, as in the first-
best case and with the same intuition, a contractor will unambiguously reduce the facility 
size and incentive offered to low-ability growers as their average risk aversion is higher 
because the risk premium and related inefficiency is higher.  
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 Turning to the effects of high-ability grower characteristics on the contracts 
offered to low-ability growers, a similar approach using (6.21), (6.23), (6.30), and (6.32) 
finds 
1 1 1 11 2 1 21 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1
/ (1/ ) ( )
            (1/ ) [( / )( ) (( ) )( )]
            (1/ ) [ 2 ( )] 0
nndn d A Z L L L L
A Z n r c r n r n r n
A Z r n r c r c




θλ γ γ σ φ φ γ σ γ σ
γ σ γ λ γ λ λ λ
= − −
= − −
= + − >
 
where the latter equality follows from (6.18). Thus, the facility size offered by the 
contractor to low-ability growers is greater when high-ability growers have higher 
average risk aversion. This occurs because the opportunity cost of offering a larger 
facility size to low-ability growers declines when the high ability growers have higher 
average risk aversion and thus more inefficiency associated with their risk premiums. 
Use of (6.20), (6.21), (6.23), and (6.32) obtains  
1 1 1 11 2 1 21 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1
2 2
2 1 2 1 1
/ (1/ ) ( )
            (1/ ) [( ( ) )( ) (( ) )( )]
            (1/ ) 0.
n n n nd d A Z L L L L
A Z r r r n r n r n





θα φ φ γ σ γ σ φ φ γ σ γ σ
α γ σ
= − −
= + − − −
= >
Thus, the incentive offered by the contractor to low-ability growers is greater when high-
ability growers have higher average risk aversion. This occurs because the opportunity 
cost of offering a higher incentive to low-ability growers declines when the high ability 
growers have higher average risk aversion and thus more inefficiency associated with 
their risk premiums. 
 Likewise, (6.21), (6.25), (6.30), and (6.34) yields  
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1 1 1 11 2 1 21 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
/ (1/ ) ( )
            (1/ ) [( / )( ) (( ) )(2 )]
            (1/ ) [ 2 ( )],
nndn d A Z L L L L
A Z n r c r c r n r n c
A Z r n c r c n r




λ γ γ λ φ φ γ σ γ λ
γ λ λ γ σ φ φ
= − −
= − − −
= − − −
 
which implies that 1 2/ ( )( )dn dλ > = <  0  as 
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 2 2( )( )2 ( ).r c n rθλ γ σ φ φ> = < −  Thus, the 
marginal effect of average ability of high-ability growers on the facility size offered by 
the contractor to low-ability growers is ambiguous. If the average ability of low-ability 
growers is high (low) relative to the difference in average risk aversion between the two 
groups, then the marginal effect of the ability of high-ability growers on the facility size 
offered to low-ability growers is positive (negative). Intuitively, the contractor is faced 
with balancing the inefficiency associated with risk aversion and the efficiency associated 
with productivity between the two groups. If the ability of high-ability growers increases 
and the risk aversion of high ability growers is low, then expected surplus increases 
sufficiently relative to the inefficiency of risk that some additional risk from low-ability 
growers can be optimally absorbed. 
Also, (6.20), (6.21), (6.25), and (6.34) shows that  
1 1 1 11 2 1 21 2 2
2 2 2
2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1
2 2 2
1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1
2
2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2
/ (1/ ) ( )
             (1/ ) [( ( ) )(2 )
                          (( ) )( )]
             (1/ ) [2 ( )
n n n nd d A Z L L L L
A Z r r r n c
r n r c





α φ φ γ σ γ λ
φ φ γ σ γ λ
γ λ α φ φ
= − −
= − + −
− −
= − + − 2 22 1 ] 0r θγ σ .<
 
Thus, the incentive offered by the contractor to low-ability growers is reduced when 
high-ability growers have greater average ability. This occurs because the opportunity 
cost of offering incentive to low-ability growers increases when the high-ability growers 
have greater average ability. 
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As far as the effects of characteristics of the low-ability group on contracts 
offered to the high-ability group, the story is quite different. Neither the average ability 
nor the average risk aversion of low-ability growers has any effect on either the facility 
size or incentive offered to high-ability growers by the contractor, 2 1/ 0dn dλ = ,  
2 1/ 0,d dγ λ =  2 1/dn dφ = 0,  and 2 1/d dγ φ 0.=  Intuitively, this appears to be explained by 
the residual position held by low-ability growers in the contractor’s problem. 
Turning to the effects of characteristics of high-ability growers on the contracts 
offered to them, using (6.27), (6.28), (6.35), and (6.36) yields  
2 2 2 22 2 2 22 2 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 2 2 2
/ (1/ ) ( )
            (1/ ) [( ( ))( ) ( )( )]
            (1/ ) 0.
nndn d A Z L L L L
A Z r n c n r n r n r n
A Z r n c




λ φ σ γ σ γ φ σ γ σ
γ λ σ
= − −
= − + −
= − <
θ   
Thus, as in the first-best case and with the same intuition, a contractor will reduce the 
facility size offered to high ability growers as they have higher average risk aversion 
because the risk premium and related inefficiency is higher. 
Also, using (6.26), (6.27), (6.28), and (6.36) obtains  
2 2 2 22 2 2 22 2 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
1 2 2 2
/ (1/ ) ( )
            (1/ ) [( )( ) ( )( )]
            (1/ ) 0.
n n n nd d A Z L L L L
A Z r r r n r n r n





θα φ γ σ γ σ γ φ σ γ σ
α γ σ
= − −
= − + −
= − <
 
Thus, as in the first-best case and with the same intuition, a contractor will 
unambiguously reduce the incentive offered to high-ability growers as their average risk 
aversion is higher because the risk premium and related inefficiency is higher 
Use of (6.27), (6.29), (6.35), and (6.37) shows that  
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2 2 2 22 2 2 22 2 1
2 2 2 2
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
/ (1/ ) ( )
            (1/ ) [( ( ))( (2 ))
                        ( )(2 (1 ))]
            (1/ ) [ (2 )
nndn d A Z L L L L
A Z r n c n r c
r n r n c
A Z r n c c n




λ φ σ γ λ γ
γ φ σ λ γ







2 2 ] 0.θφ σ >
 
Thus, much as in the first-best case and with the same intuition, a contractor will offer a 
contract for a larger facility size to high-ability growers as their average ability is greater 
because the risk inefficiency of a larger facility size is thereby reduced. 
Also, (6.26), (6.27), (6.29), and (6.37) yields  
2 2 2 22 2 2 22 2 1
2 2 2
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
/ (1/ ) ( )
             (1/ ) [( )(2 (1 ))
                          ( )( (2 ))].
n n n nd d A Z L L L L
A Z r r r n c





α φ γ σ λ γ





Substituting 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2(1 /2) / ,r r r c nθα φ γ σ γ λ γ+ = −  which follows from (6.17), into the 
first term in brackets, and 2 2 22 2 2 2 2(1 ),n cθγ φ σ λ γ= −  which follows from (6.19), into the 
second term in brackets then obtains 
2 2 2 2
2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2/ (1/ ) (1 )[(2 ) (2 )]d d A Z r c cγ λ γ λ λ γ γ γ= − − − 0.− =  
Thus, much as in the first-best case and by the same intuition, the incentive offered by the 
contractor to growers of high ability does not vary with their average ability, i.e., the 
contractor’s payoff is constant at the margin when productivity is proportional to ability. 
The most interesting results in this analysis have to do with the effects of the 
average ability of low-ability growers on the contracts offered to them. Using (6.21), 
(6.24), (6.30), and (6.33), after substituting from (6.16) and considerable manipulation 
finds that  
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1 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 2
2 2 2
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1
2 2
1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1
2 1
/ (1/ ) ( )
           (1/ ) {( / )( [ (2 ) ( 2 )])
                      (( )2 )([ (1 ) ( 2 )])}
           (1/ )
nndn d A Z L L L L
A Z n r c c r r
r n c n r r
A Z n c
γ γ γλ γ λ
θ
λ
λ γ γ λ γ γ λ λ
φ φ γ σ λ γ γ λ λ
= − −
= − −




1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
2
1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
{ [ (2 ) (2 )]
                      2 ( )[ (1 ) (2 )]}.
r c r r
n r r rθ
λ λ γ γ λ λ
γ σ φ φ λ γ γ λ λ
− + −
− − − + −
  
This result reveals that the average ability of low-ability growers has an ambiguous effect 
on the facility size in contracts offered to them by contractors. The terms in brackets in 
both the first and second right hand terms are likely positive (the case where low-ability 
growers have less than half the productivity of high-ability growers is unlikely). But these 
two terms are of opposite signs. If the likelihood of low-ability growers is high compared 
to the likelihood of high ability growers (r1 is large) and costs or average ability of low-
ability growers is large relative to the risk 2θσ  and the difference in risk among groups, 
then the first term dominates so that 1 1/ 0,dn dλ >  i.e., an increase in the average ability of 
low ability growers causes the contractor to offer them contracts with larger facility size. 
On the other hand, if risk 2θσ  and the difference in risk aversion among the two groups of 
growers dominates, then 1 1/ 0dn dλ <  so that greater average ability among low-ability 
growers causes contractors to offer them contracts with smaller facility size. This is a 
disturbing result in that low-ability growers appear to be penalized for improving their 
ability, for example, by investment. 
Finally, use of (6.20), (6.21), (6.24), and (6.33) yields  
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This result reveals that the average ability of low-ability growers has an ambiguous effect 
on the incentive offered to them. If the optimal incentive for low-ability growers γ1 is 
small and the annualized investment per animal α is high, then the first right hand term in 
braces is positive and dominates. This effect also tends to dominate if growers are more 
likely to be high-ability growers than low-ability growers, r1 < r2. On the other hand, if 
growers are more likely to be low-ability growers than high-ability growers, then r1 > r2 
so that the term in brackets in the last line is negative. Thus, if the annualized investment 
α is low, then this term dominates so that the contractor responds to an increase in the 
ability of low-ability growers by lowering their incentive.  This is the most interesting 
and disturbing result in this analysis. The fact that, say, investment in ability may reduces 
the incentive for low-ability growers implies that they may actually have a disincentive to 
invest.  
Incidentally, because 1λ = p1λ11 + p2λ12, 2λ = q1λ21 + q2λ22, 1 1 11 2 12p pφ φ= + φ , and 
2 1 21 2 2q q 2φ φ φ= + , comparative static results with respect to each of the individual abilities 
and risk parameters follow by the chain rule and yield identical qualitative results as 




6.4.3 Gains from contracting for low-ability growers 
 Now consider whether some growers are left with negative gains from contracting 
on average. Gains from contracting can be measured either ex ante or ex post. The 
contracting problem assures that all growers receive their ex ante reservation utilities in 
expectations. However, what ultimately matters is ex post gains from contracting. For 
low-ability growers, the ex ante gains compare expected gains to the reservation utility 
ER1, which is anticipated before the grower’s actual ability is realized. The ex post gains 
measure the actual realized gains from contracting, which are determined by whether the 
grower’s realized ability, λ11 or λ12. This ex post realization of ability may also change the 
grower’s assessment of his reservation utility, e.g., his estimate of how much he could 
earn as an independent grower. For this purpose, denote the ex post reservation utility by 
R1j in the case where realized ability is λ1j, j = 1,2.  
 The gain for a grower with ability λ1j, after substituting 1 1 1 ,e cγ λ=  is thus 
 
1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2




n c n c n c n n R jθγ λ λ β γ λ α φ γ σ
= −
= − − − − − j =
 
Substituting for β1 as implied by constraint (ia) of section 6.4.1 thus obtains  
 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) /2j j j jG n c n R Eθγ λ λ λ φ φ γ σ= − − − − 1R+  
       2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) /2 ( )j j j jn c n θγ λ λ λ φ φ γ σ λ λ= − − − −Δ −   
       2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( )( ) ( ) /2,   j j jn c n jθγ λ λ λ φ φ γ σ= −Δ − − − =1,2,  
where 1 1 1 1 1( ) /(j j jR ER ),λ λΔ = − −  j = 1,2, is the average increment in reservation utility 
per unit of ability that applies in evaluating ex post reservation utility for low-ability 
growers. For example, suppose the reservation utility representing the foregone benefit 
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from operating as an independent hog grower is proportional to ability. Then Δ1j 
measures the maringal effect of ability on the ex post assessment of the reservation 
utility. Thus, Δ1j compares to 21 1 1 ,n cγ λ
2  which is the marginal increment in returns per 
unit of ability under contracting. 
 The net effect of the change in ability on rent is the difference in these two, 
2 2
1 1 1 1 ,jn cγ λ − Δ  multiplied by the deviation in realized ability from expected ability, 
1 .j 1λ λ−  The terms 
2 2
1 1 1 1 ,jn cγ λ − Δ  j = 1, 2, can plausibly be either positive or negative 
depending on whether the marginal benefits of ability are greater as a contract grower or 
an independent grower (assuming the reservation utility represents operation as an 
independent grower). The term 2 2 21 1 1 1( )j n θφ φ γ σ− /2  represents the related difference in the 
risk premium of low-ability growers with lower than average realized ability from the 
average risk premium for low-ability growers. (If risk aversion is assumed to be the same 
across growers drawn from the same distribution, then this term vanishes.) Thus, growers 
with ability λ1j receive a positive gain on average (G1j > 0) if 
 
2 2 2
1 1 1 1
1 1 2 2















 for 2 21 1 1 1 ( ) 0jn cγ λ −Δ > < ,  j = 1,2. 
Obviously, the term 2 2 21 1 1 1( )j n θφ φ γ σ− /2  affects both the gains from contracting and the 
threshold ability level where the grower just breaks even from contracting.  
 Suppose 11 1 12λ λ λ< <  so that a low-ability grower who realizes less than expected 
ability is represented by the case with j = 1. If 2 21 1 1 11 0n cγ λ − Δ > , a low-ability grower 
who realizes less than expected ability 11 1( )λ λ<  receives a positive gain on average if 
the degree risk of aversion and ability are positively correlated and the variation in risk 
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aversion is large, i.e., the term 2 2 2 2 211 1 1 1 1 1 1 11( ) /[2(n n cθφ φ γ σ γ λ− )]−Δ  is absolutely large. If 
either of these conditions do not hold, he receives a negative gain on average if 
2 2
1 1 1 11 0n cγ λ − Δ > . If 
2 2
1 1 1 11 0n cγ λ − Δ < , then a grower with ability λ11 receives a positive 
gain on average if the degree of risk aversion and ability are positively correlated or the 
variation in risk aversion represented by 2 2 2 2 211 1 1 1 1 1 1 11( ) /[2(n n cθφ φ γ σ γ λ− − )]Δ  is absolutely 
small, or receives a negative gain on average if the degree risk of aversion and ability are 
positively correlated and the variation in risk aversion represented by 
2 2 2 2 2
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 11( ) /[2(n n cθφ φ γ σ γ λ− )]−Δ  is large. If a low-ability grower with lower than 
average realized ability 11 1( )λ λ<  is risk neutral, then 
  as 11 ( ) 0G > <
2 2
1 1 1 11 ( ) 0n cγ λ −Δ < > . 
 Alternatively, consider a low-ability grower who realizes greater than expected 
ability (j = 2). For 2 21 1 1 12 0n cγ λ −Δ > , a grower with ability λ12 where 12 1λ λ>  receives a 
positive gain on average if the degree risk of aversion and ability are negatively 
correlated or the variation in risk aversion represented by 
2 2 2 2 2
12 1 1 1 1 1 1 12( ) /[2(n n cθφ φ γ σ γ λ− )]−Δ  is small, and receives a negative gain on average if 
the degree of risk aversion and ability are positively correlated and the variation in risk 
aversion represented by 2 2 2 2 212 1 1 1 1 1 1 12( ) /[2(n n cθφ φ γ σ γ λ− − )]Δ  is large. If 
2 2
1 1 1 12 0n cγ λ − Δ < , then a grower with ability λ12 receives a positive gain on average if the 
degree risk of aversion and ability are negatively correlated and the variation in risk 
aversion represented by 2 2 2 2 212 1 1 1 1 1 1 12( ) /[2(n n cθφ φ γ σ γ λ− )]−Δ  is absolutely large, or 
receives a negative gain if the degree risk of aversion and ability are positively correlated 
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or the variation in risk aversion with ability represented by 
2 2 2 2 2
12 1 1 1 1 1 1 12( ) /[2(n n cθφ φ γ σ γ λ− )]−Δ  is absolutely small. If a low-ability grower with 
higher than average realized ability 12 1( )λ λ>  is risk neutral, then 
  as 12 ( ) 0G > <
2 2
1 1 1 12 ( ) 0n cγ λ −Δ > < . 
 For the risk neutral case, a grower with ability λ11 receives a negative (positive) 
gain from contracting on average as 2 21 1 1 11n cγ λ > Δ  (
2 2
1 1 1 11n cγ λ < Δ ) whereas a grower 
with ability λ12 receives positive (negative) gain from contracting on average as 
2 2
1 1 1 12n cγ λ > Δ  (
2 2
1 1 1 12n cγ λ < Δ ). Thus, it is not possible for both grower types to gain or 
lose at the same time if the ex post reservation utilities do not differ. 
 The results of this section suggest a rich set of alternative conditions where one 
group or the other among low-ability growers can experience an ex post loss from 
contracting that is likely to be repeated under the same conditions due to realizing an 
ability different than expected. 
 
6.4.4 Gains from contracting for high-ability growers 
 Defining the gains from contracting similarly for high ability growers as 
2 2 ,j jG CE R= − 2 j  j = 1, 2, and after substituting 2 2 2 ,e cγ λ=  the ex post gain for a high-
ability grower with ex post ability λ2j is 
 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2/2 /2 /2 2j j jG n c n c n c n n θγ λ λ β γ λ α φ γ σ= − − − − jR−  
where R2j is the ex post reservation utility for a high-ability grower with realized ability 
λ2j, j = 1,2. Substituting for β2 as implied by constraint (ii) of section 6.4.1 thus obtains  
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2 1 22 ( ),   1, 2,j j jλ λ+ Δ − =
 (6.39) 
where *2 2 1 2 1( ) /(j j jR ER ),λ λΔ = − −  j = 1,2, is the average increment in reservation utility 
per unit of ability that applies in comparing the ex post reservation utility for high-ability 
growers to the ex ante reservation utilty of low-ability growers. 
  Before proceeding, however, the additional constraint (ia) must be borne in mind 
for the purpose of determining whether some high-ability growers lose from contracting. 
After substituting 2 2 2 ,e cγ λ=  constraint (ia) of section 6.4.1 implies 
 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2/2 /2 /2 0,n c n c n n ERθγ λ β α φ γ σ− − − − ≥  
and, after substituting for β2 as implied by constraint (ii) of section 6.4.1, implies 
 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1( ) ( ) /2n c n ER ERθγ λ λ λ φ φ γ σ− − − ≥ − .  
Substituting this constraint into (6.39) implies 
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where 2 2 2 2 2( ) /(j j jR ER ),λ λΔ = − −  j = 1,2, is the average increment in reservation utility 
per unit of ability that applies in evaluating ex post reservation utility for high-ability 
growers. Combining these results, 
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which implies that 
 2 2 * 2 2 2 *1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( )( ) ( ) /2 ( )( ) 0,   1, 2.j j j jn c n jθγ λ λ λ φ φ γ σ λ λ−Δ − − − − Δ −Δ − ≥ =  
Thus, high ability growers can experience ex post losses on average only if 
 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( )( ) ( ) /2 0,   1, 2.j j jn c n jθγ λ λ λ φ φ γ σ−Δ − − − ≤ =  (6.41) 
 Now suppose 21 2 22λ λ λ< <  so that a high-ability grower who realizes less than 
expected ability is the case with j = 1 and a high-ability grower who realizes greater than 
expected ability is the case with j = 2. Consider first the case of risk neutrality where 
(6.41) reduces to 2 22 2 2 2 2 2( )(j jn c ).γ λ λ−Δ −λ  This implies that a high-ability grower who 
realizes greater than expected ability will never lose from contracting. However, the gain 
for a high-ability grower who realizes less than expected ability from (6.40) is 
 2 2 2 2 * *2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2( )( ) ( )( ) ( )(j j j j j jG n c n c ),jγ λ λ λ γ λ λ λ λ= −Δ − + −Δ − − Δ −Δ −λ  
which can be negative because 2 22 2 2 2 2 2( )(j jn c )γ λ λ−Δ −λ  is negative. 
 A loss is incurred by a high-ability grower who realizes less than expected ability 
if the latter two terms, 2 2 *1 1 1 2 2 1( )( )jn c λ λ λ−Δ −  and 
*
2 2 2 2( )(j j jγ ),λ λΔ −Δ −  are both small 
or offset one another. Both terms are zero if the marginal benefit of ability in determining 
the ex post reservation utility is constant so that *2 2 ,j jΔ = Δ  and is equal to the marginal 
benefit of ability to a low-ability grower under contracting, 2 2 *1 1 1 2 .jn cγ λ = Δ The two terms 
offset one another if the ability of high-ability growers who realize less than expected 
ability is the same as expected by low ability growers, 2 j 1,λ λ=  and the marginal benefit 
of ability in determining ex post reservation utility for high ability growers is equal to the 
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marginal benefit of ability under contracting for low-ability growers, 2 22 1 1 .j n c 1γ λΔ =  
Both of these are plausible although special cases. 
 But these loss possibilities also suggest that some cases are possible where a high-
ability grower who realizes less than expected ability can experience a loss even though 
his ability exceeds the expected ability of low-ability growers who do not incur a loss on 
average. This can occur in the first of the two cases of the previous paragraph if 2 1jλ λ>  
and either *2 2j jΔ > Δ  while 
2 2 *
1 1 1 2 ,jn cγ λ = Δ  or 
2 2 *
1 1 1 2 jn cγ λ < Δ  while 
*
2 2 .j jΔ = Δ  It can 
occur in the second of the two cases if 2 jλ  is slightly greater than 1λ  but 2 jΔ  is 
substantially greater than 2 21 1 1.n cγ λ  
 Turning to the risk averse case, assume for the purposes of this discussion that 
high-ability growers have less absolute risk aversion than low-ability growers, as is 
plausible 2 1( ).φ φ<  Then the risk aversion terms detract from gains if the risk aversion of 
high-ability growers does not differ between those who have lower and higher than 
expected realized ability. However, from (6.41), high-ability growers who realize greater 
than expected ability still gain from contracting except in the seemingly implausible case 
where the risk aversion of such growers is considerably higher than average risk aversion 
among all high-ability growers, 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 22 22 2 22 2 2 2( )( ) ( )n c n θγ λ λ λ φ φ γ σ−Δ − < − /2.  For high-
ability growers who realize less than expected ability, the risk terms make an ex post loss 
more likely if 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 1 1 1( ) ( )j n nφ φ γ φ φ γ− + − 0.>  Thus, a loss is more likely under risk 
aversion unless 
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In the plausible case where  this means risk terms will make loss more likely 
unless the risk aversion of high-ability growers with less than expected realized ability 
have is higher than average risk aversion among low-ability growers.  
2 2 2 2
2 2 1 1 ,n nγ γ>
 
6.4.5 Comparison with the predictions of standard contracting theory 
 The conclusions of this chapter differ from the conclusions derived under a 
similar information structure in section 3.5 of chapter 3. In that section, the gains from 
contracting are negative for low-ability growers (from the P distribution) who realize 
lower than expected ability, and are positive for such agents who realize higher than 
expected ability. In the model of this chapter, the gains can be positive or negative for 
either realized ability depending on the ex post re-assessment of the reservation utility 
after ability is realized. If ex post reservation utilities do not depend on realized ability, 
then conclusions are more similar to section 3.5 of chapter 3. In this case,   
 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( )j j jG n c n θλ λ γ λ φ φ γ σ= − − − /2 , j = 1,2, 
because Δ1j = 0 for i,j = 1,2. Thus, low-ability growers with less than expected ability 
receive negative gains from contracting unless they have considerably less risk aversion 
than the average low-ability grower. Similarly, low-ability growers with greater than 
expected ability receive positive gains from contracting unless they have considerably 
greater risk aversion than the average low-ability grower. 
If ex post reservation utilities do not depend on realized ability, then the gains 
from contracting for high-ability growers are 
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Reservation utilities disappear in this case only if both low- and high-ability growers 
have the same reservation utility, although they disappear from the lower bound 
associated with the constraint in (ib) in any case. Otherwise, this difference detracts from 
the gains of high ability growers assuming high-ability growers have higher reservation 
utilities than low-ability growers. Nevertheless, for the risk neutral case, the lower bound 
again shows that high-ability growers who realize greater than expected ability still gain 
from contracting except in the seemingly implausible case where the risk aversion of 
such growers is considerably higher than high-ability growers with less than expected 
ability, 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 22 22 2 22 2 2 2( )( ) ( ) /n c n θγ λ λ λ φ φ γ σ−Δ − < − 2.  
 Comparing to standard contracting theory in the case of a high-ability grower who 
realizes less than expected ability, a loss is more likely both because reservation values 
are not  the same for both groups and because the risk aversion of growers with lower 
than expected realized ability may be more risk averse.  
 Comparing to the results of section 3.5 of chapter 3, the results of this model are 
rich because both ability and effort affect the comparisons. The results also emphasize the 
role of risk aversion whereby qualitative results can be reversed depending on how much 
risk aversion differs among groups. Thus, use of risk neutral models may not only 
overstate or understate some results. They may err even in the qualitative implications. 
The results are further complicated if reservation utilities are affected by ex post 
realizations of ability. Ex post evaluation of the benefits of contracting seems to be the 
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most practical assumption considering that the most likely alternative to operating as a 
contract grower is operating as an independent grower. The wide variety of possibilities 
thus reveals many cases where more than one group can lose from contracting ex post 
even though they are induced to contract by expectations ex ante. 
 
6.5 The Case Where Growers Know Their Ability Perfectly 
  The most widely considered information structure in the literature is where one of 
the parties has perfect information and the other does not. This simplified information 
structure is considered in this section. Suppose growers have either of two abilities, λ1 or 
λ2 (where λ2 > λ1 > 0), with probabilities r1 and r2 (r2 = 1 – r1), respectively. Suppose at 
the beginning of the contractual relationship that growers know their abilities and the 
contractor does not. But the contractor knows that the growers know their abilities and 
also knows the alternative ability levels and probability of each. Thus, the contractor can 
design the contract so that growers reveal their ability to the contractor by their contract 
choices.  
 This corresponds to the case of sections 6.3 and 6.4 where 1 1 11 12 ,λ λ λ λ= = =  
2 2 21 22 ,λ λ λ λ= = =  1 1 11 12 ,φ φ φ φ= = =  and 2 2 21 22.φ φ φ φ= = =  The only difference is in 
interpretation whereby the contractor in this case induces each grower to choose the 
contract intended for his exact ability rather than his ability distribution. 
 The solutions for this problem appear exactly as in (6.16)-(6.19) except that 
overbars are eliminated. Because growers do not realize unexpected ex post variations in 
ability, their realized abilities do not divide them into groups by risk aversion levels nor 
are ex post reservation utilities modified from ex ante ones. Substituting 
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1 1 11 12λ λ λ λ= = =  and 1 1 11 12φ φ φ φ= = =  in to G11 or G12 above reveals that gains from 
contracting for low ability growers are zero (G1 = 0). Similar substitution in (6.40) shows 
that  
 2 2 2 2 22 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2( ) ( ) / 2G n c n ER ERθγ λ λ λ φ φ γ σ= − − − + − 0≥  
because both terms that determine a non-zero lower bound on G2 depend on probabalistic 
differences in ability and risk aversion within the high-ability group.  
 In this information structure, no agents earn negative gains from contracting on 
average because they know their abilities perfectly and thus accept only contracts that 
guarantee their reservation utilities on average. However, assuming hog growers know 
their abilities (and thus their ex post reservation utilities) perfectly before they sign the 
contracts is extreme and implausible. Relaxing this assumption reveals that some contract 
growers will have negative gains from contracting despite the asymmetric information 
advantage they hold compared to the contractor.  
  
6.6 Uniform Parameters and Dynamic Considerations 
Hog contracts in common use tend to have uniform parameters regarding 
payments per pound of gain even though they vary across growers by other parameters 
such as facility size. Thus, some further discussion about applicability of the model of 
this chapter is warranted. 
One obvious reason why separation may not be advantageous for the contractor is 
that the limited information available to the contractor may offer little separation between 
the ability distributions of low-ability and high-ability growers. If the average risk 
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aversion levels are approximately equal 1 2( )φ φ  and the average abilities are 
approximately equal 1 2( ),λ λ  then (6.16) and (6.17) imply that 
2 2 2
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1 22 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 2
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and (6.18) and (6.19) imply that 
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This could explain the optimality of no separation. But this would not explain separation 
by facility size without separation by the incentive payment. 
 Another possibility is that the ability and risk aversion differences in (6.18) 
roughly offset one another. If 2 21 2 1 2 12 ( ) ( )c n θλ λ λ φ φ σ− −  is substituted into the 
denominator of (6.18), then (6.18) and (6.19) imply that 1 2 ,γ γ  as in observed contracts. 
But this condition does not prevent large differences in the facility sizes, n1 and n2, 
offered growers of different ability distributions as an optimal separating contract. Thus, 
this condition rationalizes observed hog contracts. In reality, this condition may only hold 
approximately. Alternatively, it may be that contractors’ knowledge is simply not 
sufficient to differentiate from this condition among growers.   
  Several additional reasons that extend beyond the scope of the model developed 
in this chapter may also explain a preference for uniform payment parameters among 
contractors. For example, contracts with uniform incentive parameters are easier to 
implement. More substantively, given that information about growers’ type can be used 
to their disadvantage in future periods, growers may be reluctant to reveal their ability 
unless substantial rent or long-term guarantees are offered. This reluctance also would 
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not apply to facility size because that is readily observable and contractable. This 
dynamic aspect of contracting was discussed in section 4.4 of chapter 4 in the context of 
standard principal agent theory. Such generalizations become too complex for analysis in 
the context of the model of this chapter, but similar concerns obviously apply. For all 
these reasons, strong separation in contracts with respect to γ and β may not add much to 
contractor profits even though separation with respect to facility size is advantageous.20 
 
6.7 Conclusions 
The assumption that growers have no information about their abilities is extreme. 
Likewise, the assumption that growers know their abilities perfectly before commencing 
production is extreme. The practical assumption is the intermediate case where a grower 
has partial knowledge of his ability or productivity. Grower productivity depends on on 
asset-specific investments, including the size and features of the hog facility and growers’ 
innate and acquired ability. Contractor-supplied, technology-imbedded inputs such as the 
genetic traits of feeder pigs, the feed mix, prescribed management practices add to 
productivity and explain why earnings under contracting can exceed reservation utilities. 
Additionally, growers undertake initial irreversible investment in hog facilities upon 
signing a contract that may improve productivity over the case of independent operations.  
 Contractor specifications may lead to certain expectations regarding both the 
mean and variance of productivity based on performance statistics among other growers 
who use the contractor’s specifications. But growers do not know their own ability or 
how their own ability will complement the contractor’s specifications at the time the 
                                                 
20 An additional possible reason is that separating growers is impossible if growers do not have some 
information about their ability. But this appears highly unlikely in the hog contracting problem.  
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contract is signed. Thus, a grower’s productivity at that time of contracting may be 
represented by a random productivity parameter that can take different possible values 
corresponding to unanticipated deviations in grower productivity from the average. 
Because the distribution is determined by the contractor’s technology, the probability 
distribution may be regarded as common knowledge. 
Thus, when choosing whether to sign a contract and incur the irreversible 
investment, growers are uninformed about their ex post realization of productivity. Not 
until the end of a production period are they able to observe output and their productivity. 
Further, because of random variation in production, many production periods may be 
required to develop a reliable estimate of their individual productivity.  
On the other hand, the contractor has the opportunity to observe the productivity 
realizations of many growers at the same time. So she is likely to know the distribution of 
productivity among potential growers. But setting contract parameters targeted to the 
average grower will not maximize contractor profit, as demonstrated in section 3.4.1 of 
chapter 3. By experience, she may be able to use information about observable 
characteristics of growers to develop partial information about potential growers’ 
productivity.  
The model of this chapter incorporates each of these characteristics of the hog 
contracting problem. Results show that whether contract parameters are targeted to the 
average grower or to groups of growers based on imperfect information, some growers 
may incur negative ex post gains. Ex post assessments of gains from contracting may be 
further affected as improved information on ability is obtained through experience by the 
grower. While these issues introduce a host of questions about dynamic aspects of hog 
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contracting, these are beyond the scope of this dissertation. It suffices to say that signing 
a long-term production contract without knowing productivity parameters places growers 
at great risk, but undertaking large asset-specific investments without a long-term 
commitment from the contractor also places growers at great risk. Thus, if productivity is 
known imperfectly, then some low-ability growers can be expected to receive negative ex 





Identification and Estimation of Contract Gains 
7.1 Introduction 
 Measuring contract growers’ gains from contracting first requires knowing their 
reservation wages, i.e., the returns to hog farming that growers would have earned from 
operating independently. Then these reservation wages can be compared with what they 
have received as contract growers with the differences attributed to contracting. 
However, reservation wages are not observable because contract growers do not operate 
independently at the same time. To overcome this missing data problem, impact 
evaluation methods use the mean returns of a control group (independent growers in this 
case) as the counterfactual for the mean returns of the treatment group (contract growers 
in this case) (Heckman and Robb, 1985, 1986; Heckman, 1992; Heckman, Smith and 
Clements, 1997; Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001; and Heckman, 2001). Most of the 
empirical work in this evaluation literature focuses on group impact measures such as 
mean returns and, in particular, on the mean effect of treatment on those who receive 
treatment (Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith,1999).   
 While estimating how contracting affects growers’ profits on average yields 
straightforward interpretations, measuring the mean impact alone misses much of what is 
crucial for policy purposes. The conceptual models in previous chapters reveal that 
distributional issues are important because some growers may find themselves worse off 
after irreversible contracts are signed. Thus, a critical issue is how contracting affects 
contract growers’ profits differently. For example, while contracting may not matter for 
average profit, it may adversely affect growers on the low end of the conditional profit 
 207
distribution. In short, focusing on distribution addresses not only the question of whether 
contracting matters, but also the question of for whom contracting matters. 
 This contract evaluation problem is formally introduced in this chapter in an 
econometric context. Different impact measures are discussed and their identification 
strategies are outlined in detail. The implicit assumptions underlying the different 
estimators are also presented. To introduce this evaluation problem formally in an 
econometric context, a benchmark model of economic choice is presented in section 7.2. 
This benchmark model is adapted from Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2003) and 
Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999). Section 7.3 discusses selection bias based on 
observables and outlines their identification strategies. This section also discusses various 
estimation methods that are used to estimate the mean effect of contracting on contract 
growers, solving the potential selection bias problem based on observables. 
 Section 7.4 discusses selection bias based on unobservables and outlines their 
identification strategies. This section also discusses various methods that are used to 
estimate the mean effect of contracting on contract growers, solving the selection bias 
problem based on unobservables. Section 7.5 explores quantile treatment effects and 
explains the quantile regression method as an estimation method for quantile treatment 
effects. 
 
7.2 The Econometric Model and Mean Impact Measures 
7.2.1 The econometric model  
 Let Y0i and Y1i denote the profit of an independent grower and a contract grower, 
respectively. These profits can be expressed as a function of a vector of conditioning 
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variables, Xi. Let the conditional expectations of the profit variables be given by α0 + Xiβ0 
and α1 + Xiβ1, respectively, where α0 and α1 are unknown scalars, and β0 and β1 are 
unknown vectors of parameters. That is, suppose profits can be expressed as  
 0 0 0i iY X 0iUα β= + +  (7.1a) 
 1 1 1i iY X 1iUα β= + +  (7.1b) 
where E(U0i|Xi ) = 0 and E(U1i|Xi ) = 0. These U’s are assumed to be known ex ante to the 
grower but unknown to the econometrician. The gain to grower i of moving from 
independent production to contract production is denoted by Δi = Y1i – Y0i.   
 If both Y0i and Y1i can be observed for the same grower at the same time, the gain 
from contracting, Δi, would be observable. However, the profit for each grower is 
observed in only one state or the other. The no-contracting profit is not observed for the 
contract grower nor is the contracting profit observed for the independent grower. To 
overcome this missing data problem, most empirical work in the evaluation literature 
focuses on the mean effect of contracting and, in particular, estimates the mean effect of 
contracting on those who contract. By dealing with aggregates rather than individual 
growers, estimates of group impact measures are sometimes possible even though 
measuring the impacts of contracting on any particular grower is impossible.  
 To see this point more formally, consider the switching regression model with 
two regimes denoted by “1” and “0” introduced by Quandt (1972). The observed profit 
Yi is given by  
  (7.2) 1 (1 )i i i iY DY D Y= + − 0i
where Y1i is observed if Di = 1 and Y0i is observed if Di = 0 and Y0i and Y1i are defined by 
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equations (7.1a) and (7.1b). The potential profit actually realized depends on the decision 
made by growers of whether to contract or not. A model in this form is typically 
completed by adding a binary participation decision equation for Di as = Ziγ + U2i 
where Di = 1 iff  > 0 and Di = 0, otherwise. The variables in Zi may overlap with those 
in Xi, but at least one component of Zi is assumed to be unique as a nontrivial determinant 
of Di. That is, Di is assumed to have at least one independent source of variation. Further 





 This model of potential profits is variously attributed to Fisher (1951), Neyman 
(1935), Roy (1951), Quandt (1972, 1988) and Rubin (1974). The linear regression 
representations in (7.1a) and (7.1b) imply 
 0 0 1 0 0 1 0[ ( )] { (i i i i i i iY X D X U D U U )}iα β α β β= + + + − + + −  (7.2a) 
where α = α1 – α0. Adding and subtracting DiE(U1i – U0i| Xi, Di = 1) on the right hand side 
of (7.2a) gives 
 
0 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0
[ ( ) ( | ,
                 { [( ) ( | , 1)]}.
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
Y X D X E U U X D
U D U U E U U X D
1)]α β α β β= + + + − + − =
+ + − − − =
 (7.2b) 
 
7.2.2 Mean impact measures 
 The impact measure most commonly considered in the program evaluation 
literature is average treatment effect (ATE), which is the expected effect of contracting on 
a randomly drawn grower from the population with characteristics Xi: 
1 0 1 0( ) ( | ) ( )i i i iATE X E Y Y X Xα β β= − = + −  (7.3)  
In terms of the switching regression model, this measure is the effect of Di in the 
determinisitic component of equation (7.2a), where the term in braces is the error. 
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Integrating ATE(Xi) over the support of Xi yields ATE = ( ) ( )iATE X dF Xi∫ ≈α̂  + 
1 0
ˆ ˆ(X )β β−  where X  is the average value of Xi among the population of growers. 
However, this measure has been criticized as not being especially relevant for policy 
purposes. Because it averages across the entire population, it includes agents who would 
never choose to contract. 
In practice most non-experimental and experimental studies do not estimate ATE 
(Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2003; Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith, 1999). Instead, 
most non-experimental studies estimate the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATET), which is the mean effect for those who actually contract. This measure 
conditions on contracting as follows: 
 1 0 1 0 1 0( ) ( | , 1) ( ) ( | , 1)i i i i i i i i iATET X E Y Y X D X E U U X Dα β β= − = = + − + − =  (7.4) 
It is the coefficient on Di in the deterministic component of the regression equation 
(7.2b). Integrating ATET (Xi) over the domain of Xi |Di = 1 yields ATET. Measure ATET 
combines structural parameters in α + Xi (β1 – β0) with the means of the unobservables 
E(U1i – U0i| Xi, Di = 1). It measures the average gain in profits for growers who choose to 
contract compared to what they would have experienced as independent growers. It 
computes the average gain in terms of both observables and unobservables. Inclusion of 
the unobservables, E(U1i – U0i| Xi, Di = 1), makes this measure look nonstandard 
compared to the constant effect model as represented by (7.6). Most econometric activity 
is devoted to separating β0 and β1 from the effects of the regressors on U0 and U1. 
 In general, the mean of the composite error term is not zero because E[U0i + 
Di(U1i – U0i)] = E(U1i – U0i | Di = 1)Pr(Di = 1). If U1i – U0i, or variables statistically 
dependent upon it, helps determine Di, then E(U1i – U0i | Di = 1) ≠ 0. Intuitively, a grower 
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is more likely to have gains from contracting if E(U1i – U0i | Di  = 1) > 0. Selection bias 
arises when the contract indicator Di is correlated with the errors (U0i,U1i) in the profit 
equations. This correlation could be induced by incorrectly omitted observable variables 
that partly determine Di and Yi. Then the omitted variable component of the regressor 
error will be correlated with Di, which is the case of selection on observables. Another 
source of selection consists of unobserved factors that partly determine both Di and Yi. 
This is the case of selection on unobservables. 
 The two impact measures are the same, i.e., ATE (Xi) = ATET (Xi), if the 
unobservables are common across the two states. This happens when the unobservable 
errors in the profit equations vary across hog operations but are not affected by whether 
the operation is a contract grower, i.e., when U0i = U1i = Ui. From (7.2b), the following 
regression model is obtained when U0i = U1i = Ui: 
0 0 1 0[ ( )]i i i iY X D X iUα β α β β= + + + − + . (7.5) 
A more common but restrictive specification has α + Xi (β1 – β0) = α in which the 
contracting group has an additional intercept reflected in α, but the slope coefficients of 
the regressors, Xi, are unaffected by contracting. When the slope coefficients are the same 
in both regimes, i.e., β0 = β1 = β, (7.5) boils down to 
0i i iY X D iUα β α= + + + . (7.6) 
 Model (7.6) dominates the conventional evaluation literature. The conventional 
econometric evaluation literature focuses on α, and more rarely on α + Xi (β1 – β0) 
where 0 1β β≠  and selection bias arises from the correlation between Di and Ui. Selection 
bias arises when some component of the contract decision is relevant to the profit 
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determination process. That is, when some of the determinants of the contract decision 
also determine profit. 
 Another impact measure often considered in non-experimental studies is the 
average treatment effect on the non-treated (ATNT), which is the mean effect for those 
who do not receive treatment. This measure conditions on contracting as follows: 
 1 0 1 0 1 0( ) ( | , 0) ( ) ( | , 0)i i i i i i i i iATNT X E Y Y X D X E U U X Dα β β= − = = + − + − = .  
Integrating ATNT (Xi) over the domain of Xi |Di = 0 yields ATNT. This measure combines 
structural parameters in α + Xi (β1 – β0) with the means of the unobservables E(U1i – U0i| 
Xi, Di = 0) to measure the average gain in profits for independent growers had they 
chosen to contract. This is the difference in average profits for independent growers 
between what they would have experienced as contract growers and what they actually 
make as independent growers. This measure becomes important when policy makers 
intend to induce more independent growers to contract.  
 
7.3 Identification and Estimation of Mean Gains 
7.3.1 Selection based on observables 
 When Di and (Y0i,Y1i) are correlated, an assumption is needed to identify 
contracting effects. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) introduced the following assumption, 
which they called ignorability of treatment (given observed covariates Xi): 
Assumption 1: Conditional on Xi, Di and (Y0i,Y1i) are independent. 
This assumption is also known as the conditional independence assumption (CIA). It 
implies 
 , j = 0,1, ( | , 1) ( | , 0) ( |ji i i ji i i ji iF Y X D F Y X D F Y X= = = = )
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which further implies 
 , j = 0,1. ( | , 1) ( | , 0) ( |ji i i ji i i ji iF U X D F U X D F U X= = = = )
0)
For many purposes, it suffices to assume ignorability in a conditional mean independence 
(CMA) sense: 
Assumption 1a:  E(Yji| Xi, Di) = E(Yji| Xi),  j = 0, 1.  
 Obviously, CMA is weaker than CIA. The idea underlying this assumption is that 
if one can observe enough information (contained in Xi) that determines contract choice, 
then (Y0i,Y1i) might be mean independent of Di, conditional on Xi. Loosely speaking, even 
though (Y0i,Y1i) and Di might be correlated, they are uncorrelated once the effects of the 
Xis are removed. Thus, if the relationship between the contract decision and profit is 
purely through the observables, rather than unobservables (U0i,U1i), then selection can be 
controlled by including the appropriate conditioning variables in the profit equation. If 
valid, CMA implies no omitted variable bias once Xi is included in the regression. Thus, 
sample selection bias will not arise purely because of the differences in observable 
characteristics between the contract and independent growers. 
 
7.3.1.1 Identification with no heterogeneity 
 The average difference between profits for contract growers and independent 
growers, which can be estimated from (7.6) as the coefficient on Di after regression of Yi 
on (Di,Xi), is: 
 
( | , 1) ( | , 0) ( | , 1) ( | ,
                                                        ( | ) ( | )
                                                       
i i i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i
E Y X D E Y X D E U X D E U X D









The second-line right-hand side follows from CMA. When CMA holds, the mean 
difference in the pre-treatment unobservables between those who contract and those who 
do not, E(Ui| Xi, Di = 1) – E(Ui| Xi, Di = 0), disappears. Entering all the observables that 
affect both profit and contract decision into the profit equation (7.6) solves the selection 
bias problem based on observables. In this case, a simple comparison of the average 
profits of contract growers and independent growers estimates the effect of contracting on 
contract growers. 
While familiar, the framework of (7.6) is a special case. Potential profits (Y0i,Y1i) 
differ only by a constant (Y0i – Y1i = α). The grower with the best Y1i also has the best Y0i 
and all growers gain or lose the same amount in switching from independent to contract 
operation. Even though growers may be heterogeneous, their gains from contracting are 
not. 
In the more general case with β0 ≠ β1, represented by equation (7.5), E(Yi| Xi, Di = 
1) – E(Yi| Xi, Di = 0) = α + Xi (β1 – β0) is obtained. In this case, all growers with the same 
Xi receive the same gains in switching from independent to contract operation. Absence 
of heterogeneity in response to treatments is a strong assumption (Heckman, Smith, and 
Clements, 1997).  
 
7.3.1.2 Identification with heterogeneity 
 If the unobservable errors in the profit equations are affected by whether the 
operation is a contract grower or not, that is, if U0i ≠ U1, then equation (7.2a) implies 
 1 1 0 1 0( | , 1) ( | , 1) ( | , 1i i i i i i i i i i iE Y X D X E U X D E U U X D )α β= = + + = + − =  
0 0 0( | , 0) ( | , 0)i i i i i i iE Y X D X E U X Dα β= = + + = . 
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The average difference between profits for contract growers and independent growers, 
which can be estimated from (7.2a) as the coefficient on Di after regression of Yi on 
(Di,Xi), is: 
( | , 1) ( | , 0)i i i i i iE Y X D E Y X D= − =  
  
1 0 1 0
0 0
( ) ( | , 1)
              ( | , 1) ( | , 0)
i i i i i
i i i i i i
X E U U X D
E U X D E U X D
α β β= + − + − =
+ = − =
 
  1 0 1 0 0 0( ) ( | ) ( | ) ( |i i i i i i i i )X E U U X E U X E U Xα β β= + − + − + −  
  1 0 1 0( ) ( |i i )i iX E U U Xα β β= + − + − . 
The third-line right-hand side follows from CMA.  
 In addition to CMA, suppose that E(U1i| Xi) = E(U0i| Xi). This condition could arise 
if growers who choose to contract either do not know or do not act upon either U1i  – U0i 
or information dependent on (U1i  – U0i) in making their decision to contract. This may 
generate ex post heterogeneity. But if this information is not used ex ante, then   
 1 0( | , 1) ( | , 0) ( )i i i i i i iE Y X D E Y X D Xα β β= − = = + −  
Thus, ATE(Xi) = ATET(Xi) = α + Xi (β1 – β0). However, the unconditional contracting 
effect is generally not equal to this because ATE is the expected value of ATE (Xi) across 
the entire population (i.e., over both contract and independent growers) whereas ATET  is 
the expected value of ATET(Xi) in the contracting subpopulation. Mathematically, ATE = 
E[ATE(Xi)] and ATET = E[ATE(Xi)|Di = 1]. This compares with ATE(Xi) = ATE = 
ATET(Xi) = ATET = α when β0 = β1. That is, the unconditional equality of these two 




7.3.2 Estimation with selection based on observables 
 Estimation of ATE(Xi) requires consistent estimation of  conditional expectations 
E(Yi| Xi, Di = 1) and E(Yi| Xi, Di = 0), which depend on observables. Since a random 
sample of observations on (Yi, Xi, Di) from the population of hog growers is available, 
these conditional expectations are parametrically and nonparametrically identified and, 
hence, can be estimated consistently. But complexity arises when the impact measures 
ATE(Xi) and ATET(Xi) are to be identified from conditional expectations. Parametric and 
nonparametric estimation of these conditional expectations based on selection on 
observables, and thus estimation of ATE(Xi) and ATET(Xi), are discussed in this section.  
 A number of cross section methods have been proposed in the evaluation 
literature to deal with selection bias in treatment effect models. Two broad groups of 
methods that yield unbiased estimators when only observable factors affect the decision 
to contract are ordinary least squares (OLS) and propensity scoring methods. 
 
7.3.2.1 The ordinary least squares method 
 Consider estimation of the simplest contracting effect model of section 7.2 which 
is represented by equation (7.6) as 0 .i i iY X D iUα β α= + + +
0 0i iY X
Under usual regularity 
conditions and assuming that selection is based on observables, that is E(Ui|Xi, Di) = 0, α 
can be estimated consistently by OLS. In the more general case with β0 ≠ β1 represented 
by equation (7.5), the estimated equation is 1 0[ ( )]i iD X iUα β α β β= + + + − + . In 
this case, OLS can be used separately on observations with Di = 0 and Di = 1 to obtain 
0 0
ˆˆ ˆ( | , 0)i i i iE Y X D Xα β= = +  and 1ˆ ˆ( | , 1)i i iE Y X D X 1̂iα β= = + . Thus, 
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1 0 1 0 1 0
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( | , 1) ( | , 0)
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ                                    ( ) ( ) ( ).
i i i i i i i i
i i
ATE X ATET X E Y X D E Y X D
X Xα α β β α β
= = = − =
= − + − = + − β
 
Alternatively, integration over the distribution of Xi yields unconditional estimates as  
 1 0
1








= ≈ = +∑∫ −  
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N
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k
ATET ATET X dF X D D ATET X
N =
= = ≈ ∑∫ i  
where N is sample size and N1 is the number of growers with Di = 1 in the sample. In both 
of these OLS regressions, Xi is assumed to include all of the variables that affect both the 
contract decision and profit. 
 
7.3.2.2 Matching estimators based on common support 
 In the more recent evaluation literature, researchers have focused on 
nonparametric matching estimators. When these estimators are applied to a rich data set, 
they have been found to perform well in replicating the results of benchmark experiments 
(Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997). The advantage of matching estimation over 
traditional regression analysis is that it does not make the functional form assumption that 
regression requires. Also, it highlights the support problem in a way that regression does 
not. Stated simply, matching makes plain whether or not comparable independent 
operations are available for each contract operation. In this way, it avoids identifying 
effects solely by projections into regions where no data points are observed (Wooldridge, 
2002, pp.603-644).  
 To illustrate the support problem, suppose only one binary independent variable, 
Xi, determines profits, and that every grower in the population with Xi = 1 contracts. 
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Then, while E(Yi | Xi = 1, Di = 1) can be estimated with a random sample from the 
relevant population, E(Yi | Xi = 1, Di = 0) cannot because no data are available on the 
subpopulation with Xi = 1 and Di = 0. Therefore, ATE(Xi) is not identified at Xi = 1. If 
some hog growers with Xi = 0 contract while others do not, ATE(Xi) is identified at Xi = 0. 
Explicitly, ATE = P(Xi = 0) · ATE(Xi = 0) + P(Xi = 1) · ATE(Xi = 1). Since ATE(Xi = 1) 
cannot be identified, the unconditional ATE cannot estimated. In effect, ATE can be 
estimated only over the grower population with Xi = 0, which means the population of 
interest has to be redefined. 
 Although this example is extreme, it illustrates consequences that arise in more 
plausible settings. Suppose that Xi is a vector of binary indicators for the size of hog 
operations. For most size intervals, the probability of contracting is strictly between zero 
and one, which means observations are available for both contract and independent hog 
growers. If the contracting probability is zero or one at some size level, however, then 
observations with these size(s) have to be excluded from the hog grower population to 
avoid the identification problem. This kind of exclusion of observations from the grower 
population will be used later when the results of impact measures obtained by propensity 
score matching methods are presented.  
 
7.3.2.3 Propensity score matching 
 Matching is a non-parametric or semi-parametric analogue to regression that is 
used for the evaluation of binary treatments. It uses non-parametric regression methods to 
construct counterfactuals under an assumption of selection on observables. Intuitively, 
matching contrasts the profits of contract growers with those of the “comparable” 
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independent growers. Differences in profits between the two groups are attributed to 
contracting. While the parametric regression approaches in sections 7.2, 7.3.1, and 7.3.2.1 
make functional form assumptions about E(U1i| Xi,) and E(U0i| Xi,), ATE(Xi) and 
ATET(Xi) can both be estimated alternatively by modeling p(Xi), the probability of 
contracting. This probability is also known as the propensity score given the covariates. 
 Formally, the propensity score is defined by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) as the 
conditional probability of contracting given pre-contracting characteristics Xi, 
 }|{)|1()( iiiii XDEXDPXp ==≡  (7.7) 
They shown that if the contracting decision is random within cells defined by Xi then it is 
also random within cells defined by the values of the one-dimensional propensity score, 
p(Xi). As a result, if the propensity score p(Xi) is known, the ATET can be estimated as  
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E E Y Y D p X
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= − =
= = − = =
where the outer expectation is over the distribution of p(Xi) | Di = 1. Formally, the 
following assumption is needed in addition to CIA to derive (7.8) from (7.7). 
Assumption 2:  0 < p(Xi) < 1 for all Xi.  
An equivalent representation of CIA is Pr(Di = 1|Y0i,Y1i, Xi) = Pr(Di = 1|Xi). 
 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) establish that conditional on p(Xi), (Y0i,Y1i) and Di 
are uncorrelated when both of these assumptions hold. They call Assumptions 1 and 2 
together strong ignorability of treatment. As explained in section 7.3.1, CIA is a 
restriction that implies the choice of whether to contract is purely random for similar 
growers. Loosely speaking, even though (Y0i,Y1i) and Di might be correlated, they are 
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uncorrelated once the effects of the Xi s are removed. Assumption 2 is the common 
support condition for identification. This condition guarantees that matches can be made 
for all values of Xi. If all the hog growers with a given covariate Xi choose contracting, 
then no observations will be available for similar growers who choose to remain 
independent growers, and vice versa. Assumption 2 is used to avoid this problem. 
 The matching approach is motivated by the following thought experiment. 
Suppose a propensity score, p(Xi), is chosen at random from the grower population. Then, 
two growers sharing the chosen propensity score are selected from the population, where 
one contracts and the other does not. Under CIA, the expected difference in the observed 
profits for these growers is 
 , 1 0[ | 1, ( )] [ | 0, ( )] [ | ( )]i i i i i i i i iE Y D p X E Y D p X E Y Y p X= − = = −
which is the ATE conditional on p(Xi). By iterated expectations, averaging across the 
distribution of propensity scores gives ATE = E(Y1i – Y0i) (Wooldridge, 2002: pp.603-
644).     
An estimation strategy requires estimating the propensity scores, estimating the 
profit differences for pairs matched on the basis of the estimated propensity scores, and 
then averaging over all such pairs. However, the probability of observing two growers 
with exactly the same value of the propensity score is in principle zero since p(Xi) is a 
continuous variable. Because finding identical predicted probabilities is often unlikely 
when there are many covariates or the covariates are continuous variables, contract and 
independent growers with similar scores are matched and compared instead. Effectively, 
growers with similar propensity scores are considered a match. Various definitions of 
‘similar’ yield various propensity score matching estimators.  
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7.3.2.4 Popular matching methods   
 A number of different matching methods have evolved in the literature (see 
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997, 1998; Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd, 
1998; Becker and Ichino, 2002). Four of the most widely used are nearest-neighbor 
matching, kernel matching, and bias-adjusted matching. Since the widely-used impact 
measure is ATET, all of the matching estimators will be explained in terms of impact 
measure ATET. 
Nearest-neighbor matching. The nearest-neighbor matching method matches a 
contract grower with the independent grower who has the nearest propensity score. 
Neighbors can be chosen with or without replacement, where “with replacement” means 
that a given independent grower can be a best match for more than one contract grower. 
Although not necessary, the nearest-neighbor method is usually applied with 
replacement. Once each contract grower is matched with an independent grower, the 
difference between the profits of these growers is computed. The ATET is then obtained 
by averaging these differences.  
 For nearest-neighbor matching, the comparison group for each contract grower 
indexed by i, Aj(p(Xi)), is defined as Aj(p(Xi)) = {j |min j | p(Xi ) – p(Xj )|}, which is a 
singleton set unless there are multiple nearest neighbors that generate the same difference 
in propensity scores. More generally, nearest-neighbor estimators can be defined such 
that a fixed number of nearest neighbors are selected for each contracting grower 
regardless of ties in differences in propensity scores. This variant of nearest-neighbor 
matching is known as simple average nearest-neighbor matching. For simple average 
nearest-neighbor estimation one must decide first how many neighbors to use. Once the 
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number of neighbors is decided, that number of neighbors must be selected by their 
proximity to the contract grower i. Once each contract grower is matched with a set of 
independent growers, the difference between the profit of the contract grower and the 
average profit of the matched independent growers is computed. The ATET is then 
obtained by averaging these differences over all contract growers. 
 Specifically, let w(i,j) be the weight placed on the jth independent grower in 
constructing the counterfactual for the ith contract grower. The weights of nearest 
neighbors must satisfy Σj w(i,j) = 1, and 0 ≤  w(i,j) ≤ 1 for all i. Let N0 and N1 be the 
number of independent and contract growers in the sample, respectively. Also, let   
denote the number of independent growers included in the matched set Aj(p(Xi)). 
Obviously,  = 1 if the nearest neighbor is a singleton. The typical weighting scheme 
for the nearest-neighbor matching estimator with simple averaging is wNN(i,j) = ( )-1 if 
j ∈  Aj(p(Xi)), and 0 otherwise. Then the weighted comparison group mean for contract 
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and the estimated treatment effect for contract grower i is Y1i – . The associated 
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All contract growers have a match with the nearest-neighbor method . However, 
some of these matches may be poor because the nearest neighbor for some contract 
growers may have a very different propensity score and, nevertheless, contribute to the 
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estimation of the contracting effect regardless of this difference. This problem gets is 
worse with the simple average nearest-neighbor method. The kernel and local linear 
regression matching methods attempt to address this problem.  
 
Kernel matching. With kernel matching, the weights are inversely proportional to 
the distance between the propensity scores of contract and independent growers. This 
weighting is achieved through a kernel function.  Kernel matching uses the entire sample 
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where K is a kernel function and h is a bandwidth or smoothing parameter analogous to 
the choice of the number of neighbors included in a nearest-neighbor approach or the size 
of the radius in a radius matching approach. Kernel functions are usually chosen to 
satisfy  and ( ) 1K s ds =∫ ( ) 0.K s sds =∫  Like before, the kernel matching estimator for 
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 Thus, different matching estimators of ATET are generated by varying the way the 
weights wK(i,j) are constructed.  
 
 Bias-adjusted matching. The simple matching estimator will be biased in finite 
samples when the matching is not exact (Abadie et al, 2001). Abadie and Imbens (2002) 
show that matching discrepancies result from differences in covariates between matched 
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units. Thus, their matches bias matching estimators. In practice, some of this bias can be 
removed after matching. The bias-adjusted matching estimator adjusts the difference 
within the matches for the differences in their covariate values.  
 Abadie and Imbens (2002) consider a bias-corrected matching estimator where 
the difference within the matches is regression-adjusted for the difference in covariate 
values. The adjustment is based on an estimate of the regression function for the matched 
controls μ0(x) = E(Y0i|X = x) using only the data in the matched sample. Following Rubin 
(1973) and Abadie and Imbens (2002), Abadie et. al. (2001) approximate the regression 
function by a linear function estimated by using least squares on the matched 
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The bias-corrected matching estimator provides a link between matching and regression 
estimators, highlighting advantages and disadvantages of both. 
 
7.3.3 Selection based on unobservables  
 If the ignorability-of-treatment assumption (Assumptions 1or 1a) fails, the 
identification strategy for ATE(Xi) and ATET(Xi) in previous sections breaks down. These 
assumptions fail when the unobservable characteristics U2i affecting the contract decision 
are correlated with the unobservable characteristics (U0i,U1i) affecting the profits. This 
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correlation generates a relationship between the contract decision and the profit-
determination process through unobservables. In this case, controlling for the observable 
characteristics, Xi, when explaining profits is insufficient because some additional 
process influences the profit, namely, the process determining whether a grower 
contracts. 
 If these unobservable characteristics are correlated with the observables then 
failure to include an estimate of the unobservables creates omitted variable bias leading 
to incorrect inference regarding the impact of the observables on profits. Even if they are 
are uncorrelated with the observables, failure to include an estimate of them may lead to 
an incorrect estimate of the intercept coefficients, which is a component of the impact of 
contracting. In this situation, a simple comparison of the average profits of contract 
growers and independent growers does not estimate the effect of contracting on contract 
growers.  
 
7.3.3.1 Identification with no heterogeneity 
 Consider first the standard case represented by (7.6) where U0i = U1i = Ui. The 
average difference between profits for contract growers and independent growers, which 
can be estimated from (7.6) as the coefficient on Di after regression of Yi on (Di, Xi), is:    
2 2
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Here, ATE(Xi) = ATET(Xi) = α is not identified from the average difference between 
profits for contract growers and independent growers. When the slope coefficients are not 
the same in regimes as represented by (7.5), the same difference is 
 
1 0 2 2
( | , 1) ( | , 0)
                            ( ) ( | ) ( | )
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
SelectionBias
E Y X D E Y X D
iX E U U Z E U U Zα β β γ γ
= − =
= + − + > − − ≤ −
14444444244444443
 
In this case, ATE(Xi) = ATET(Xi) = α + Xi (β1 – β0) is not identified either. The selection 
bias E(Ui |U2i > –Zγ) – E(Ui |U2i ≤ –Zγ) is the mean difference in the no-contracting 
unobservables between those who contract and those who do not. In other words, it is the 
difference in unobservables between what (profit) contract growers would have realized 
if they were independent growers and what independent growers realized.  
 In order to identify the impact measures, it is important to quantify the selection 
bias term using the correlation between Ui and U2i, and then include this term in the 
equation as an independent variable. In this way, the omitted variable bias problem due to 
unobservables can be solved. Heckman’s two-step estimation procedure can be applied 
for this purpose. Alternatively, a two stage least squares estimation method can be used to 
estimate α, β0 and β1 consistently provided that instruments are available that are 
correlated with Di but not with Ui = U0i = U1i.  
 
7.3.3.2 Identification with heterogeneity 
 If U0i ≠ U1i, then the average difference between profits for contract growers and 
independent growers, which can be estimated from (7.2a) as the coefficient on Di after 
regression of Yi on (Di, Xi), is:    
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 The first right hand side follows from the fact that the errors (U0i,U1i,U2i) are 
independent of (Zi,Xi ). Since ATET(Xi) and ATE(Xi) differ by a sorting effect, ATE(Xi) ≠ 
ATET(Xi) unless the sorting effect is zero. The sorting effect, E(U1i – U0i|Di = 1), is the 
mean gain from unobservables for growers who choose to contract. In order to identify 
ATET(Xi), the selection bias term must be quantified and included in the equation as an 
independent variable. In order to identify ATE(Xi), in addition to the selection bias term, 
the sorting effect term must be quantified and included in the equation as an independent 
variable. In this case, obtaining and using a set of instruments correlated with Di but not 
with (U0i, U1i) does not solve the identification problem. Hence, instrumental variables 
(IV) do not provide a consistent estimator of the mean return to contracting in the 
presence of heterogeneity and selection bias. Heckman’s two-step estimation method 
obtains consistent estimates of ATE and ATET by solving the omitted variables bias 
associated with unobservables.  
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7.3.4 Heckman’s two-step estimation method 
 The most widely-used methods for estimating sample selection models allow for 
selection on unobservables and are based on Heckman’s two-step method. This 
estimation procedure fully exploits the correlation between (U0i,U1i) and U2i. To obtain 
consistent estimates of the impact measures, this procedure quantifies the selection bias 
term using the correlation between (U0i,U1i) and U2i and includes it in the profit equation 
as an independent variable. 
  
7.3.4.1 The simple case with no heterogeneity 
 First, the standard case represented by (7.6) will be considered maintaining the   
assumption that any unobservables have the same effect on profits irrespective of 
contracting status, i.e., U0i = U1i = Ui. The average difference between profits for contract 
growers and independent growers, which can be estimated from (7.6), as the coefficient 
on Di after regression of Yi on (Di, Xi), is: 
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  (7.9) 
where σu is the standard deviation of Ui, ρ is the correlation between Ui and U2i, and λ = 
ρσu. The terms )}(1/[)( γγφ ii ZZ −Φ−−  and ( ) / ( )i iZ Zφ γ γ− Φ −  are known as the inverse 
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Mills ratios in the literature. Regression of Yi on (Di, Xi) and 
( ) /[ ( )(1 ( ))i i iZ Z Z ]φ γ γΦ − −Φ −
,|()1,|(
γ  gives the coefficient on Di as an unbiased estimate of 
ATET = ATE = α. 
 
 7.3.4.2 Heterogeneity in observables  
The methods of section 7.3.4.1 extend readily to the case where the effects of 
observable characteristics to vary with contract status (β0 ≠ β1). The average difference 
between the profits of contract and independent growers, which can be estimated from 
(7.5) as the coefficient on Di after regression of Yi on (Di, Xi), is: 
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In this case, estimation of a probit model is required to obtain estimates of the correction 
terms for both contracting and independent operations separately. Then the correction 
terms are included as regressors in the second stage model of profits separately for each 
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 Estimation of E(Yi | Xi, Di = 0) and E(Yi | Xi, Di = 1) yields estimators 0α̂ , 1α̂ , , 
and . Thus, 
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where N is sample size and N1 is the number of growers with Di = 1 in the sample. 
 
7.3.4.3 Heterogeneity in both observables and unobservables 
The selection correction two-step estimator in the section 7.3.4.2 allows for 
correlation between the errors in the selection model and the profit model. However, it 
requires that unobservable factors affecting profits must have the same effect irrespective 
of contracting status even though observable factors are have different effects depending 
on contracting status. This rules out the possibility that the effect of contracting may 
differ with the unobserved aspects of the profit of a hog operation. Even when U0i ≠ U1i 
and the idiosyncratic gain, U1i – U0i, is observed by the individual grower when making 
the contract decision, the two-step estimation procedure can still apply with added 
complications.  
 Allowing the effect of observable characteristics to vary between contracting and 
non-contracting regimes, the expected profit for hog operations conditional on the choice 
of contracting status are: 
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where ρj2 = Corr(Uji,U2i ), j = 0, 1, and ( )φ ⋅  and ( )Φ ⋅  are the standard normal density and 
distribution functions, respectively. These expressions are derived under the assumption 
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, 
where the variance parameter in the selection equation is normalized to unity without loss 
of generality.  
 Impact measures can be consistently estimated through a two-step procedure as 
follows (Heckman et al, 2001; and Aakvik et al, 2003):   
1.  Estimate γ̂  from a probit model on the selection equation.  
2.  Compute the appropriate selection correction terms evaluated at γ̂ , 
i.e. ˆ( ) / (i ˆ)iZ Zφ γ Φ γ ˆ ]i when Di  = 1, and ˆ( ) /[1 ( )iZ Zφ γ γ−Φ  when Di = 0.  
3.  Fit profit regressions for contract and independent growers, conditioning on 
observable covariates that directly effect profit, Xi, and the selection correction 
term, i.e.,   
  1 1 1 1ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) [ ( )i i iY X Z Z ˆ ]iα β λ φ γ γ= + + Φ  
0 0 0 0
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) [1 ( )i i iY X Z Z ˆ ]iα β λ φ γ γ= + + −Φ . 
4.  Use the estimated coefficients from the independent and contract profit 
regressions to predict the counterfactual profit  for contract grower i and  for 
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where 0α̂ ,  and  (0β̂ 0λ̂ 1α̂ ,  and ) are used instead of 1β̂ 1̂λ 1α̂ ,  and  (1β̂ 1̂λ 0α̂ ,  
and ) to predict the counterfactual profit that would occur without (with) 
contracting.   
0β̂
0λ̂
5.  Estimate the average effect of contracting on a randomly selected grower as  
  1 0 1 0 1 0ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )i i iATE X X Xα α β β α β= − + − = + − β   
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 estimate the average effect of contracting on contract growers as  
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 and estimate the average effect of contracting on independent growers as 
1 0 1 0 1 0





ZATNT X Z X
)Z
φ γα α β β λ λ
γ
= − + − + −
−Φ
. 




1( , ) ( , | 1) ( , )
n
i i i i i i i i
k
ATET ATET X Z dF X Z D D ATET X Z
n =
= = ≈ ∑∫  
  
10
1( , ) ( , | 0) (1 ) ( , )
n
i i i i i i i i
k
ATNT ATNT X Z dF X Z D D ATNT X Z
n =





7.4 Quantile Treatment Effects 
Contracting effects may be heterogeneous and varying along with the profit 
distribution. The presence of heterogeneity in contracting effects is important for 
evaluating contract gains and understanding the pattern of grower discontent with 
contracting. Policymakers are often interested in the distributional consequences of 
contracting. A measure of interest in the presence of heterogeneous effects is the quantile 
treatment effect (QTE). As originally defined by Lehmann (1974) and Doksum (1974), 
QTE corresponds, for any fixed percentile, to the horizontal distance between two 
cumulative distribution functions. To define QTE as a treatment effect at the grower 
level, a useful assumption is that the a grower’s rank in the distribution given the 
contracting decision does not depend on the decision to contract, following the line of 
argument of Doksum (1974), and Lehmann (1974). This assumption is known as the 
rank invariance assumption.  
 
7.4.1 The model in quantile form 
Rewriting (7.1a) in the quantile regression form considered by Koenker and 
Bassett (1978) gives 
0 0 0i iY X 0iU
θ θ θα β= + +  (7.12a) 
1 1 1i iY X 1iU
θ θ θα β= + + ,  (7.12b) 
where U X  and  and the 
conditional quantile of Y0i and Y1i (conditional on Xi) satisfies 
0 0 0 0 0( )i i
θ θ θα α β β= − + − + 0 1iU
0
iU 1 1 1 1 1( )i iU X
θ θ θα α β β= − + − +
0 0( | )i i iQuant Y X X
θ θ
θ α β= +  
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and 
1 1( | )i i iQuant Y X X 1
θ θ
θ α β= +  
for 10 ≤≤ θ , so that  and . In the presence of 
the selection mechanism, the conditional quantile of observed profit is given by 
0)|( 0 =ii XUQuant
θ
θ 0)|( 1 =ii XUQuant
θ
θ
0 0 0 0( | , 0) ( | , 0)i i i i i i iQuant Y X D X Quant U X D
θ θ θ
θ θα β= = + + =  
1 1 1 1( | , 1) ( | , 1)i i i i i i iQuant Y X D X Quant U X D
θ θ θ
θ θα β= = + + = . 
Thus, observed profit can be written as 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0[ ( )] [ (i i i i i i iY X D X U D U U
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θα β α β β= + + + − + + − )]i
)}i
. (7.13)  
If the slope coefficients of the regressors are unaffected by contracting status (i.e., if β0 = 
β1), then 
0 0 0 1 0{ (i i i i i iY X D U D U U
θ θ θ θ θ θα β α= + + + + −  (7.14)  
 
7.4.2 Quantile regression to estimate quantile treatment effects  
The QTE is estimated using quantile regression, which estimates the effect of 
explanatory variables on the dependent variable at different points of the dependent 
variable’s conditional distribution. Quantile regression was initially introduced as a 
robust regression technique to allow for estimation where the typical assumption of 
normality of the error term may not be satisfied (Koenker and Bassett, 1978).  It has also 
been used to estimate models with censoring (Powell, 1984, 1986; Buchinsky, 1994, 
1995). Most recently, quantile regressions have been used simply to get information 
about points in the distribution of the dependent variable other than the conditional mean 
(Buchinsky, 1994, 1995). Quantile regression is used here to examine whether the effects 
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of contracting differ across the quantiles in the conditional distribution of profit effects of 
contracting.  
Consistent estimates of conditional quantiles Quantθ(Y0i| Xi, Di = 0) and 
Quantθ(Y1i| Xi, Di = 1) are required to estimate QTE. The quantile difference between 
profits for contract and independent growers, which can be estimated from (7.14) as the 
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where θ θ θα α α= −
1 0( | , 1).i i i iQuant U U X D
θ θ θ
θα= + − =
. If CIA holds, i.e., if Di and (Y0i,Y1i) are independent conditional on 
Xi, then the selection bias term disappears. Thus, QTE is identified as 
 However, if CMA holds instead of CIA (i.e., if 
E(Yji | Xi,Di) = E(Yji | Xi) for j = 0,1), then the selection bias term does not necessarily 
disappear. However, if CMA is replaced by conditional quantile independence, Quantθ 
(Y0i| Xi, Di) = Quantθ (Y0i| Xi), then the selection bias term disappears, and thus QTE is 
identified.   
QTE
 Alternatively, if selection is based on unobservables, the selection bias term can 
be quantified using the correlation between 0 1( ,i iU U )
θ θ and U2i and included in the equation 
as an independent variable. Thus, omitted variable bias through unobservables can be 
solved. In the more general case with β0 ≠ β1, which is represented by equation (7.13), 
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quantile regressions can be done separately on observations with Di = 0 and Di = 1 to 
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Thus, the selection bias term disappears when the CIA holds. Thus, 
 QTE θα=  + 1 0( )iX
θ θβ β−  + 1 0( | ,i i i iQuant U U X D
θ θ
θ 1)− = .   
Alternatively, when selection is based on unobservables, a two-step estimation 
procedure can be used. In first step, the selection bias term is quantified using the 
correlation between 0 1( , )i iU U
θ θ and U2i where the selection bias is given by 
0( | , 1i i iQuant U X D
θ
θ = ) ) – 0( | , 0i i iQuant U X D
θ
θ =   
= 0 2( |i i iQuant U U Z
θ
θ )γ> −  – 0 2( | )i i iQuant U U Z
θ
θ .γ≤ −   
In second step, this term is included in the equation as an independent variable. Thus, 
omitted variable bias through unobservables can be corrected while estimating QTE. 
 This chapter discusses various estimation methods that are used to estimate the 
mean and quantile effects of contracting on independent and contract growers, solving 
the potential selection bias problem based on observables and unobservables. The 
econometric methods reviewed in this chapter provide the necessary techniques to 
estimate not only the average effects of contracting but how contracting affects individual 
growers in the overall distribution of growers in the following chapter.    
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Chapter 8: 
Estimation of the Profit Effects of Hog Contracting  
8.1 Introduction 
 This chapter uses the estimation methodology of chapter 7 to estimate the profit 
effects of hog contracting. This is done using revealed preference data from the well-
known Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) for 2004. The major 
difficulty in implementing a nonexperimental evaluation strategy is choosing among the 
wide variety of estimation methods available in the literature. This choice is important 
given the substantial evidence that impact measures are often highly sensitive to the 
estimators chosen (Lalonde, 1986). As described in chapter 7, a number of cross section 
methods have been proposed in the evaluation literature that deals with selection bias in 
treatment effect models. Two broad groups of methods allowing potential selection bias 
in estimating the effect of contracting on contract growers are examined here. The cross 
section methods that rely on the assumption that only observable factors affect the 
decision to be a contract grower are OLS and propensity scoring methods. The widely 
used cross-section method that attempts to allow for selection based on unobservables is 
Heckman’s two-step method.  
 However, each of these treatment effect methods focuses on average treatment 
effects. Such standard methodologies may miss how contracts affect gains differently at 
different points on the conditional profit distribution. For example, while contracting may 
have positive gains on average, the gains from contracting may not be positive at all 
points of the conditional profit distribution. Measuring effects on average gains may 
obscure zero effects at some points of the distribution and negative effects at others. That 
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is, while estimating how contracting affects average growers’ profits, useful information 
would also indicate how high-profit growers are affected differently from low-profit 
growers and whether some growers are worse off with contracting. This is especially 
relevant for measuring hog contract gains if this analysis is to be relevant for policy 
advice. Section 8.2 describes the available dataset and provides summary statistics of the 
variables used in this study. Section 8.3 presents estimation results for the first step of 
Heckman’s two-step estimation method. Section 8.4 reports estimation results for 
revenues and costs obtained with Heckman’s two-step estimation method. Section 8.5 
estimates gains from contracting for contract and independent hog growers and explores 
the incidence of negative gains from contracting. Section 8.6 presents quantile regression 
results. Finally, section 8.7 summarizes conclusions. 
 
8.2 Data Description 
8.2.1 ARMS hog data 
 To estimate the effect of contracting on contract hog growers, I employ data from 
the Agricultural Resource Management Survey Phase III, Hogs Production Practices and 
Costs and Returns Report, Version 4, for 2004 (hereafter ARMS III V4) data. This survey 
conducted by USDA collected information from a cross section of U.S. hog operations 
chosen from a list of farm operations maintained by the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS). This particular version of the ARMS incorporated questions to obtain 
information on measures of farm size and financial characteristics, production costs, 
production facilities and practices, business arrangements, and farm operator 
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characteristics. Additional information on the other control variables such as state- and 
county-level characteristics is obtained from the 2002 US Agricultural Census. 
The ARMS III V4 target population was farms with 25 or more hogs on the 
operation during 2004 and included 1,414 hog growers from 19 states (AR, CO, GA, IL, 
IN, IA, KS, KY, MI, MN, MO, NE, NC, OH, OK, PA, SD, VA, and WY). From the 
survey, NASS produced 1232 usable observations, of which 34 were deleted because of 
extensive missing data. As shown in Table 2, out of the final 1198 observations, 331 
operations are farrow-to-finish, 72 are farrow-to-feeder pig, 478 are feeder pig-to-finish, 
96 are farrow-to-weanling, 83 are weanling-to-feeder pig, and 138 are mixed producers.  
Table 2. Observed types of hog production and contracting operations
Contract 1 19 309 77 80 31
Independent 330 53 169 19 3 107














Only 1 farrow-to-finish producer used production contracts and only 3 weanling-to-
feeder pig producers operated independently. Out of 72 farrow-to-feeder pig producers 19 
used production contracts and out of 96 farrow-to-weanling producers only 19 operated 
independently. Only 31 out of 138 mixed producers are contract producers. Because the 
greatest mix of behavior is found in the feeder pig-to-finish category, and to maintain 
maximum comparability by choosing a single type of operation, this study focuses only 
on the 478 feeder pig-to-finish producers. 
Of the 478 feeder pig-to-finish producers, 169 are independent producers and 309 
are contract producers. Of these 309 contract producers, 245 of them use production 
contracts exclusively, 58 of them use both production and marketing contracts, 4 of them 
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use both production contracts and cash or open market sales, and 2 of them use all of 
these marketing arrangements. Two of the contract growers use homegrown feed, and 
thus are excluded. To estimate gains from production contracts precisely, these 66 
producers are dropped to eliminate the complications of other confounding factors, and 
the remaining 243 contract producers are used for this study. Thus, of the 412 feeder pig-
to-finish producers used in this analysis, 169 are independent producers and 243 are 
contract producers.  
From these data, 24 observations for small growers (producing less than 275 hogs 
in 2004) were discarded for purposes of estimation for a variety of reasons. First, 
conditions differ widely in relative terms among these observations. Second, only two 
observations among this group are contract growers so reliability of comparisons for this 
group is limited. Third, an analysis of outliers in the data revealed that 13 of the 22 
observations on independent growers in this group had distinct outliers (more than 3.25 
standard deviations from the mean), thus challenging the reliability of these observations. 
Fourth, although some less distinct outliers existed in the data for other size groups, 
statistical tests revealed no significant differences in behavior whereas data for small 
growers including these extreme outliers caused statistically significant differences in 
estimated behavior (for example, rejecting expected utility maximization) and sufficient 
data for analysis of small growers are not available otherwise. However, 8 more 
observations producing at least 275 hogs in 2004 were also discarded because they 
contain distinct outliers (one or more of the factor input variables for an observation were 
more than 3.25 standard deviations from the mean on a per head basis). Four of these 
were contract observations. 
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8.2.2 Variables included 
 The survey data available for this study include over a thousand variables. The 
endogenous variable of interest in this analysis is the profit per animal of a grower, which 
is the difference between total revenue received and total production cost incurred by the 
grower. In the survey data, revenue for contract hog growers is measured as total 
payments received from contract production while revenue for independent growers is 
measured by cash or open market sales plus any additional receipts from marketing 
contracts after deducting marketing expenses. 
 Production cost involves both operating and ownership costs. Operating cost 
consists of costs for labor; feed; feeder pigs; fuel and lubrication (which includes 
electricity); veterinary and medical services; custom services; bedding and litter; 
marketing; and operating interest. Ownership costs include the annualized cost of 
maintaining the capital investment in hog facilities and equipment (capital recovery 
costs). Overhead costs consist of general overhead, non real estate property taxes and 
insurance, maintenance and repair costs, and land costs.  
 Table 3 presents these cost components as shares of total costs for the contract 
and independent operations used in this analysis. The major costs for contract operations 
are feeder pig costs at 41.0 percent followed closely by feed costs at 37.2 percent. For 
independent operations, feed costs are most important at 38.4 percent followed closely by 
feeder pig costs as 31.7 percent. 
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Table 3: Input cost as a share of total operation cost




Labor 9.5% 6.4% 5.7% 4.2%
Feed 38.4% 10.0% 37.2% 12.6%
Feeder pigs 31.7% 11.3% 41.0% 12.4%
Fuel & lubricant 1.6% 1.6% 1.1% 0.8%
Veterinary & medical 1.1% 1.3% 0.7% 0.8%
Custom services 0.4% 1.0% 0.7% 1.1%
Bedding & litter 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2%
Marketing expense 0.7% 0.6% 1.1% 0.3%
Operating interest 0.6% 0.1% 0.7% 0.1%
Total operating cost 4.5% 4.3%
General overhead 1.9% 2.3% 1.8% 1.5%
Taxes & insurance 1.0% 0.9% 0.6% 0.7%
Maintenance & repairs 1.4% 1.4% 1.0% 1.3%
Land 0.1% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1%
Total overhead cost 4.4% 3.4%
Capital recovery cost 11.5% 6.3% 8.5% 4.5%
Percent of independent 
operation cost
Percent of contract 
operation cost
 
 Because this study focuses on identifying the benefits to growers from 
contracting, the proportion of these costs under contracting that are borne by the growers 
is critical. Obviously, independent growers bear the total costs of independent operation. 
The data show for all observations that contractors bear 100 percent of the cost of feeder 
pigs whereas contract growers bear 100 percent of the cost of labor, general overhead, 
taxes and insurance, repairs, land, and capital recovery. Also, in all but three exceptions, 
contractors bear 100 percent of feed costs. For these exceptions, two contract growers 
paid 100 percent of feed costs and another paid 10 percent of feed costs. Because these 
growers accounted for such a small share of the sample and too few observations are 
available to generate reliable estimates of how they differ, these three observations were 
discarded from the sample. 
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 For fuel and lubricant, veterinary and medical, custom supplies, and bedding and 
litter expenses, contract growers’ cost shares ranged from a minimum of zero to a 
maximum of 100 percent with averages of 93 percent, 9 percent, 39 percent, and 37 
percent, respectively. Because these four categories of expenses amount to a total of only 
2.5 percent of total expenses for contract operations, separate modeling of these shares is 
regarded as unnecessary. Thus, these four categories of costs are combined into a single 
category of “other” costs for empirical purposes, although an accurate measure of the cost 
share for this category of costs is included in the model. 
Of the remaining costs, marketing costs are deducted from revenues for purposes 
of comparability of contract and independent growers. Costs of items that do not 
contribute to productivity are not included in the production model but are included in the 
cost model. These variables are interest, general overhead, taxes and insurance, and 
repairs and maintenance. 
Thus, the following variables are defined for the production model.  
Operator Characteristics      
revenue = revenue per animal less marketing expenses (in dollars) 
contract = contracting indicator (1 if the operator is a contract grower; 0 
otherwise)                     
op_exp = years in the hog business 
op_educ = education indicator (1 if operator has 4 years of college or a higher 
level of education; 0 otherwise) 
op_ocup = occupation indicator (1 if the operator’s main occupation is farming; 0 
otherwise) 
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special = specialization indicator (1 if the operator is specialized in livestock; 0 
otherwise) 
Farm Characteristics 
assets = assets per animal (in thousand dollars) 
debt = debt per animal (in thousand dollars) 
labor = labor cost per animal (in dollars) 
capital = capital recovery cost per animal (in dollars) 
feed = feed cost per animal (in dollars) 
pigs = feeder pig cost per animal (in dollars) 
other = other cost per animal (fuel & lubricant, veterinary and medicine, custom  
supplies, and bedding and litter in dollars)  
 n = number of animals (in thousands)  
Regional Characteristics21 
rn = regional indicator for northern states (1 if MI, MN, PA, SD; 0 otherwise) 
rs = regional indicator for southern states (1 if AR, GA, MO, KY; 0 otherwise)  
re = regional indicator for eastern states (1 if NC, VA; 0 otherwise) 
rw = regional indicator for western states (1 if CO, KS, OK, NE, WY; 0 
otherwise) 
rm = regional indicator for mid-western states (1 if IL, IN, IA, OH; 0 otherwise)  
Others 
ncr = county average net cash returns per farm (in thousands of dollars) 
 
                                                 
21 No observations are from states other than those included in one of these regions. 
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8.2.3 Descriptive statistics  
Summary statistics of the contract and independent operations given in Table 4 
suggest that contract operations have mainly appealed to less educated entrants to the hog 
industry. But the educational differences between the two groups are not statistically 
significant. The difference in hog experience between the two groups is statistically 
significant. More than 49 percent of contract feeder pig producers had been producing 
hogs less than 10 years in 2004, while 66 percent of independent producers had been in 
business 10 years or more. The difference in main occupation of the two groups is also 
statistically significant. Farming is the main occupation for 93 percent of independent 
growers but only 71 percent of the contract growers. The specialization in livestock 
production is significantly different between the two groups with a p-value of 0.090.  
The average total asset value per animal for independent operations is $1,023, 
which is almost four times the average total asset value per animal for contract 
operations, $289. The average debt per animal for independent operations is $157, which 
is over three times the average debt per animal for contract operations, $47. Obviously, 
from means of assets and debts for both types of operations in Table 4, operations with a 
high borrowing capacity tend to be independent operators rather than contract operators.  
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contract 0.000 1.000   
revenue 127.818 32.140 130.309 19.654 -0.84 * 0.404
op_educ 0.252 0.436 0.244 0.430 0.18 0.859
op_exp 18.014 12.071 10.731 5.961 6.73 * 0.001
op_ocup 0.930 0.256 0.714 0.453 5.92 * 0.001
special 0.671 0.471 0.752 0.433 -1.70 0.090
assets 1.023 1.364 0.289 0.463 6.22 * 0.001
debt 0.157 0.258 0.047 0.074 6.08 * 0.001
labor 13.929 13.894 6.485 6.902 5.97 * 0.001
capital 15.236 9.294 9.177 5.670 7.04 * 0.001
feed 50.819 19.304 42.229 18.774 4.26 0.001
pigs 40.967 16.062 44.957 14.883 -2.45 0.015
other 4.228 3.521 2.654 1.901 4.92 * 0.001
n 4.290 5.339 8.814 8.888 -6.17 * 0.001
rn 0.259 0.439 0.222 0.417 0.81 0.419
re 0.000 0.000 0.363 0.482 -9.01 * 0.001
rs 0.091 0.288 0.107 0.310 -0.50 0.619
rw 0.154 0.362 0.068 0.253 2.48 * 0.014
rm 0.497 0.502 0.239 0.428 5.10 * 0.001
ncr 2.943 1.509 4.577 3.418 -6.37 * 0.001
143 234
a The variables revenue , asset , debt , and ncr  are measured in thousands of dollars, 
labor , capital , feed , pigs , and other  are measured in dollars, and n  is measured in
thousands of animals. All other variables are indicactor variables as defined in the text.
See the text for variable definitions.
b The t -statistics are for the hypothesis that the mean of a variable is the same for
independent and contract operations. The p -values give the probabilities of more extreme
t -ratios under the hypothesis of a zero mean. Asterisks (*) denote non-central t -tests,
which were used when F -tests rejected the hypothesis of equal variances between the
the two groups at the 5 percent level.  
p -value   
Observations
Variablea
Independent operations Contract operations
t -ratiob
 
The average labor and capital recovery costs per animal are $13.93 and $15.24 for 
independent operations and $6.49 and $9.18 for contract operations, respectively. 
Independent operations incur significantly more labor and capital cost per animal 
compared with their contracting counterparts. Similar differences are observed for feed 
and other inputs. However, feeder pig cost is significantly more for contract operations. 
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The size differential between contract and independent operations is also apparent. 
Independent operations average less than half the size of contract operations, a difference 
that is highly significant. Most contract feeder pig farms are highly specialized industrial-
scale operations with an average of more than 8,814 head sold per year compared to an 
average of about 4,290 head sold from independent operations.   
 
8.3 Two-step Estimation  
 As emphasized in section 8.1, choosing among the wide variety of estimation 
methods available in the literature is crucial. As described in section 7.3.2 of chapter 7, 
before applying OLS and a variety of propensity score matching methods, an assessment 
of the plausibility of the CIA for this hog data is required. In order to satisfy the CIA, all 
variables that jointly influence the contract decision and profit must be included as right 
hand side variables. This requires that all factors affecting the decision to become a 
contract grower are included as covariates in the profit equation and in the contract 
decision equation that eventually provides propensity scores for matching. However, 
propensity score matching methods require that errors in the contract decision equation 
are uncorrelated with those in the profit equation. If this assumption is valid and all the 
variables in contract decision equation are included in the profit equation, then the CIA is 
satisfied and the coefficient on the contracting indicator variable in the OLS regression of 
profit identifies the effect of contracting on contract growers, and matching methods 
work like a randomized experiment. 
The dataset, described in section 8.2, contains a rich set of variables. Thus, 
arguments supporting the CIA are plausible if contract and independent operators are 
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similar in characteristics and production practices. The comparisons in Table 4, however, 
show that contract growers differ significantly from their independent counterparts in 
many aspects including experience, occupation, assets, debt, feed expense, operation 
scale, and regional and county characteristics. However, unobservable differences in 
entrepreneurial skill and quality of feed and other inputs and genetic quality of animals 
may also exist.   
Key and McBride (2003) argue that contractor-provided goods and services, such 
as veterinary care, feed, and especially the genetic quality of the animals, are superior to 
those available to an independent producer. These yield healthier animals and produce 
more weight gain from an equal amount of feed, labor, and capital. If these unobservable 
factors also affect the contract decision, then the CIA will not hold and CIA-based 
methods will not produce unbiased estimates of the contracting effect.  
Thus, I begin with Heckman’s two-step estimation method, which does not 
require the CIA. As described in section 7.3.4 of chapter 7, this estimator relies simply on 
the assumption that the errors in the selection model and the profit model are jointly 
normally distributed.  
 
8.3.1 First-step estimation 
In the two-step procedure, the inverse Mill’s ratio (imr) is calculated in the first 
step and then used as an independent variable to estimate the profit equation in the 
second step. The inverse Mill’s ratio used in the two-step method is estimated using a 
probit model where the dependent variable, contract, is an indicator variable that takes 
the value 1 if the grower participates in contracting and zero otherwise. The independent 
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variables are chosen to capture the operator and farm level characteristics, differences in 
operation size, regional characteristics, and county-level variation. Table 5 gives the 
results of the probit estimation that are used in the following second step estimation of 
profit. The results suggest that the model significantly and correctly predicts 83 percent 
of operators’ choices. 






z -statistics p -values
n b 0.026 0.018 1.44 0.149 -0.01 0.06
labor -0.583 0.230 -2.54 0.011 -1.03 -0.13
assets -0.444 0.150 -2.97 0.003 -0.74 -0.15
debt -1.068 0.883 -1.21 0.227 -2.80 0.66
op_educ -0.281 0.192 -1.46 0.143 -0.66 0.10
op_ocup -1.014 0.273 -3.72 <0.001 -1.55 -0.48
op_exp -0.050 0.009 -5.25 <0.001 -0.07 -0.03
special -0.724 0.212 -3.42 0.001 -1.14 -0.31
rw -1.372 0.317 -4.32 <0.001 -1.99 -0.75
rn -0.949 0.276 -3.44 0.001 -1.49 -0.41
rm -1.169 0.238 -4.92 <0.001 -1.64 -0.70
re c N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
ncr 0.094 0.036 2.64 0.008 0.02 0.16
constant 3.353 0.487 6.89 <0.001 2.40 4.31
are produced with 377 observations obtaining a pseudo R 2 of 0.4187, a log likelihood of -145.45, 
and a likelihood ratio chi-square statistic of 125.89, corresponding to a p -value less than 0.0001.
b For this probit estimation n  represents number of animals in thousands.
c No independent growers were observed in the east, i.e., "N/A" means not applicable.
95% confidence 
interval
a The p -values give the smallest significance level at which the hypothesis of a zero coefficient
is rejected. The dependent variable is the indicator variable for contracting, contract . The results
 
A legitimate question for this type of model is whether all of the right hand side 
variables are exogenous. The variable most likely to be endogenously influenced by the 
decision to contract is labor. That is, growers who contract could require less labor as a 
result of contractor-provided inputs, rather than the probit conclusion that those who have 
less labor available are more likely to contract. Similarly, the exogeneity question might 
also be raised for assets and debt although these are long-term variables less likely to be 
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influenced by an annual decision to contract. Thus, Smith-Blundell tests of exogeneity 
were performed for labor, assets and debt using instruments such as the interest rate on 
debt, the unpaid labor wage rate, the paid labor wage rate, and total land (not land used 
for hog production). 
A Smith-Blundell test of exogeneity for labor produces a chi-square statistic of 
0.37 with 1 degree of freedom, which has a p-value of 0.5424, and thus is far from 
rejecting exogeneity. The hypothesis of joint exogeneity of labor, assets, and debt is not 
rejected at the 5 percent level by a chi-square statistic of 7.19 with 3 degrees of freedom. 
While this test has a p-value of 0.066, which is close to rejection at the 5 percent level, it 
suffices to support estimation without endogeneity corrections, particularly given the 
strength of the test for exogeneity of labor and the heuristic strength of the arguments that 
assets and debt are long term accumulation variables and thus are not likely to be 
influenced by short-term contracting decisions. 
Table 5 shows that the most significant characteristics affecting the decision to 
contract are specialization both in farming (op_ocup) and livestock (special), operator 
experience in the hog business (op_exp), and, to a lesser extent, operator education 
(op_educ). Each makes contracting less likely, and all except education are highly 
significant beyond the 1 percent level. These results appear plausible and in harmony 
with the simple statistics in Table 4 where the difference between contract and 
independent growers is highly significant for all of these except education.  
Intuitively, a more experienced, educated, and specialized full-time farmer is 
more likely to possess the know-how that a contractor can provide to a less experienced, 
less educated, and part-time grower. The lower level of specialization among independent 
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growers in Table 4 therefore appears to be a spurious relationship rather than indicative 
of a causal relationship. Thus, an important explanation of the choice to contract appears 
to be the comparative disadvantage that some growers have in know-how.  
 Regional indicators also play a highly significant role in determining contract 
decisions. Regional indicators rw, rn, and rm (the effect of rs is included in the constant 
term) are each significant beyond the 1 percent level, all with negative coefficients, 
suggesting that contracting is significantly more likely in the south. As described by Key 
and McBride (2003), regional differences such as in climate, technologies, factor quality, 
or prices are unobservable. These indicators may reflect such differences. The significant 
negative signs on these three regions is in harmony with the regional concentrations of 
contracting as reflected in Table 4, which shows that contracting is more likely in the 
south but less likely in the west, north, and midwest. 
Table 5 also reveals that assets decrease the likelihood of contracting with 
significance beyond the 1 percent level. The negative sign of the coefficient is expected 
because, if total assets serve as a proxy for risk-aversion, then poorer growers are more 
likely to be more risk averse (under decreasing absolute risk aversion) and thus more 
likely to operate under a sharing contract. Thus, risk reduction appears to be one of the 
motivations for contracting in hog production. 
The debt coefficient is also negative although insignificant. Debt can have several 
effects. On the one hand, it reduces net worth, which would increase wealth and thus 
reduce risk aversion. On the other hand, debt causes greater financial vulnerability thus 
suggesting that a more risk-averse operator would tend to carry less debt. Debt servicing 
(paying interest and principal) requires more stable income generation, which is more 
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likely with a sharing contract. The latter explanation is consistent with the summary 
statistics in Table 4, which show that contract operations carry less debt.  
To sort out the separate roles of debt and wealth, the latter of which is likely a 
better proxy for risk aversion, the component of the probit equation in Table 5 
represented by –0.444 assets –1.068 debt can be rewritten as –0.444 net worth –1.512 
debt where net worth = assets – debt. Thus, more net worth clearly tends to independent 
operation following the risk aversion argument, whereas the additional negative debt 
effect may represent the lack of credit availability for contract growers not represented 
elsewhere in the model. But it may also represent a risk aversion effect not captured by 
net worth.  
 The results of Table 5 also show that the size of the hog operation affects the 
choice to contract. Size, as measured by the number of animals (n), is significant only at 
the 15 percent level, but the positive coefficient implies that the probability of contracting 
rises with the operation size. 
 Table 5 further shows that operations with higher per animal labor input are less 
likely to contract. This is also expected because, as described in section 8.2.3, 
independent operations incur more than twice as much labor cost per animal compared to 
contract operations. Intuitively, because contract operations are significantly less labor 
intensive than independent operations, households with more alternative employment 
opportunities are likely to prefer contracting to independent operations. This intuition is 
consistent with the higher observed specialization in farming among independent 
growers. 
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 Finally, Table 5 suggests that operators living in a county with higher net cash 
returns per farm (ncr) are more likely to be contract growers. This result may reflect the 
tendency of contractors to operate in counties that have characteristics favorable for hog 
production.   
 
8.3.2 Theoretical relevance of selection results 
 An important suggestion from these results is that risk reduction matters for hog 
growers and is one of the motivations for contracting. As described in section 5.3.1 of 
chapter 5, one strain of the hog contracting literature considers risk reduction as one of 
the main reasons why growers are motivated to contract production. The results of the 
theoretical model in sections 6.4.3 and 6.4.4 of chapter 6 show how risk can be important 
in measuring growers’ gains from contracting, and, thus, the relevance of risk in 
explaining the decision to contract. 
 As indicated by the literature reviewed in section 2.6.2 of chapter 2 and section 
5.3.1 of chapter 5, the relevance of risk for hog contracting is disputed. This dispute is 
based on the argument that, if wealth is taken as a proxy for risk-aversion, then poorer 
growers are more likely to be more risk averse (under decreasing absolute risk aversion). 
Thus, they are more likely to operate under a production sharing contract, contrary to the 
observed pattern where large growers are more likely to contract. However, this argument 
only applies for a given level of risk. 
 A more careful analysis of the facts from contract hog growing reveals the fallacy 
of this argument. The argument is flawed because the size of an operation in animal 
numbers is used as a proxy for wealth. The results here show that contract growers tend 
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to have less assets and less net worth than independent growers for a given size of 
operation, as measured by number of animals. This is the more relevant comparison when 
a grower with a given size of facility is deciding whether to contract or not.  
 Finally, as demonstrated in chapters 2 through 5, other factors beyond risk 
motivate agents to contract. One such factor is the capital constraint (Kliebenstein and 
Lawrence, 1995). The probit results suggest that the capital constraint matters. More 
assets relax the capital constraint whereas poorly capitalized growers may be required by 
lenders to have contracts to get what credit they can. Less debt for a given amount of 
assets may reflect this motivation for contracting. Further, this intuition explains the 
additional intensity of the debt variable compared to net worth. For example, Section 2.3 
of chapter 2 explains how a wealth constraint can impose a sharing contract on the parties 
even if the agents are risk neutral. Thus, the implicit significant negative coefficient on 
net worth may represent both a capital-constraint and risk-aversion. 
 Aside from statistical significance, the economic importance of individual factors 
in Table 5 is also of interest. To measure economic importance, the estimated coefficients 
in Table 5 can be converted into an effect of the variable on the probability of 
contracting. Evaluating all other variables at their means across both contract and 
independent observations, the change in the predicted probability due the average 
difference in labor between contract and independent growers is –0.21. Similar 
calculations for n, assets, debt, op_exp, and ncr yield estimated effects of .01, –0.16, 
0.39, –0.02, and 0.03 respectively. Thus, debt appears to have the most important 
economic effect among the economic variables, suggesting that credit availability plays a 
strong role in the decision to contract. This ranking of economic importance is somewhat 
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different than for statistical significance in Table 5 in which debt has the lowest 
significance. 
 Similarly, each of the estimated coefficients of indicator variables can be 
converted into a discrete change in probability associated with the indicator variable. 
Again, evaluating all other variables at their means across both contract and independent 
observations, the changes in the predicted probability due to a discrete change from zero 
to 1 in op_educ, op_ocup, special, rw, rn, and rm are –0.11, –0.30,  –0.24,  , 
and –0.43, respectively. Thus, regional location is the most economically 
important determinant in the decision to contract with contracting least likely in West 
followed by the Midwest and North, while contracting is most likely in the South. These 
results may be largely driven by contractor location. Among the other indicator variables, 
occupational specialization is the most economically important variable affecting the 




8.4 Second-Step Estimation of Revenues and Costs 
Depending on whether the effects of observable and unobservable characteristics 
on profit differ between contract and independent operations, three variants of the two-
step estimator are discussed in section 7.3.4 of chapter 7. In the standard and most 
restrictive case of section 7.3.4.1, the effects of observable and unobservable 
characteristics on profit must be the same for contract and independent growers so that 
the contracting effect is the shift term associated with the intercept. If the effects of 
observable characteristics on profit differ with contract status as in section 7.3.4.2, then 
the contracting effect also depends on the slope coefficients of the profit equation. If both 
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observable and unobservable characteristics differ by contract status, then the approach of 
section 7.3.4.3 is required. For the empirical analysis, I start with this most general case 
and then test whether the other variants are applicable in section 8.4.2.  
 
8.4.1 Second-step estimation of revenues 
The regression specification for this study cannot follow standard profit function 
approaches that require positive profits because of many profit observations have 
negative values. For this reason, the profit equation is estimated here by decomposing 
profit into revenues and costs. In general, decomposition allows more accurate estimation 
(a general principle from simultaneous equation estimation). For this purpose, second-
step estimation is applied to estimation of revenues and variable costs separately. Gains 
from contracting are then calculated in section 8.5 by subtracting both variable costs and 
overhead costs (viewed as fixed) from revenue. This allows estimation of how the 
difference in profit between contract and independent operation depends on various 
individual grower characteristics and circumstances. 
 
8.4.1.1 The production model for independent growers  
Suppose the aggregate weight gain of the herd of an independent grower can be 
represented as 
fl p o
p ol fQ AK X X X X e
ηη η ηφ ε= , 
where K represents unobserved fixed physical capital and lX , fX , pX , and oX  represent 
unobserved variable input quantities of labor, feed, feeder pigs and other inputs (fuel & 
lubricant, veterinary & medicine, custom supplies, and bedding & litter), respectively, ε 
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is a disturbance representing stochastic variation of production among growers, and 
,  ,  and ,iA φ η  i = l, f, p, o, are unknown coefficients. Thus, the aggregate revenue for the 
herd can be represented as 
fl p o
p ol fR pQ pAK X X X X e
ηη η ηφ ε= = , (8.1) 
where p is the mean output price among growers and ε is redefined to incorporate random 
variation in the output price among growers.   
 Variable cost is represented by  





,i iX  i =  l, f, p, o, (8.2a) 
are the variable costs of labor, feed, feeder pigs, and other inputs, respectively, and the 
wi’s are the respective input prices. Short-run profit of an independent grower is thus  
fl p o
p ol f ii
R V pAK X X X X e w X
ηη η ηφ ε= − = −∑  π
kC =
Capital recovery cost of the grower is represented by 
rK  (8.2b) 
where r is an unobserved rate of recovery on fixed physical capital that must be 
maintained for profitable operation. Thus, net profit is  
fl p o
p oK l f i ii
V C O pAK X X X X e w X rK O
ηη η ηφ ε− − − = − − −∑R  (8.3) Π =
where O represents the overhead cost of items that do not contribute to grower 
productivity, e.g., taxes, insurance, maintenance and repair, etc.  
  With a utility function ( )U Π  satisfying ( ) 0U ′ Π >  and ( ) 0,U ′′ Π <  the expected  
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which has first-order conditions 
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i = l, f, p, o, where .
fl p o
p ol fQ AK X X X X
ηη η ηφ=  These conditions can be represented by 
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Multiplying through by eε and dropping the unobservable right-hand expression, 
these conditions can be expressed as 
 l f p o
l f p o
R R R
C C C




which yield conditions on cost shares, Si = Ci/R, i = l, p, f, o, in the form 
 l i i lS Sη η=  i = p, f, o.  
For econometric purposes, errors in optimization can be added to these equations 
obtaining 
,l i i l iS Sη η δ= +  i = f, p, o,              (8.4) 
where each δi is a disturbance with mean zero. 
 In the survey data available for this study, data on capital K, feeder pig 
quantity ,pX  and the quantity of other inputs ,oX  are not available.  Because some of the 
input quantities are not observable in this study, the empirical approach must depart from 
typical empirical production studies that are based on their observability. Rather, the 
comparable observable variables are the costs, Ck, Cl, Cf, Cp and Co. Substitution of 
(8.2a)-(8.2b) into the revenue expression (8.1) yields 
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 .of p p fl o ll f p o k l p f oR pr w w w w AC C C C C e
η η η ηη η η ηφ φ ε− −− −−=  
 
Because all observations in the survey data are for the same year, a reasonable 
assumption is that all the hog growers in the same region face essentially the same prices 
aside from unobservable random differences that can be further incorporated into ε. If the 
prices of output, variable inputs, and the rates of interest, taxes, and depreciation are 
constant within regions after adjustment for operator and farm characteristics, then 
p fl
l p f o
opr w w w w Aη ηηφ − −−− η−  can be replaced by a function of variables representing these 
factors. 
Suppose this function is of the form Zeν  where Z is a vector of indicator variables 
reflecting region, operator and farm characteristics. Then p fl o Zl p f opr w w w w A e
η ηη ηφ ν− −− −− =  so 
that the estimated revenue equation can be expressed as 
 f pl o Zk l f p oR C C C C C e e
η ηη ηφ ν ε=  (8.5) 
and the net profit equation in (8.3) becomes 
.f pl o Zk l f p o i kiC C C C C e e C C O
η ηη ηφ ν εΠ = − − −∑           
With constant returns to scale, (8.5) can be written as 
 / ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )f pl o Zk l f p oR n C n C n C n C n C n e e
η ηη ηφ ν ε=  
where n is number of animals. For non-constant returns to scale, the function can be 
written as 
 / ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )f pl o Zk l f p oR n C n C n C n C n C n n e e
η ηη ηφ ς ν ε=        (8.6) 
where 1l p f oζ φ η η η η= + + + + −  and thus 0ζ =  under constant returns to scale. 
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8.4.1.2 Estimation of the production model for independent growers  
 The system of estimable equations thus consists of (8.6) and the three equations in 
(8.4). In log form, equation (8.6) can be expressed linearly as 
, , ,
ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( / ) ln .k i i
i l p f o
R n C n C n n Zφ η ς ν
=
= + + + ε+∑  (8.7) 
A linear system of equations is then obtained by combining (8.7) and the three equations 
in (8.4), 
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where each entry, aside from the column vector of parameters, represents a column of 
observations across all independent growers.  
 The system in (8.8) is estimated allowing different variances of disturbances for ε, 
δf, δp, and δo, as well as possible covariances among the δi’s because they contain 
information about common first-order conditions. The vector Z contains indicator 
variables reflecting operator education (op_educ), operator occupation (op_ocup), and 
region (re, rm. rn, and rw) as well as a location-specific variable reflecting local farming 
opportunities (ncr). To correct possible selection bias, an inverse Mill’s ratio (imr) based 
on results in Table 5 is also added to the system as a right-hand side variable in the first 
equation.  
 Because the optimization conditions in (8.4) represent a conjectural hypothesis, 
the joint applicability of the structure represented by (8.7) and the optimization 
conditions in (8.4) is first tested by testing applicability of the cross-equation parameter 
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constraints in the system in (8.8). That is, the model is first estimated without cross-
equation parameter constraints where Si is associated with an alternative multiplicative 
parameter, say, * * *,  ,  and ,f p oη η η
*)
 respectively, in each of the latter three equations. 
Applicability of the cross-equation parameter constraints * *( , ,f f p p o oη η η η η η= = =  is 
not rejected at the 5 percent level with an F-statistic of 2.59, which has a p-value of 
0.0518 with 3 and 555 degrees of freedom. Thus, the model in equations (8.1)-(8.8) 
appears to capture both the technology and behavior of independent hog growers 
reasonably well.22 
 Another legitimate question for this type of model is whether all of the right hand 
side variables are exogenous. If right hand side endogeniety is present, it most likely 
comes through labor, feed, feeder pigs, and other costs. To consider this possibility, 
exogeneity of labor, feed, pig, and other costs was tested with a Hausman test using the 
labor wage rate, total land (not land used for hog production), operator age, assets and 
debt as instruments. The chi-square statistic is 18.17, which has a p-value of 0.1513 with 
13 degrees of freedom. On this basis, the restricted model in (8.8) is estimated without 
endogeneity corrections for independent growers with results as reported in Table 6. 
                                                 
22 Another approach is to divide the sample into size classes. By dividing the sample into only two size 
classes, the F-tests for applicability of (8.8) have p-values far from rejection in each separate size class. By 
comparison, while the test statistic is close to rejection when combining all independent observations, the 
convenience of a coherent single representation for subsequent analysis is far more preferable and makes 






error t -ratios p -values
b
ln(n ) 0.177 0.015 11.79 < 0.001 0.15 0.21
ln(labor ) 0.118 0.018 6.46 < 0.001 0.08 0.15
ln(capital ) 0.191 0.024 7.86 < 0.001 0.14 0.24
ln(feed ) 0.334 0.025 13.46 < 0.001 0.29 0.38
ln(pigs ) 0.294 0.022 13.11 < 0.001 0.25 0.34
ln(other ) 0.013 0.020 0.64 0.524 -0.03 0.05
op_educ -0.120 0.029 -4.11 < 0.001 -0.18 -0.06
op_ocup 0.222 0.058 3.81 < 0.001 0.11 0.34
ncr 0.028 0.010 2.88 0.004 0.01 0.05
re c N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
rm -0.052 0.055 -0.93 0.352 -0.16 0.06
rn -0.084 0.054 -1.56 0.118 -0.19 0.02
rw 0.059 0.058 1.01 0.312 -0.06 0.17
imr -0.084 0.034 -2.46 0.014 -0.15 -0.02
constant -0.005 0.009 -0.56 0.577 -0.02 0.01
of 9346.34, R 2 of 0.9954 and adjusted R 2 of 0.9953,  which corresponds to a p -value less than
0.0001. The dependent variable is the log of grower revenue per animal.
b The p -values give probabilities of more extreme t -ratios for the hypothesis of a zero coefficient.
c No observations in this region were available for this regression, i.e., "N/A" means not applicable.
Table 6: Independent grower revenue per head (restricted case)a
95% confidence 
interval
a These results were produced with 143 (after stacking 572) observations obtaining an F -statistic   
 
 The results show that revenue per animal increases with the size of hog operation 
and with each of the specific factor inputs (labor, capital, feed, and feeder pigs) as 
implied by production theory. Each of these effects is statistically significant beyond a 1 
percent level. The effect of other inputs is also positive but not significant. Specialization 
of the operator in farming has a positive impact on revenue per animal with significance 
beyond 1 percent, as is plausible. Operator education, however, has a negative estimated 
effect which seems counter intuitive. However, this variable could reflect the intensity of 
off-farm labor beyond the effects that can be represented by the dichotomous variable 
op_ocup and, thus, represent reduced specialization for more educated growers that work 
off-farm more intensively. 
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The positive and highly significant coefficient on county net cash returns per farm 
(ncr) implies that growers in a county with more lucrative alternatives have higher 
revenue per animal, as is plausible with normal competitive forces. The regional 
indicators (rw, rn, rm, re) are not highly significant individually. Which regional 
indicators are quantitatively important depends on which region is arbitrarily included in 
the constant term. However, an F-test for their joint significance yields an F-statistic of 
4.490 with a p-value of 0.004. These differences likely reflect factors such as climate and 
unobservable input and output price differences among regions. Finally, the inverse Mills 
ratio (imr) has a highly significant negative impact on revenue per animal, implying that 
unobservables affect both the contract decision and grower revenue. 
 
8.4.1.3 The production model for contract growers   
 The revenue of a contract grower is the total payment received from a contractor. 
As described in section 6.2 of chapter 6, the total payment to a contract grower is 
  ( / )c f fR bQ C Q s Q Q Cβ γ β= − − = −    
where ,b sγ β= +  b and β are the base and incentive parameters of the per-pound-of-gain 
component of the payment, c is feed cost per animal, and s is the standard to which feed 





l f fR AK X X X X e C
ηη η ηφ εγ β= −  
In the model of equations (8.2a)-(8.2b), 
p f p fl o l oc
l p f o k l p f o fR r w w w w AC C C C C e C
η η η ηη η η ηφ φ εγ β− −− −−= −  
Thus, the contracting grower’s revenue is of the same form as the independent grower’s 
revenue after substituting γ for p and adding the incentive term for feed efficiency.  
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By substituting ( / ) ,p fl o Zl p f or w w w w A p e
η ηη ηφγ − −− −− = νγ  contract grower revenue cR  
can be rewritten as 
( / ) .p fl oc Zk l p f o fR p C C C C C e e C
η ηη ηφ ν εγ β= −  
The variable cost equation is also modified from the independent grower case to 
represent the fact that the contractor bears only a portion of some of the variable costs 
including the entire feed cost. The variable cost incurred by the grower is thus 
l l p p p o o o l p p oV w X w X w X C C Coψ ψ ψ= + + = + +ψ   
where ψi is the share of input i provided by the grower (with the contractor providing the 
rest). These shares are observable and vary by grower according to individual grower 
contract parameters in the survey data. Accordingly, net profit is  
 ( / ) .p fl o Zk l p f o l f p p o o kp C C C C C e e C C C C C O
η ηη ηφ ν εγ β ψΠ = − − − − − −ψ  
The expected utility maximization problem is 
,..,
(





l l p p p f f o o o
Max EU AK X X X X e
w X w X w X w X rK O
ηη η ηφ εγ
ψ β ψ− − − − − −
 
which has first-order conditions 
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These first-order conditions can be represented as 
 ( ( )) .
( ( ) )
f pl o
l l f f p p p o o o
Q QQ Q E U
w X w X w X w X E U eε
η γ η γη γ η γ
β ψ ψ
′ Π
= = = =
′ Π
 
Multiplying through by (p/γ)eε and dropping the unobservable right-hand expression, 
these conditions can be expressed as  
 ,l f p o
l f p p o o
R R R R
C C C





which yield conditions in terms of cost shares in the form 
 l f f lS Sβη η=   
and  
,l i i i lS Sηψ η=  i = p, o. 
For econometric purposes, errors in optimization can be added to these equations 
obtaining 
 l f f l fS Sβη η= +δ
,
                                   (8.10a) 
and 
 l i i i l iS Sηψ η δ= +  i = p, o.                             (8.10b) 
where each δi is a disturbance with mean zero.  
 If β is observable, then the revenue equation can be linearized by defining a 
pseudo total revenue variable R* for the contract grower as 
 * ,l f p p o o kR C C C C C Oβ ψ ψ= Π + + + + + +  
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and representing the revenue equation as 
 * ( / ) .
c
p fl o Z
k l p f oR p C C C C C e e
η ηη ηφ ν εγ=  
For non-constant returns to scale, this function can be written as 
 .* / ( / )( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )p fl Zk l p f o oR n p C n C n C n C n C n n e e
η ηη ηφ ς ν εγ=     
This equation can be linearized as 
*ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( / ) ln ck l l p p f f o oR n C n C n C n C n C n n Zτ φ η η η η ς ν= Δ+ + + + + + + +ε  (8.11) 
where τ is a coefficient to be estimated representing ln(γ/p) and Δ is an indicator 
variable for contracting equal to 1 for a contract grower and zero otherwise. 
This pseudo total revenue R* differs from the actual total revenue from 
contract operations, ( / )( ),c fR p R Cγ β= +  because it is evaluated at γ rather than 
p and because it adds back in the feed efficiency incentive otherwise subtracted 
from the grower’s payment. If β is unobservable, then this equation provides a 
way to estimate β before estimating (8.11). This suggests regressing Rc on R  and 
fC  with no constant term following the equation 
 ( / )c fR p R Cγ β= − ,          (8.12) 
where after adding a random disturbance for econometric purposes. This regression 
provides estimates of both the ratio γ/p and β. The results of estimation of (8.12) are 






error t -ratios p -values
b
Total revenue 0.111 0.011 9.67 0.000 0.09 0.13
Feed cost -0.039 0.033 -1.20 0.232 -0.10 0.03
R 2 of 0.6650 and adjusted R 2 of 0.6621,  which corresponds to a p -value less than 0.001.
The dependent variable is contract grower revenue.
b The p -values give probabilities of more extreme t -ratios for the hypothesis of a zerocoefficient. 
Table 7: Estimation of contract parameters for contract growersa
95% confidence 
interval
a These results were produced with 234 observations obtaining an F -statistic of 230.22, an    
 
The survey data shows that contractors in 2004 received an average of about $130.31 per 
animal whereas contract growers received an average of about $13.08. per animal. This 
corresponds to growers receiving about 10.04 percent of total receipts on average. Thus, 
11.1 percent in the regression appears highly plausible after correcting for the feed 
incentive.  
  
8.4.1.4 Estimation of the production model for contract growers  
 Using equations (8.10a) and (8.10b), additional information is available to 
identify the key parameters just as in the independent grower case. Combining (8.11) 
with the 3 equations in (8.10a) and (8.10b) obtains the linear regression system  
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  (8.13) 
where all entries, other than in the parameter vector, represent vectors over all contract 
growers. The system in (8.13) is estimated allowing different variances of disturbances 
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for ε, δf, δp, and δo, as well as covariances among the δi’s because they contain 





error t -ratios p -values
b
ln(n ) 0.112 0.012 9.57 < 0.001 0.09 0.13
ln(labor ) 0.081 0.021 3.91 < 0.001 0.04 0.12
ln(capital ) 0.228 0.029 7.95 < 0.001 0.17 0.28
ln(feed ) 0.177 0.025 7.22 < 0.001 0.13 0.23
ln(pigs ) 0.149 0.025 5.89 < 0.001 0.10 0.20
ln(other ) 0.099 0.028 3.54 < 0.001 0.04 0.15
op_educ 0.022 0.032 0.70 0.485 -0.04 0.09
op_ocup 0.057 0.034 1.67 0.095 -0.01 0.12
ncr 0.010 0.005 1.93 0.054 0.00 0.02
re c -0.443 0.060 -7.42 < 0.001 -0.56 -0.33
rm -0.150 0.057 -2.62 0.009 -0.26 -0.04
rn -0.220 0.056 -3.93 < 0.001 -0.33 -0.11
rw -0.314 0.079 -4.00 < 0.001 -0.47 -0.16
imr -0.120 0.064 -1.87 0.061 -0.24 0.01
constant -0.015 0.009 -1.68 0.093 -0.03 0.00
an F-statistic of 2135.65, an R 2 of 0.9703, and an adjusted R 2 of 0.9698, which corresponds to a 
p-value less than 0.0001. The dependent variable is the log of pseudo grower revenue per animal.
b The p -values give probabilities of more extreme t -ratios for the hypothesis of a zero coefficient.
c No observations in this region were available for this regression, i.e., "N/A" means not applicable.
Table 8: Contract grower revenue per heada
95% confidence 
interval
a These results were produced with 234 (after stacking 931 with 5 missing) observations obtaining 
 
 To test joint applicability of the system in (8.13), the system was estimated 
without imposing cross-equation parameter constraints as in the case of independent 




 respectively, in each of the 
latter three equations of (8.13), a test of the applicability of cross-equation parameter 
constraints * *( , ,f f p p o oη η η η η= = η=  produces an F-statistic of 0.66 with 3 and 914 
degrees of freedom corresponding to a p-value of 0.5146. This lends strong support for 
both the structural assumption representing technology and the assumed optimization 
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behavior. For contract growers, the exogeneity of labor, feed, pig, and other costs is also 
not rejected at a 5 percent level with a chi-square statistic of 21.99, which corresponds to 
a p-value of 0.0787 with 14 degrees of freedom (using the same instruments as for the 
exogeneity test related to Table 6). Although this exogeneity would be rejected at the 10 
percent level, use of the same estimation technique is desirable in these conditions to 
avoid introducing differences due to different estimation techniques. Thus, the results of 
the restricted model in Table 8 are well supported for contract growers. 
 The results in Table 8 are remarkably comparable to Table 6. They show that 
revenue per animal increases with the size of hog operation and with each of the factor 
inputs (labor, capital, feed, feeder pigs, and other inputs) as is consistent with production 
theory. Each of these effects are statistically significant beyond the 1 percent level. The 
lower elasticity on labor and higher elasticity on capital and other inputs compared to 
those for independent growers in Table 6 seem plausible for the more sophisticated 
technology represented by contracting, although the lower elasticity on feeder pigs is 
surprising. 
 Specialization of the operator in farming also has a positive impact on revenue per 
animal although quantitatively less than for independent growers and with less 
significance. Operator education, however, has a positive sign compared to a negative 
sign for independent growers although without statistical significance. The positive result 
in Table 8 seems intuitively reasonable for contract farmers who deal with more legal 
restrictions and rigorous specifications. 
The sign on county net cash returns per farm (ncr) is positive but smaller in 
magnitude and less significant than for independent growers. This could be due to 
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contractors being located only in the best areas so local conditions do not differentiate 
grower returns as much. The regional indicators (rw, rn, rm, re) are all negative and 
highly significant implying the south (included in the constant term) is the most 
profitable region. Statistical significance in each case is beyond the 1 percent level. These 
differences likely reflect factors such as climate and unobservable input and output price 
differences among regions as well as contractor location. 
Finally, the inverse Mills ratio (imr) has a highly significant negative impact on 
revenue per animal implying that unobservables affect both the contract decision and 
grower revenue. 
 
8.4.2 Testing commonality of production elasticities  
 Because contractors claim to offer growers improved technology in feed rations, 
genetic quality of pigs, and other services, an interesting hypothesis is whether the 
technology of contract growers differs from independent growers. For this purpose, the 
equation systems in (8.8) and (8.13) can be stacked to test for uniformity of production 
elasticities between independent and contract growers. The most interesting hypothesis is 
whether productivity of the key inputs remains the same when switching to contract 
production. When properly specified to allow for different variances of disturbances 
between the independent and contracting cases, estimated coefficients and standard errors 
are identical to Tables 5 and 7. So further results of estimation need not be reported for 
the case where independent and contract growers are combined. 
 With the combined model, the results of various tests of productivity differences 
between the two groups are reported in Table 9. 
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Table 9. Tests of coefficient differences between independent and contract growers 
 
Hypothesis test of no  Degrees of 
change in coefficients  F-Statistic Freedom p-value 
 
ln(n) 8.62 1, 1474 0.003 
ln(labor)  2.07 1, 1474 0.151 
ln(capital) 0.76 1, 1474 0.384 
ln(feed) 16.87 1, 1474 <0.001 
ln(pigs)  16.06 1, 1474 <0.001 
ln(other) 5.41 1, 1474 0.020 
All of the above 40.82 5, 1474 <0.001 
op_educ 8.88 1, 1474 0.003 
op_ocup 5.46 1, 1474 0.020 
ncr 2.01 1, 1474 0.157 
re N/A N/A N/A  
rm 1.90 1, 1474 0.168 
rn 3.01 1, 1474 0.083 
rw 16.88 1, 1474 <0.001 
All regional indicators 22.05 4, 1474 <0.001 
imr 0.09 1, 1474 0.768 
constant 0.37 1, 1474 0.542 
 
Table 9 rejects equality of the farm size elasticity of revenue between the two 
groups beyond the 1 percent level, implying larger returns to scale for the independent 
growers. This suggests the motivation for rejecting the seemingly more sophisticated 
technology represented by contract growers. However, the higher capital elasticity for 
contract growers compared to independent growers suggests the motivation for the use of 
the more sophisticated technology represented by contract growers who have limited 
capital, although equality of the capital elasticity between the two groups is not rejected 
at the 10 percent level. Table 9 also does not reject equality of the labor elasticity of 
revenue between the two groups at the 10 percent level.  
The lower elasticities of feed and feeder pigs for contract growers compared to 
independent growers, which are significantly different, are surprising and seem to refute 
the claimed superiority of contractor supplied feed and feeder pigs as claimed by many. 
A possible explanation for these estimated differences is that the quality and quantity of 
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these inputs varies less for contract growers because of contract specifications so these 
variables explain less of the variability of revenue.  
Table 9 rejects equality of the other inputs elasticity of revenue between the two 
groups at the 2 percent level. The higher elasticity of other inputs (i.e., fuel & lubricant, 
veterinary & medicine, custom supplies, and bedding & litter) for contract growers 
compared to independent growers also reflects the higher quality of inputs specified by 
grower contracts and be the most important manifestation of the superior technology 
under contracting. This elasticity is over seven times greater for contract growers than 
independent growers.  
The results in Table 9 reject the equality of the combined factor productivity of 
size, labor, capital, feed, feeder pigs, and other variable inputs beyond the 1 percent level. 
This verifies that the technology of contract growers indeed differs from independent 
growers.  
Results also reject equality of the coefficients on op_educ and op_ocup between 
the two groups at the 1 and 2 percent levels, respectively even though equality is not 
rejected for ncr at the 10 percent level. Differences in the regional effects for contract and 
independent growers are not significant at the 5 percent level except for the West region 
(rw). (Note that the constant terms that represent the South are also not significantly 
different.) This suggests that growers in the rural South, who tend to have fewer 
alternative economic opportunities and lower skill levels, benefit relatively more with 
contract operations than independent operations compared with other regions, where 
alternative economic activities are more plentiful. Finally, the coefficient of the inverse 
Mill’s ratio (imr) is not significantly different between the two groups.    
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 Thus, while several of the coefficients of variables determining revenue are not 
significantly different between contract and independent growers, others are. A Chow test 
for equivalence of all coefficients other than the constant term between the two groups of 
growers yields an F-statistic of 139.97 which has a p-value of less than 0.001 with 14 and 
1474 degrees of freedom. This result further underscores that differences in the 
technology and its dependence on grower attributes are introduced by contracting and 
contractor provided inputs. 
 Additionally, rejection of equality of models according to this Chow test rejects 
the first two variants of two-step methods discussed in section 7.3.4 of chapter 7 for 
estimating revenues of the growers. Thus, I apply the most general two-step estimator for 
revenue estimation. This means the separately estimated revenues of independent and 
contract growers, presented in Tables 6 and Table 8, respectively, are used for further 
analysis.   
 
8.4.3 The second-step estimation of costs 
To estimate costs for both independent and contract growers, a cost function 
approach can be used. However, the cost functions for both independent and contract 
growers must be specified in a manner compatible with the production specification. 
 
8.4.3.1 The cost function for independent growers 
Although the production problem assumes expected utility maximization, the 
inputs do not affect risk and input prices can be reasonably assumed known at the time 
purchases are made.  Thus, cost minimization applies so that the cost function is the same 
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as for the standard expected profit maximization case with the production function 
fl p o
p ol fQ AK X X X X e
ηη η ηφ ε=  where E(ε) = 0. Suppose ε = ξ + υ where ξ is the part of ε that 
is known to the grower when input decisions are made, e.g., representing deviations from 
regional input prices specific to the grower, and υ is the part of ε that is unknown to the 
grower, e.g., random biological performance of hogs during the growing season, with 
assumed to have zero expectations. Then output expected by the grower given input 
choices is ( ) .
fl p o
p ol fQ AK X X X X E e e
ηη η ηφ υ ξ=  The cost function that minimizes cost with 




( | , ) { min | ( ) }
                
fl p o
p o
l p f o
p f p fl o l o
l l p p f f o o l fX X X X
l p f o l p f o
c w Q K w X w X w X w X Q AK X X X X E e e
QK A w w w w
ηη η ηφ υ ξ
ηη η η ηη η η ηφη η η η η− −− −− −
= + + + =
⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦
 
where w = (wl, wp, wf, wo) and l p f oη η η η η= + + +  (see Just, Hueth, and Schmitz 2004, p. 
82).   
Recall that ,p fl o Zl p f opr w w w w A e
η ηη ηφ ν− −− −− =  which implies 
1 p fl o Z
l p f oA w w w w
η ηη η pr eφ ν− −=
f oC+
−
l pV C C C= + +
. Upon substituting this expression, using (8.2b), and treating 
 as an observation on ( |c w , ),Q K the cost equation becomes 
 
1/
,p fl oZk l p f oV pQC e
ηη ηη ηφ νη η η η η− −− −− −⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  
or in per animal terms, recalling that 1,ζ φ η= + −  
1/
/ ( / )( / ) p fl oZk l p f oV n pQ n C n e n ,
ηη ηη ηφ ν ςη η η η− −− −− − −⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦η  
or in logarithmic per animal form, 
 [ ]*ln( / ) (1/ ) ln( / ) ln( / ) lnkV n R n C n n Zη η φ ς ν υ= + − − − +    (8.14) 
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where R pQeυ=  and  * ln (1/ ) ln( ).p fl ol p f o
η ηη ηη η η η η η η− −− −= +
 
8.4.3.2 Estimation of the cost model for independent growers  
 Equation (8.14) could be incorporated into the system in (8.8) and estimated 
jointly with cross-equation parameter constraints. However, the cross-equation 
constraints would be highly nonlinear in a system that already has substantial structure. 
Thus, a practical approach is to estimate this equation separately by a regression of per 
animal variable cost on a constant term, per animal revenue, per animal capital cost, 
number of animals (all in log form) and the same characteristic variables included in the 
production model (op_educ, op_ocup, ncr, re, rm, rn, rw).  
 On this basis, the cost model for independent growers is estimated in Table 10. 
Because the exogeneity of revenue may be a questionable in this regression, the 
exogeneity of revenue was tested using a Hausman test. The chi-square statistic is 1.46, 
which has a p-value of 0.9990 with 10 degrees of freedom, suggesting no hint of 






t -ratios p -valuesb
ln(revenue ) 0.431 0.073 5.93 <0.001 0.29 0.57
ln(n ) -0.040 0.028 -1.40 0.165 -0.10 0.02
ln(capital ) 0.005 0.044 0.12 0.906 -0.08 0.09
op_educ 0.102 0.048 2.14 0.034 0.01 0.20
op_ocup -0.196 0.098 -1.99 0.048 -0.39 0.00
ncr -0.014 0.016 -0.87 0.386 -0.05 0.02
re c N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
rm -0.052 0.093 -0.57 0.573 -0.24 0.13
rn 0.017 0.090 0.18 0.854 -0.16 0.19
rw -0.161 0.097 -1.65 0.102 -0.35 0.03
imr 0.192 0.056 3.43 0.001 0.08 0.30
constant 3.260 0.426 7.66 <0.001 2.42 4.10
0.3912 and adjusted R 2 of 0.3451, which corresponds to a p -value less than 0.0001. The dependent
variable is total variable cost per animal.
b The p -values give probabilities of more extreme t -ratios for the hypothesis of a zero coefficient.
c No observations in this region were available for this regression, i.e., "N/A" means not applicable.
Table 10: Variable cost per head for independent growersa
95% confidence 
interval
a These results were produced with 143 observations obtaining an F- statistic of 8.48, R 2 of  
 
 The results show that growers who gain greater revenue per head generally incur 
more variable cost per head. The elasticity of revenue is 0.43 and is statistically 
significant beyond the 1 percent level. This is as expected because, for given fixed factors 
of production, higher revenue per head can generally be obtained from more variable 
factor input use at rational production levels. The results also show that variable cost 
decreases with the size of hog operation. The elasticity of size is –0. 040. This implies 
that cost returns to scale in hog production are increasing, which adds to the revenue 
returns to scale implied by the highly significant positive elasticity on n in the revenue 
regression for independent growers. However, the elasticity of size in Table 10 is 
statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level. 
 Capital, perhaps surprisingly, has a positive elasticity although without statistical 
significance. This result, however, is not implausible given the much larger and highly 
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significant positive elasticity for capital in the independent grower revenue equation. The 
implication is that capital increases net returns because it increases revenue by more than 
it increases variable costs. For example, capital may increase the ability to use more 
variable inputs effectively. Operator education, surprisingly, has a positive estimated 
effect on variable cost. This effect seems counter intuitive given that education has a 
negative effect on independent grower revenue. As described for revenue in section 
8.4.1.2, this variable could reflect the intensity of off-farm labor that is not reflected in 
the indicator variable used for that purpose. Thus, it may reflect reduced specialization 
for more educated growers who work off-farm more intensively. Specialization of the 
operator in farming has a negative impact on variable cost per animal, with significance 
beyond 5 percent, as is plausible under cost economies of scope. 
The negative coefficient on ncr is plausible because higher county returns to 
farming likely occur in locations where factor prices are less. Regional indicators (i.e., 
rw, rn, and rm) are jointly significant with an F-statistic of 2.49 with 3 and 131 degrees 
of freedom, corresponding to a p-value of 0.0630. This is expected because these 
differences likely reflect factors such as climate and unobservable input price differences 
among regions. Finally, the inverse Mill’s ratio (imr) has a positive impact on variable 
cost, which implies that unobservables that affect the contract decision have a net positive 
impact on growers’ variable cost. Without this term, growers’ variable cost would have 
been underestimated. Thus, with the explanation for education, all the estimated 




8.4.3.3 The cost function for contract growers 
Comparing the optimization problems of independent and contract growers, the 
argument of the utility function changes from 
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to  The only 
changes are to substitute γ for p, βwf for wf, and ψwi for wi for i = p,o. The same is true of 
the respective first-order conditions and their implications. Thus, the same changes apply 
for the cost function where costs are now characterized by including the feed efficiency 
incentive, βCf, with cost rather than revenue. Thus, the cost minimization problem for 
contract growers is  
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where  is regarded as an observation on this cost function. * l p p f oV C C C Cψ β ψ= + + + o
Substituting 1 p fl o Zl p f oA w w w w pr e
η ηη η φ ν− = − −  and using (8.2b), this cost function 
becomes23 
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ηη η η ηη η ηφ νη β ψ ψ η η η η− −− −− −⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  
or in per animal terms, recalling that 1,ζ φ η= + −  
                                                 
23 The feed efficiency incentive term, βCf, must be incorporated into the cost to obtain the correct results by 
analogy with the independent grower case. Also, note that the revenue variable appropriate for this 
representation of the cost equation for the contract grower is total revenue to the contractor and contract 
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or in logarithmic per animal form, 
 [ ]* *ln( / ) (1/ ) ln( / ) ln( / ) lnc kV n R n C n n Zη η φ ς ν= + − − − +υ    (8.15) 
where, as for independent growers, .R pQeυ=  The only notable differences in this 
estimated equation from the independent grower case is the inclusion of the feed 
efficiency incentive, the weighting of input costs by the contract grower shares in the left 
hand side, and the different constant term,  
on the right hand side.  
* ln (1/ ) ln( ),f p p fo l oc p o l p
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8.4.3.4 Estimation of the cost model for contract growers  
 The cost model for contract growers in (8.15) is estimated in Table 11. As in the 
case for independent growers, because the exogeneity of revenue may be a questionable 
the exogeneity of revenue was tested using a Hausman test. The chi-square statistic is 
0.75, which has a p-value of 1.0000 with 11 degrees of freedom, suggesting no hint of 






t -ratios p -valuesb
ln(revenue ) 0.071 0.151 0.47 0.639 -0.23 0.37
ln(n ) -0.216 0.031 -6.95 <0.000 -0.28 -0.15
ln(capital ) 0.125 0.053 2.35 0.020 0.02 0.23
op_educ 0.068 0.056 1.22 0.224 -0.04 0.18
op_ocup -0.111 0.060 -1.86 0.065 -0.23 0.01
ncr -0.004 0.009 -0.45 0.655 -0.02 0.01
re 0.034 0.096 0.35 0.724 -0.16 0.22
rm -0.296 0.098 -3.04 0.003 -0.49 -0.10
rn -0.392 0.093 -4.22 <0.000 -0.58 -0.21
rw -0.258 0.130 -1.98 0.049 -0.51 0.00
imr 0.530 0.107 4.96 <0.000 0.32 0.74
constant 3.548 0.753 4.71 <0.000 2.06 5.03
0.4514 and adjusted R 2 of 0.4242, corresponding to a p -value less than 0.0001.  The dependent
variable is V * as defined in the text, which is the variable cost per head incurred by the grower 
adjusted for the feed incentive.
b The p -values give probabilities of more extreme t -ratios for the hypothesis of a zero coefficient.
Table 11: Variable cost per head for contract growersa
95% confidence 
interval
a These results were produced with 234 observations obtaining an F- statistic of 16.61, R 2 of  
 
 The results in Table 11 are remarkably comparable to Table 10 although some 
important differences are significant and plausible. The results show that growers who 
incur more variable cost per head tend to generate more revenue per head. However, this 
effect is statistically insignificant for contract growers, probably owing to the constraints 
on the technology imposed by contractors. Nevertheless, an F-statistic of 5.19, which has 
a p-value of 0.0233 with 1 and 354 degrees of freedom, does not reject equality of the 
revenue elasticity between the two groups at the 1 percent level.  
 An F-statistic of 16.38, which has a p-value of less than 0.001 with 1 and 354 
degrees of freedom, rejects equality of the size elasticity between the two groups beyond 
the 1 percent level. The higher absolute elasticity on size for contract growers compared 
to independent growers seems plausible for the more sophisticated technology 
represented by contracting because larger operations realize proportionately greater 
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benefits from better technology. However, as evident from the revenue regressions, the 
magnitude of returns to scale for revenue is larger for independent growers than for 
contract growers. These results jointly imply that contract growers’ returns to scale result 
more from cost savings than for independent growers, which is plausible if contractors’ 
specifications are cost efficient. 
 The high positive elasticity for capital may be surprising, but is consistent with a 
contractor-imposed strategy of using capital to facilitate more intensive use of variable 
inputs. On the other hand, the substitution of capital for variable inputs is limited for 
contractors because contract growers follow contractor-provided production practices 
whereby certain input quantities are largely dictated. Further, contract growers have 
greater incentives to use variable inputs for which they only bear a portion of the costs 
under grower contracts, whereas independent growers pay for all of their inputs. Finally, 
contract growers have greater maintenance incentives because they can do so partly with 
contractor-provided inputs. Thus, the net effect of capital on variable cost is likely to be 
large and positive for contract growers. Nevertheless, an F-statistic of 2.65, which has a 
p-value of 0.1044 with 1 and 354 degrees of freedom, does not reject equality of the 
capital elasticities of cost for contract and independent growers at the 10 percent level.  
 Operator education has a lower impact on variable cost compared to independent 
growers, although without statistical significance. As argued in section 8.3.1, a 
comparative disadvantage in know-how likely induces some growers to contract. These 
contract growers follow contractor prescribed production practices, which thus reduces 
the dependence of production practices on education. However, an F-statistic of 0.15, 
which has a p-value of 0.7029 with 1 and 354 degrees of freedom, does not reject 
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equality of the coefficient on operator education for contract and independent growers at 
the 10 percent level.  
 Specialization of the operator in farming has a negative impact on variable cost 
per animal although quantitatively less than for independent growers and with more 
significance. Again, a quantitatively smaller impact is likely due to using contractor-
specified technology.  However, an F-statistic of 0.52, which has a p-value of 0.4727 
with 1 and 354 degrees of freedom, does not reject equality of the coefficient on operator 
specialization for contract and independent growers at the 10 percent level.  
   The sign on ncr is negative but smaller in absolute magnitude and less significant 
than for independent growers. This may be due to contractors providing inputs procured 
with mass buying power, thus making growers less dependent on local market conditions 
within their county. However, an F-statistic of 0.11, which has a p-value of 0.7417 with 1 
and 354 degrees of freedom, does not reject equality of the coefficient on ncr for contract 
and independent growers at the 10 percent level.  
 Regional indicators (i.e., rw, rn, rm and re) are jointly significant with an F-
statistic of 8.54 with 4 and 222 degrees of freedom, corresponding to a p-value of less 
than 0.001. Highly significant negative coefficients on  rm, rn , and rw imply lower 
variable cost in the Midwest, North and West regions compared with the South (reflected 
by the intercept). 
  Finally, the inverse Mills ratio (imr) has a highly significant positive impact on 
variable cost per animal implying that unobservables affect both the contract decision and 
grower variable cost. An F-statistic of 8.69, which has a p-value of 0.0034 with 1 and 354 
degrees of freedom, rejects equality of the coefficient on imr for contract and independent 
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growers beyond the 1 percent level. This result implies that, without this term, contract 
growers’ variable cost would have been underestimated more compared with independent 
growers. It also implies that unobservables that explain the contracting decision differ 
between contract and independent growers. 
 While several of the coefficients of variables determining cost are not 
significantly different between contract and independent growers, others are. A Chow test 
for equivalence of all coefficients other than the constant term between the two groups of 
growers yields an F-statistic of 7.97 which has a p-value of less than 0.001 with 11 and 
354 degrees of freedom. This result implies that contract growers as a group differ from 
independent growers in the effect their attributes have on costs or in other aspects of 
productivity due to contractor provided inputs. This Chow test also rejects the first two 
variants of the two-step method discussed in section 7.3.4 of chapter 7 for estimating 
variable cost per head. Therefore, I apply the most general two-step estimator for variable 
cost estimation. That is, the separately estimated variable cost functions for independent 
and contract growers, as reported in Table 10 and Table 11, respectively, are used for 
further analysis.    
 
8.5 Gains from Contracting 
I now turn to use of the impact measures (ATE, ATET, and ATNT) discussed in 
section 6.4.3 of chapter 6 to analyze the ex post gains from contracting. These measures 
are used to estimate the actual realized gains from contracting, which depend on the 
grower’s realized ability. The ex post realization of ability changes the grower’s 
assessment of his reservation profit, e.g., his estimate of how much he could earn as an 
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independent grower. The actual realized gain from contracting of a grower is calculated 
as the difference in his profit and assessment of his reservation profit. This difference in 
profit and assessment of reservation profit is computed for each of the contract growers. 
Different impact measures are then obtained by averaging these differences over different 
sets of growers.   
Based on the regression results in Tables 5, 6, 8, 10, and 11, I predict profit and 
counterfactual profit (i.e., assessment of reservation profit) for a grower with arbitrary 
characteristics under both independent and contract operations.24 These predictions are 
applied to construct Table 12. Specifically, Table 12 is constructed following steps 1 
through 5 of section 7.3.4.3 of chapter 7. Table 12 presents a comparison among various 
impact measures of contracting for the contract and independent growers as a whole and 
for different size groups.        
 
8.5.1 Calculating gains for contract growers 
 Steps 1 and 2 (computing the appropriate selection correction terms, i.e., inverse 
Mills ratios) are performed on the basis of the probit regression results reported in Table 
5. Step 3 (obtaining the predicted profits for independent and contract growers) is 
performed on the basis of the regression results presented in Tables 6, 8, 10, and 11. Step 
4 (obtaining the counterfactual profits for contract and independent growers using the 
estimated coefficients from the independent and contract profit regressions, respectively) 
                                                 
i ii
OC rC=∑
24 Profits are adjusted for differences in operating capital costs between the two groups. In the above 
framework, operating capital has a role in determining profit but not production. Since Ci represents the 
expenditure on productive variable inputs, the operating capital requirement is  where ri 
represents the interest rate on ith variable costs for the period of time from expenditure to receiving 
production revenue in each production cycle. This cost does not appear in the production function because 
it contributes nothing to production, but would be an additional cost subtracted in the variable cost 
function.  
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is performed based on the same sets of tables. Finally, Step 5 (estimation of impact 
measures ATE, ATET, and ATNT) is performed combining the results obtained from steps 
3 and 4. Steps 1 through 4 facilitate construction of counterfactual profits for each of the 
contract growers, and thus allow investigation of ex post gains from contracting for sub-
groups of contract growers. Thus, these steps permit investigating the possibility of 
negative gains from contracting for a fraction of contract growers, which is a major point 
of focus of this dissertation.  
 The second column of Table 12 presents a comparison among various impact 
measures of contracting for contract and independent growers as a whole. The average 
gain from contracting for a randomly selected grower is $11.01, as given by the ATE. The 
average gain from contracting for those who contract is $20.50, as given by the ATET. 
The average gain from contracting for those who operate independently is -$4.51, as 
given by ATNT. As expected, and as confirmation of the plausibility of empirical results, 
contract growers not only gain more from contracting than those who do not contract, but 
contract growers have absolute gains from contracting on average and independent 
growers would experience absolute losses from contracting on average. These result are 
explained by the estimated sorting effect and selection bias. 
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Table 12:Two-step estimates of mean effects of contracting
3,000 < n 6,000 < n
≤ 6,000 ≤ 11,000
OLS 23.11 54.58 34.00 17.51 -16.87
ATE 11.01 26.34 13.92 5.43 -18.86
ATET 20.50 52.48 31.22 13.92 -16.74
ATNT -4.51 7.21 -20.70 -15.09 -34.21
Selection Biasa 2.61 2.10 2.77 3.59 -0.13
Sorting Effectb 9.49 26.14 17.31 8.49 2.12
Total Biasc 12.10 28.25 20.08 12.08 1.99
n  > 11,000
c Total bias = OLS – ATE.
Size All
a Selection bias = OLS – ATET.
b Sorting effect = ATET – ATE.
n  ≤ 3,000
 
Recall that the average difference in profit for contact growers and independent 
growers is decomposed following section 7.3.3.2 of chapter 7 into the ATE, the sorting 
effect, and the selection bias where ATE and the sorting effect combined are the ATET. 
The selection bias measures how much of the difference in estimated profits is due to the 
difference in unobservables between contract and independent growers and, thus, would 
not be an effect of switching contract status by a given (average) grower. The estimated 
selection bias reported in Table 12 is $2.61. A positive selection bias means that the 
average grower who chose independent operation would have earned $2.61 greater profit 
per head by contracting than the average grower who chose to contract because 
independent growers have different unobservables on average. While this effect alone 
suggests a counterintuitive comparative disadvantage for contract growers from 
contracting, this effect likely cannot be captured by any particular grower. The more 
interesting effect is the sorting effect.  
The total bias is the sum of sorting and selection bias. The positive total bias of 
$12.10 means that the OLS estimate of the contract effect associated with observable 
variables would be biased upward by that amount. The sorting effect is the mean gain for 
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growers who choose to contract due to unobservables, i.e., from variables other than 
those used in the regressions. The estimated sorting effect is $9.49. Not surprisingly, the 
sorting effect is large and positive on average. The sorting effect is roughly of the same 
order of magnitude as the ATE, which reflects the difference in profits from contracting 
due to the observable variables for which estimated coefficients are estimated in Tables 6, 
8, 10, and 11. Thus, growers who choose to contract gain greater profits from contracting 
both because of the observables as reflected by the ATE ($11.01 on average) and because 
of the effect of unobservable variables as reflected by the sorting effect ($9.49 on 
average). 
The decision to contract depends on the ATET, which is combines of both these 
effects. The difference due to observables (ATE) is presumably available to growers who 
chose independent operation by switching to the technology provided by contractors, but 
the sorting effect may not be available to those who chose independent operation because 
it represents a difference in unobservables that are not controllable (at least as 
characterized by the regression analysis). The results thus evidence purposive sorting into 
groups of contracting and independent growers on the basis of a comparative advantage 
in gains from contracting, which differs between the two groups of growers (even after 
switching technologies) by the sorting effect (Heckman and Li, 2004). These results 
imply that the principle of comparative advantage provides an important explanation for 
contracting in the hog industry. 
The results in the second column of Table 12, however, only reveal part of the 
story. Columns 3, 4, 5, and 6 provide the breakdown of impact estimates for four 
approximately equal-sized groups of contract growers (n ≤ 3,000, 3,000 < n ≤ 6,000, 
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6,000 < n ≤ 11,000, n > 11,000). The ATEs are $26.34, $13.92, $5.43 and –$18.86 for the 
first, second, third and fourth quartiles of contract growers, respectively. Thus, size has a 
strong decreasing effect on the estimated impact of contracting due to observables (ATE). 
Similarly, size has a strong decreasing effect on the estimated ATET with a negative 
ATET of –$16.74 for the highest quartile. Further, size has a strong decreasing effect on 
the OLS estimate of gains from contracting. Thus, irrespective of the estimation method 
(OLS, ATE, or ATET), larger contract growers receive on average smaller gains from 
contracting, with negative estimated gains for the highest quartile. Negative gains for the 
largest quartile are puzzling because larger shares of growers with larger size choose to 
contract.  
The sorting effects are $26.14, $17.31, $8.49, and $2.12 for the respective 
quartiles. These results suggest unobservables tend to contribute to gains from 
contracting for growers in all size classes, even though this effect declines with size. The 
selection biases are $2.10, $2.77, $3.59, and –$0.13 for the respective quartiles. 
Curiously, size tends to increase the selection bias, except for the highest quartile, 
although the variation is small. The negative estimate for the fourth quartile implies that 
large growers who chose to contract would experience a smaller profit effect of 
unobservables than large growers who chose not to contractr. The positive total biases for 
all the quartiles means that OLS estimates of contracting effects would be biased upward 
for all quartiles.  
The estimates of ATNT are $7.21, –$20.70, –$15.09, and –$34.21 for the 
respective quartiles. The effect of size on the estimates of ATNT is generally negative 
except for a slight increase between the second and third quartile. This means larger 
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independent growers have greater disincentives to contract. Since ATET exceeds ATNT 
for all sizes, growers in all size classes who choose to contract have, on average, greater 
benefits from contracting than those who do not choose to contract. Thus, the results have 
a plausible consistency across size classes. But results are not fully as expected in all size 
classes. For example, in the smallest quartile, even though the gains for growers who 
chose to contract are larger, the growers who chose not to contract could also have had 
positive gains from contracting. This result is surprising given that smaller shares of 
small size growers choose to contract. This apparent anomaly is explained below. 
 
8.5.2 Negative gains: theoretical predictions versus empirical results 
  This section presents the rather unique empirical results of this dissertation that 
identify individual growers who experience losses from contracting and their 
characteristics. The important issue of whether all growers gain from contracting under 
heterogeneity is explored theoretically in detail in chapter 3, 4, and 6. The main 
theoretical prediction derived in section 3.5 of chapter 3 and section 4.3 of chapter 4 is 
that for the most plausible information structure, that is, when growers have partial 
knowledge of their ability, some low-ability growers with below average productivity 
receive negative gains from contracting on average. This implies that the average gain of 
high-ability growers is expected to be larger than that of their low-ability counterparts. 
However, when ex post assessment of reservation profit varies with ability as assumed in 
the theoretical modeling of hog contracts in section 6.3 of chapter 6, a negative average 
gain from contracting is possible for a contract grower of below average productivity of 
any ability. Even low-ability growers with above average productivity are can experience 
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an ex post loss from contracting in this case. Thus, the average gain of high-ability 
growers may be no greater than their low-ability counterparts.  
 This section explores this negative and relative gain issue. This section also 
considers the theoretical implication that the contractor gives an incentive to high-ability 
growers to use their higher ability with greater effort and larger facilities than these of 
low-ability growers. According to this theoretical result, high-ability growers are 
expected to earn higher profits than low-ability growers. Specifically, three questions are 
answered in this section: (i) whether high-ability contract growers earn higher profits on 
average than low-ability growers, (ii) whether losses from contracting are observed for 
some contract growers of all ability levels or only for the low-ability levels, and (iii) 
whether contract growers of both below and above average productivity or only below 
average productivity lose from contracting. Answers to the latter two questions hinge on 
growers’ ex post assessments of reservation profits. The first two of these questions 
answer the stated puzzle in the previous section.  
 
8.5.2.1 Consistency across abilities 
 For the purposes of this discussion, operation size is regarded as a proxy for 
ability as suggested by the theoretical model of chapter 6. If operation size is used as a 
proxy for ability then large size growers are expected to gain more from contracting. This 
suggests that large shares of the large sizes would choose to contract compared to smaller 
sizes, as observed. However, the results of the previous section show that the average 
gain is larger among smaller size growers. This is inconsistent with the theoretical 
predictions of chapters 3 and 4 unless ability is negatively proxied by size (that is, 
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growers with larger size have less ability). However, these theoretical predictions fail to 
consider that average reservation profit as well as average actual profit of larger growers 
is larger than for smaller growers. This resolves the seemingly counterintuitive 
implication that growers with larger size have less ability (as well as the more 
implausible implication that a contractor induces lower ability growers to construct larger 
facilities).  
 The underlying assumption in chapters 3 and 4 is that the assessment of 
reservation profits does not vary across realized abilities, which is relaxed in the 
theoretical model adapted to the hog industry in chapter 6. For the relaxed assumption 
that the reservation profits vary with realized ability as in chapter 6, the theory predicts a 
wide variety of possibilities revealing many cases where more than one group can lose 
from contracting ex post. In particular, larger gains for smaller growers and negative 
gains for larger size growers are not precluded.     
 The empirical results show that a large number of contract growers experience 
negative gains from contracting. Of 234 contract growers, 76 experience negative gains 
from contracting, which is 33 percent of all contract growers. Similarly, 80 independent 
growers, which is 56 percent of all independent growers, would have experienced 
negative gains from contracting had they contracted. Negative gains for independent 
growers are reasonable due to self selection, but why do so many contract growers 
choose to contract if they lose from contracting? Also, what are the characteristics of 
those who lose from contracting?  Do they tend to be the smaller or larger contract 
growers? How do these results relate to the comparative advantage argument for 
contracting? Are these losses behind the recent trend toward independent hog operations? 
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  These questions can be answered by analyzing the counterfactual profits (the 
reservation profits) of contract growers as presented in Table 13. This table is constructed 
following the 5 steps used for construction of Table 12. The average profits (per animal) 
are –$15.83, –$7.97, –$4.60 and –$3.37 for first, second, third, and fourth quartiles, 
respectively. Thus, the profits of contract growers are increasing in size. This confirms 
the theoretical prediction that high-ability growers earn higher profits than low-ability 
growers where size is taken as a proxy for ability. These results also explain, in part, why 
large shares of the large sizes choose to contract when the gains to them are on average 
smaller compared with their smaller counterparts. But this is a comparison of profits 
across growers of different abilities, not gains from contracting for growers of different 
abilities.  
Table 13: Two-step estimates of revenues, costs, and profits of contract growers 
3,000 < n 6,000 < n
≤ 6,000 ≤ 11,000
Revenues 14.09 14.42 15.00 14.91
Costs 29.92 22.39 19.60 18.28
Profits -15.83 -7.97 -4.60 -3.37
Counterfactual revenues 93.87 104.15 116.86 139.39
Counterfactual costs 162.18 143.35 135.39 126.03
Counterfactual profits -68.31 -39.19 -18.53 13.37
ATET 52.48 31.22 13.92 -16.74
Size n  > 11,000n  ≤ 3,000
 
 The further breakdown in Table 13 offers insight explaining the higher average 
profit for contract growers of large sizes. The average revenue per animal is $14.09, 
$14.42, $15.00 and $14.91 for the respective quartiles.25  Thus, larger average profits of 
                                                 
25 The yearly average live-weight prices of hog were $47.41, $49.45, $39.58, $43.56, $52.51, $50.05, 
47.26, and $47.09 for the years 2000 through 2007, respectively. Thus, estimates of negative profits when 
fully accounting for family labor and imputed capital cost are not due to unusually low prices. In fact, the 
2004 average price was the highest in this period, implying that growers are operating with less than market 
wate rates for family labor and/or less that market rates of return on capital.  
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larger contract growers do not result from larger revenues. Rather, they result mainly 
from smaller average costs per animal given by $29.92, $22.39, $19.60and $18.28 for the 
respective quartiles. The average counterfactual profits (i.e., reservation profits) are         
–$68.31, –$39.19, –$18.53 and $13.37 for the respective quartiles. Thus, even though the 
average profit of large contract growers is larger than that of small contract growers, their 
smaller average gain from contracting is due to their larger average reservation profits.   
  If the reservation profit were uniform across all growers, e.g., at a level between  
–$4.60 and –$3.37, then only contract growers in the fourth quartile would have positive 
average gains from contracting. Or at a uniform reservation profit level between –$7.97 
and –$4.60 contract growers from both the third and fourth quartiles would have positive 
average gains from contracting, and so on. Or a uniform reservation profit greater than     
–$3.37 would imply negative average gains from contracting for all contract growers. 
Regardless of the level of any uniform reservation profit, negative average gains would 
be implied for the smaller growers if any. Assuming size is a proxy for ability, these 
results are thus consistent with the theoretical predictions of chapters 3 and 4 whereby 
low-ability contract growers receiving negative gains from contracting, i.e., where the 
reservation profit is the same across all growers.  
 Interestingly, both actual profits and reservation profits of the first and second 
quartiles of contract growers are highly negative. Apparently, these operations would 
either have to expand to operate more efficiently or quit hog operations since they are 
losing money on average. For the larger two quartiles in contrast, breakeven profit is 
possible if only paid labor costs are considered. The unpaid family labor costs are $10.76, 
$5.48, $3.98 and $2.28 for the respective quartiles. These results offer an explanation for 
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why small and medium size growers are either expanding their hog operations or closing 
down.26 These results also explain why large hog growers have preferred independent 
operations to contract operations recently. Large reservation profits for contract growers 
in the fourth quartile explain the preference for independent operations. 
Given this explanation, a breakdown of reservation profits by size is useful. Table 
13 shows that the average reservation revenues are increasing in size while the average 
reservation costs are decreasing in size. Thus, while the variation in contract growers’ 
actual profits across sizes occur mostly from variations in costs, variations in contract 
growers’ reservation profits across sizes are due to both variations in costs and revenues. 
Thus, grower size is critical. Small size growers are being forced out of the hog business 
regardless of contracting status unless they expand their operation size. These results are 
explained by the estimated returns for scale. Both of the per animal variable cost 
regressions in section 8.4.3 estimate a negative coefficient for the size variable ln(n). 
Similarly, both of the revenue per animal regressions in section 8.4.1 estimate a positive 
coefficient on the size variable ln(n). 
Thinning spot market may explain why both actual profits and reservation profits 
are small for smaller growers. Thin spot markets make spot market transactions costlier 
for all market participants. Further, spot market transactions are even more costly for 
smaller participants who cannot reap scale benefits. Thus, small growers make small 
                                                 
26 Between 1994 and 1999, the number of U.S. hog farms fell from over 200,000 to less than 100,000 
showing a decrease of more than 50 percent, while the hog inventory remained relatively stable. During the 
same six-year period, farms with at least 2,000 head increased their share of total swine inventory from 37 
percent to 81 percent (Key, 2004). Similarly, rapid growth occurred among very large operations. 
Operations producing at least 50,000 head increased their share of total hogs marketed from 17 percent in 
1994 to 37 percent in 1997 to 51 percent in 2000 (Lawrence and Grimes,  2001; Key, 2004).  According to 
McBride and Key (2003), extraordinary growth occurred in the average size of specialized hog operations 
between 1992 and 1998. Hog finishing operations showed an average increase of 240 percent in sales and 
removals during that period. 
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profits as independent growers, which means their reservations profits are small. 
Consequently, contractors will pay them less or compel them to carry larger costs than 
their large size counterparts. Thus, they also earn smaller profits if they contract.27  
These conclusions of this section are confirmed by the qualitative survey 
responses. In response to the survey question “How many more years do you expect this 
operation will be producing hogs?”, 25 percent (54 contract, 40 independent) growers 
mentioned 5 years or less while 8 percent did not respond to this question. Not 
surprisingly, 61 percent of these 94 growers who indicated a likelihood of quitting the 
hog business in the next 5 years are in the first quartile of growers (which is 46 percent of 
the growers in this quartile) while the corresponding share is 20 percent for second 
quartile growers (which is only 23 percent of this quartile). The corresponding shares for 
the third and fourth quartiles are 11 and 8 percent, respectively. These figures definitely 
suggest continuing disappearance of small-scale hog operations irrespective of their 
contracting status.  
 
8.5.2.2 Consistency within abilities 
 The discussion thus far explains why larger growers have smaller gains from 
contracting than smaller growers based on differences in ability and its implications for 
                                                 
27 Roberts and Key (2005) explore a similar line of reasoning for negative gains by developing a model 
that shows how introducing the opportunity to contract can lower welfare for some, and perhaps all, 
contracting parties. They consider a situation where processors can obtain inputs from suppliers (farmers) 
using either a spot market or contractual arrangements, and where spot market transaction costs depend on 
the volume of trade in the spot market. Contracting parties may lose when more contracting causes higher 
transaction costs for spot market participants. At the margin, firms and input suppliers gain from signing 
contracts. However, contracting raises spot-market transaction costs for those who do not sign contracts, 
which provides a greater incentive for others to sign contracts, ultimately inducing more contracting than 
optimal. Their model demonstrates why structural or organizational change may be rapid and why the 
private minimization of transaction costs may not lead to optimal institutional arrangements.   
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variation in reservation profits. This section turns to analysis of negative average gains 
from contracting for contract growers of a given ability. This discussion relates to the 
theoretical implication that a contract grower loses from contracting if his realized 
productivity is below the average productivity of the growers of that ability.  
 In section 3.5 of chapter 3, the gains from contracting are negative for low-ability 
agents who realize lower than expected ability and positive for such agents who realize 
higher than expected ability. The conclusions of chapter 6 derived under a similar 
information structure differ from the conclusions of chapter 3. The results of section 6.4.3 
of chapter 6 suggest a rich set of alternative conditions where one group or the other 
among low-ability growers can experience an ex post loss from contracting that is likely 
to be repeated under the same conditions due to realizing an ability different than 
expected. 
  For contract growers of a given average ability (reflected by size), Table 14 
presents average realized profits for contract growers who gain from contracting and for 
contract growers who lose from contracting, compared to the average profit of all 
contract growers of that ability. For example, the first row presents the average profit of 
growers for whom their realized profit is greater than their reservation profit. 
Table 14: Profit of contract growers who gain and lose from contracting  
3,000 < n 6,000 < n
≤ 6,000 ≤ 11,000
Growers who gain -15.54 -7.82 -4.16 -3.02
Growers who lose -19.82 -8.50 -5.39 -3.56
Average profit -15.83 -7.97 -4.60 -3.37
Size n  > 11,000n  ≤ 3,000
 
 For the first quartile, the average realized profit of 4 of 60 contract growers who 
lose from contracting was –$19.42, considerably below the average of –$15.83, while the 
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average realized profit for contract growers who gain was –$15.54, only slightly above 
the average. Similarly, for the second quartile, 13 of 58 contract growers who lose by 
contracting had an average realized profit of –$8.50, considerably less than the average 
profit of –$7.97, while contract growers who gain had an average realized profit of          
–$7.82, only slightly above the average.. For the third quartile, 21 of 58 contract growers 
who lose from contracting had an average realized profit of –$5.39 compared to an 
average realized profit of –$4.60 for those who gain. Finally, for the fourth quartiles, 38 
of 58 contract growers who lose have an average realized profit of –$3.56 compared to an 
average realized profit of –$3.37 for those who gain.  
 Thus, for all quartiles (i.e., all abilities), growers with below expected realized 
abilities experience negative gains from contracting, which validates theoretical 
predictions of both chapters 3 and 6. However, both the difference in realized profits 
between gainers and losers and the negative magnitude of realized profits decreases with 
size (i.e., with average ex ante ability). Interestingly, profits increase in size (i.e., ability) 
but gains decrease in size as implied by the increasing share of contract growers in each 
quartile who lose from contracting (6.8%, 22.4%, 36.2%, and 65.5% of growers in the 
respective quartiles). This happens because reservation profits increase (in ability) faster 
than profits.  
 
8.5.2.3 Appropriateness of other methods 
In general, the two-step results described thus far suggest that selection based on 
unobservable characteristics is substantial. The results also suggest purposive sorting into 
groups of contracting and independent growers on the basis of comparative advantage or 
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gains from contracting. The inverse Mill’s ratio, imr, is highly statistically significant in 
three of the four regressions used for calculating gains from contracting and is near 5- 
percent significance in the fourth. This means the CIA discussed in chapter 6 is not 
satisfied because selection is based on unobservables.  
Further, impact heterogeneity can be another reason for violation of the CIA. With 
heterogeneity in how the observables affect revenues as in section 8.4.2, contracting 
effects are not simply the differences in intercepts between contracting and independent 
grower regressions at a given size. A similar argument applies to the contracting effects 
of costs. Matching methods assume the difference in the intercepts in these regressions 
are the contracting effects on revenues and costs. Thus, heterogeneity makes the 
predicted revenues and costs dependent on the contracting status, violating the CIA 
because the same observables give different levels of predicted profits depending on the 
contracting status. 
For these reasons, propensity score matching methods have been shown to be 
inappropriate and highly likely to produce biased impact estimates for the purposes of 
this dissertation. Note that the CIA-based OLS estimate was obtained and its implications 
are reported in Table 12, showing that OLS impact estimates have significant biases. 
 
8.6 The Quantile Effects of Contracting 
 Thus far the results obtained with Heckman’s two-step estimation procedure 
analyze the mean effects of contracting on contract and independent growers. Using the 
quantile regression method, this section explores further how contracting affects contract 
growers’ gains from contracting differently at different points along the conditional profit 
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distribution. Two-step results signal that gains from contracting decrease over profit 
quantiles. This result is generated from the fact that profits increase in size and gains 
decrease in size as presented in Table 13. However, the quantile regression method has 
several other virtues for my analysis. The quantile regression estimator gives less weight 
to outlier data points of the dependent variable than least squares methods, which 
weakens the impact such data points might have on the results. Also, by allowing the 
parameter estimates for the marginal effects of the explanatory variables to differ across 
quantiles of the dependent variable, robustness to potential heteroskedasticity is achieved. 
Further, when the error terms are non-normal, quantile regression estimators may be 
more efficient than least squares estimators. The main advantage, however, is the semi-
parametric nature of the approach, which relaxes the restriction that parameters must be 
constant across the entire distribution of the dependent variables (Koenker and Bassett, 
1978; Buchinsky, 1994, 1995).  
 
8.6.1 Treatment effects at different quantiles 
 As discussed in section 8.4.2, test results rejecting pooled two-step regression 
invalidate the first two-variants of two-step estimation procedures for revenues so only 
the third variant is used here. Thus, I apply separate regressions for independent and 
contract growers both in revenue and cost estimation. The quantile regression results at 
the 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, and 0.9 conditional quantiles are presented in Tables 15a 
and 15b for independent and contract growers, respectively. Similarly, the quantile 
regression results for variable costs per head at the 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, and 0.9 
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conditional quantiles are presented in Table 16a and 16b for independent and contract 
growers, respectively. 
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Table 15a: Quantile regression estimates for independent grower revenue
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9
ln(n ) 0.131 0.136 0.207 0.218 0.211 0.252 0.272
0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.007
ln(labor ) 0.028 0.037 0.053 0.061 0.075 0.103 0.130
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005
ln(capital ) 0.193 0.188 0.231 0.247 0.258 0.272 0.411
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.012
ln(feed ) 0.482 0.318 0.249 0.232 0.246 0.220 0.217
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.011
ln(pigs ) 0.204 0.405 0.372 0.335 0.327 0.243 0.196
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.013
ln(other ) 0.008 0.047 0.017 0.006 0.008 -0.003 0.000
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.007
op_educ -0.046 -0.075 -0.163 -0.169 -0.151 -0.091 -0.124
0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.009
op_ocup 0.034 0.273 0.137 0.155 0.219 0.314 -0.037
0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.026
ncr -0.023 0.010 0.008 0.023 0.014 0.069 0.029
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
re b N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
rm 0.454 -0.037 -0.027 0.013 -0.021 -0.127 0.035
0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.020
rn 0.249 -0.160 -0.080 -0.041 -0.090 -0.123 0.119
0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.017
rw 0.516 0.044 0.044 0.059 0.040 -0.053 0.184
0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.017
imr -0.021 -0.062 -0.010 -0.037 -0.068 0.019 -0.040
0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.011
constant -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
a These results were produced with 143 (572 after stacking) observations obtaining pseudo R 2's of   
0.8857, 0.9125, 0.9404, 0.9501, 0.9586, 0.9692, and 0.9619 for quantiles 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5, 
0.6, 0.8, and 0.9, respectively. The dependent variable is grower revenue per animal. Standard errors 
are reported below the coefficients.  
b No observations in this region were available for this regression, i.e., "N/A" means not applicable.




Table 15b: Quantile regression estimates for contract grower revenue
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8
ln(n ) 0.046 0.093 0.119 0.135 0.168 0.177 0.199
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ln(labor ) 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.003
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ln(capital ) 0.076 0.101 0.168 0.175 0.220 0.287 0.399
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ln(feed ) 0.222 0.141 0.176 0.178 0.119 0.104 0.133
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ln(pigs ) 0.294 0.244 0.149 0.124 0.093 0.126 0.167
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ln(other ) 0.103 0.091 0.073 0.064 0.049 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
op_educ 0.084 0.051 0.028 0.016 -0.018 0.013 0.116
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
op_ocup 0.004 0.022 0.021 0.028 0.012 -0.012 0.036
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ncr -0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.002
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
re -0.183 -0.131 -0.212 -0.189 -0.179 -0.354 -0.963
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
rm -0.293 0.057 0.048 0.067 0.073 -0.072 -0.529
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
rn -0.542 -0.063 -0.064 -0.052 0.003 0.042 -0.441
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
rw -0.628 -0.258 -0.142 -0.120 -0.134 -0.343 -0.778
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
imr 0.030 -0.024 0.005 -0.010 0.050 0.094 -0.079
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
a These results were produced with 234 (931 after stacking, 5 missing) observations obtaining 
pseudo R
0.9
2's of 0.7569, 0.8305, 0.8944, 0.9124, 0.9274, 0.9453, and 0.9281 for quantiles 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 
0.5, 0.6, 0.8, and 0.9, respectively. The dependent variable is grower revenue per animal. Standard 
errors are reported below the coefficien 
Variables Coefficients at different quantiles
a
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Table 16a: Quantile estimates of variable cost for independent growers
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9
ln(revenue ) 0.543 0.408 0.421 0.442 0.401 0.297 0.371
0.382 0.146 0.100 0.078 0.115 0.072 0.083
ln(n ) -0.060 -0.076 -0.078 -0.051 -0.052 -0.020 0.010
0.168 0.056 0.045 0.036 0.047 0.031 0.031
ln(capital ) 0.003 0.005 0.013 0.020 0.041 -0.020 0.008
0.247 0.070 0.064 0.049 0.069 0.047 0.024
op_educ 0.117 0.136 0.085 0.102 0.084 0.090 0.056
0.235 0.088 0.071 0.054 0.069 0.049 0.048
op_ocup -0.274 -0.146 -0.037 -0.148 -0.097 -0.343 -0.332
0.512 0.166 0.141 0.117 0.157 0.101 0.081
special 0.224 0.125 0.096 0.070 0.029 -0.014 -0.040
0.260 0.095 0.072 0.057 0.073 0.050 0.049
ncr 0.003 -0.005 -0.011 -0.003 -0.007 -0.011 -0.023
0.094 0.030 0.025 0.018 0.023 0.013 0.011
re b N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
rm -0.140 -0.022 0.050 0.038 0.033 -0.037 -0.070
0.388 0.189 0.145 0.104 0.133 0.087 0.089
rn -0.062 0.001 0.022 0.005 0.081 0.099 0.124
0.484 0.187 0.139 0.100 0.130 0.085 0.084
rw -0.296 -0.053 -0.002 -0.053 -0.034 -0.145 -0.233
0.545 0.201 0.151 0.111 0.137 0.089 0.100
imr 0.206 0.165 0.079 0.128 0.137 0.288 0.303
0.312 0.108 0.085 0.063 0.085 0.062 0.057
constant 2.587 3.305 3.198 3.033 3.244 4.164 3.666
2.475 0.841 0.600 0.449 0.634 0.401 0.443
a These results were produced with 143 independent observations obtaining pseudo R 2's of 0.2634,   
0.2445, 0.2204,0.2098, 0.2282, 0.3155, and 0.4173 for quantiles 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, and 0.9, 
respectively. The dependent variable is labor costs per animal. Standard errors are reported below
the coefficients.  
b No observations in this region were available for this regression, i.e., "N/A" means not applicable. 




0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9
ln(revenue ) 0.310 0.177 0.243 0.059 0.068 -0.453 -0.097
0.154 0.286 0.148 0.192 0.126 0.230 0.321
ln(n ) -0.196 -0.152 -0.206 -0.180 -0.176 -0.194 -0.265
0.051 0.050 0.032 0.043 0.030 0.053 0.091
ln(capital ) 0.069 0.192 0.103 0.122 0.173 0.159 0.040
0.083 0.084 0.050 0.067 0.045 0.080 0.121
op_educ -0.023 0.044 0.018 0.020 0.064 0.136 0.174
0.084 0.085 0.053 0.073 0.049 0.084 0.134
op_ocup -0.053 -0.003 -0.108 -0.093 -0.119 -0.235 -0.215
0.121 0.099 0.061 0.083 0.055 0.101 0.137
special 0.071 -0.033 0.064 -0.072 -0.078 -0.145 -0.079
0.116 0.113 0.064 0.087 0.059 0.105 0.159
ncr -0.014 0.011 -0.002 -0.008 -0.004 -0.011 0.003
0.015 0.013 0.008 0.012 0.008 0.017 0.026
re 0.149 0.039 0.026 0.038 -0.060 -0.020 -0.129
0.149 0.135 0.084 0.120 0.081 0.156 0.252
rm -0.222 -0.257 -0.422 -0.344 -0.320 -0.352 -0.426
0.164 0.154 0.091 0.127 0.085 0.149 0.235
rn -0.279 -0.312 -0.468 -0.434 -0.393 -0.479 -0.542
0.162 0.141 0.085 0.119 0.082 0.149 0.250
rw -0.107 -0.176 -0.293 -0.277 -0.357 -0.503 -0.592
0.177 0.204 0.120 0.163 0.110 0.200 0.320
imr 0.263 0.513 0.716 0.644 0.541 0.730 0.760
0.266 0.196 0.106 0.144 0.098 0.186 0.157
constant 1.860 1.866 2.522 3.349 3.310 6.293 5.519
0.841 1.317 0.718 0.946 0.652 1.264 1.981
a These results were produced with 134 contract observations obtaining pseudo R 2's of 0.1884,   
0.1956, 0.2383, 0.2560, 0.2767, 0.3411, and 0.3666 for quantiles 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, and 0.9, 
respectively. The dependent variable is variable costs per animal. Standard errors are reported below 
the coefficients.  
Table 16b: Quantile estimates of variable cost for contract growers




 Following the similar 5-step procedure applied in section 8.5 and discussed in 
section 7.3.4.3 of chapter 7, quantile regression estimates of contracting effects are 
obtained and reported in Table 17.  Steps 1 and 2 (computing the appropriate selection 
correction terms, i.e., inverse Mill’s ratios) are performed on the basis of the probit 
regression results reported in Table 5.28 Step 3 (obtaining the predicted quantile profits 
for contract and independent growers) is performed on the basis of the regression results 
presented in Tables 15a, 15b, 16a, and 16b. Step 4 (obtaining the counterfactual quantile 
profits for contract and independent growers using the estimated coefficients from the 
independent and contract profit regressions, respectively) is performed on the basis of the 
results presented in the same set of tables. Finally, Step 5 (estimation of the impact 
measures ATE, ATET, and ATNT at various quantiles) is performed combining the results 
obtained from steps 3 and 4.  
Table 17 presents the impact measures estimated at different quantiles conditional 
on profits. This table reports only the coefficients on the main parameter of interest to this 
study—the quantile treatment effect of contracting for growers. For comparison purposes, 
both estimates at the mean (copied from Table 12) and estimates by quantile regression at 
various quantiles are presented in Table 17.     
Table 17: Quantile regression estimates of the contracting effect
0.1 0.2 0.4 Median 0.6 0.8 0.9
ATE 11.01 44.65 24.53 5.83 1.65 1.39 -50.89 -37.05
ATET 20.50 60.86 34.94 11.82 8.20 11.77 -55.45 -27.30
ATNT -4.51 18.12 7.50 -3.98 -9.07 -15.58 -43.44 -53.02
     Quantiles of the Impact Distribution
Method Mean
 
                                                 
28 Ideally, a probit regression would be performed at each quantile but lack of enough observations to make 
such estimates meaningful forced reliance on a single probit regression for the purpose of two-step quantile 
regressions. 
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 The estimate of ATET is positive for all but the 0.8 and 0.9 quantiles. The estimate 
at the median is $8.20, which is considerably smaller than the estimate at the mean of 
$20.50.  Estimates at the extreme points of the profit distribution are also quite different 
than the impact estimate at the median. The ATET of $60.86 for the 0.1 quantile is 
substantially larger than the median estimate of $8.20, which is substantially larger than 
the estimate of –$27.30 at quantile 0.9. The impact estimates of ATET have an obvious 
pattern whereby estimated impacts decrease over quantiles except for some apparent 
noise in the relationship at quantiles 0.6 through 0.9. This implies that the decreasing 
trend in gains from contracting over profit quantiles is due to an increasing trend in 
reservation profits over quantiles because the average reservation profit is equal to the 
average profit minus ATET.  
 The estimate of ATNT is negative at all but the 0.1 and 0.2 quantiles. The estimate 
at the median is -$9.07 which is smaller than the estimate at the mean of -$4.51.  
Estimates at the extreme points of the profit distribution are also quite different than the 
impact estimate at the median. The ATNT estimate of $18.12 for the 0.1 quantile is 
substantially larger than the median estimate of –$9.07, which is substantially greater 
than the estimate of –$53.02 at quantile 0.9. The impact estimate of ATNT also has a clear 
pattern with estimated impacts decreasing over quantiles. These results imply that the 
decreasing trend in counterfactual gains from contracting for independent growers over 
profit quantiles are due to an increasing trend in the profits they earn as independent 
operations over quantiles.  
In general, these results suggest that the effect of contracting differs across the 
distribution of profits for growers. Contracting has a substantially different effect at the 
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top and bottom of the profit distribution for growers. The prevailing pattern is a decrease 
in impact estimates across profit quantiles. Thus, a general conclusion from Table 17 is 
that contracting has higher benefits not only for smaller growers but also growers toward 
the lower end of their conditional profit distributions.   
 
8.7 Conclusions 
 The various models specified in chapter 7 for estimating mean and quantile 
contracting effects for which empirical analysis supports assumptions have been 
estimated. The results provide a number of important insights regarding the benefits and 
costs of contracting depending on both observable and unobservable differences among 
growers. The results are summarized as follows: 
1. Risk reduction and limited credit availability both appear to be important 
motivations for hog contracting. 
2. The technologies employed by contract and independent growers differ with 
respect to the productivity of individual variable factor inputs.  
3. High ability growers earn higher profits on average than low ability growers 
as predicted by hog contracting theory. 
4. The average effect of contracting for contract growers (ATET) is positive for 
all contract growers as a group, but when contract growers are considered by 
size quartiles, the ATET is positive for lower three quartiles whereas it is 
negative for the highest quartile. 
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5. A positive selection bias is estimated, which tends (because of the effect of 
unobservables) to give contract growers a comparative disadvantage from 
independent operation.  
6. The sorting effect is positive, implying that contract growers tend (because of 
the effect of unobservables) to choose contracting because of a  comparative 
advantage in doing so.  
7. The mean effect of contracting for independent growers (ATNT) is negative, 
suggesting that their choice not to contract is rational. 
8.  The ATET exceeds the ATNT, meaning that independent growers would gain 
less than contract growers had they contracted.  
9. Some 33 percent contract growers receive negative gains from contracting.  
10. Losses from contracting are explained by below average productivity, which 
may not have been anticipated by growers at the time they committed to 
investments in the hog business. 
11. The contracting effect for contract growers, measured by ATET, tends to 
decrease over quantiles of the profit distribution implying that gains from 
contracting are smaller for higher-profit growers. 
12. The contracting effects for independent growers, measured by ATNT, also 
tend to decrease over quantiles of the profit distribution and are negative for 
all but the lowest quantiles. 
13. The results suggest that small growers will be forced either to exit the hog 
business or else expand operations regardless of their contracting status. 
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 The results thus offer a considerably complex explanation of contracting effects 
that highlight heterogeneity of effects among growers. The regression results on which 
these conclusions are based are highly statistically significant, are remarkably consistent 
with economic theory given the number of parameters that are estimated, and offer a 
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